THE
Napoli
Nile Valley
INEVITABLE
Belgrade

Nairobi

Hong Kong
SPECIFICITY
Canary Islands
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OF CITIES

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Edited by ETH Studio Basel

Roger Diener
Jacques Herzog
Marcel Meili
Pierre de Meuron
Manuel Herz
Christian Schmid
Milica Topalović

HOW CITIES ARE INEVITABLY SPECIFIC

Jacques Herzog

CASE STUDIES FOR NAPOLI, NILE VALLEY, BELGRADE, NAIROBI, HONG KONG, CANARY ISLANDS, BEIRUT, AND CASABLANCA

Of course cities are specific—why even say so and why devote an entire book to this topic? Most people naturally regard cities as specific, or at least special, singular, or different. Individual cities are often said to have a specific character—though usually this only reflects an enthusiastic or nostalgic memory of a city's postcard appeal, and certainly reflects a limited or curtailed view of that city.

The aim of this book is not to promote a romantic view of the city, nor a discussion of specificity as a means to argue against globalization. It is not a hymn to contextuality nor is it a plea for the return of the genius loci. This book takes an uncompromising look at cities today in very different parts of the world. It identifies specific characteristics that would not be used on picture postcards for any city. Instead they illustrate a specific profile, like a pattern that affects a particular city and that the city can never escape, because it is constantly regenerating that blueprint.

But cities were always planned to be something very different. They were meant to be ideal—not specific—they were to be perfectly organized and well supplied with all they needed, they were to be ideally oriented according to particular directions of the compass. The notion of ideal also always implied a wider validity, an exemplary applicability, authoritative rightness, timelessness: the grid plans of Greek and Roman antiquity, the Gründungsstädte (foundation towns) of the Middle Ages, the ideal city in the Renaissance, revolutionary utopias in eighteenth- and nineteenth-century France and Russia, the garden city, the Modernist city. . . .

And then globalization loomed into sight. Would it make all cities look the same in the end, indistinguishable—ruthlessly compelling them to follow the commercial force of global brands? But globalization has not ironed out differences; on the contrary it has heightened them. The supposedly equalizing, generic impact of the major brands delivered the coup de grâce to ugly pedestrian zones in the old towns of European cities, but in so doing it had only dealt a blow to those cities in areas that had already lost their vitality.

In other words, where the vivacity and normality of everyday life in the city had already ebbed away, cities start to resemble one another, but in those places where people are actually leading their daily lives, cities are developing distinct and specific differences. It turns out that as the ideal, planned city disintegrates, only then does it become distinctive and specific. But this disintegration is no more than the reemergence and growth of the commonplace, the normal, and the quotidian. The disintegration of the ideal and the formation of the normal is inevitable. It is an expression of the transience of the specific exertion of power over an urbanized territory during the course of its history.

"HOW DO CITIES DIFFER?"
For a long time now, at least since 2003, when we wrote the text "How Do Cities Differ?" we have been preoccupied with the specific. That text from 2002/03 was in a sense an outline theory of the specific city and we have included the original version in this publication because by now it is already "historical," that is to say, upon rereading it, one does not realize what a major, paradigmatic change was on the horizon back then. The years leading up to that point—the late 1970s and

the 1980s—had been colored by a philosophical discourse that placed greater emphasis on the virtual than on reality. Reality was becoming increasingly irrelevant to architectural production and ultimately detachment and frivolity became the hallmarks of numerous projects in the last twenty to thirty years. Reality was not the thing that spurred on the immaterial and virtual beauty of the postmodern thinking of philosophers, architects, and writers on architecture. Reality was a nontopic, unavoidable but not relevant. But reality was to take center stage again. In the form of terrorism it assaulted the hearts of our cities; in the form of the financial crisis it shattered the indestructible self-image of the world of banking. Successive environmental catastrophes and major power outages have highlighted the reality of the surface of the Earth as urbanized nature, as a territory, and not a touch screen that we can control as we like. Numerous books and texts were published by writers who believed that reality had been overcome, that the global city had lifted itself and outpaced its old earthly rivals, that the global city had become a universal, increasingly uniform entity. All those texts have long since disappeared and been forgotten, in the way that most texts about architecture and urbanism disappear much faster than any author can imagine. Why? Because the reality of the city is more complex and incalculable than any description of it, and because cities may develop specific blueprints but are not following the ideologies of those who write about them.

The more we looked at cities and the more closely we looked, we found that although there are many commonalities between cities, what is dissimilar is much more interesting. It is more interesting because the dissimilar reflects the everyday lives of human beings much more tellingly and directly than the commonalities, which, like an underlying grid of sorts, are available to everyone everywhere. The things that all cities have in common are the three fundamental driving forces that account for their existence in the first place and that determine the transformations they undergo during the course of history: territory, power, and difference. The unique interactions of these three vector forces lead to the inevitable specificity that distinguishes one city from another.

EIGHT CASE STUDIES
Examples of the interaction of territory, power, and difference are set out here in the chapters with the case studies of Naples, Nile Valley, Belgrade, Nairobi, Hong Kong, Canary Islands, Beirut, and Casablanca. We selected these cities, rather than others, because they seemed to us most suited. We could just as easily have selected other cities, any other cities. However, initial discussions, sometimes also intuition or personal bias, ultimately led us to the cities described here.

Some places that we examined do not feature in the book—Paris, for one, where we gathered an astonishing wealth of material, but did not manage to present it coherently within the confines of the present publication. The incredible beauty of Paris is the consequence of the specific way that the state has exerted its authority over its territory, which it has done obsessively for hundreds of years, and continues to do, with crystalline precision.

Basel is also missing—the city on our own doorstep, so to speak, which has been a driving force for us, even before the ETH Studio Basel was founded.

We have not included Basel because we have already published numerous studies on it (see Herzog & de Meuron with Rémy Zaugg, "Basel, eine Stadt im Werden?" or Diener, Herzog, Meili, de Meuron, and Schmid, *Switzerland–An Urban Portrait*). In "Basel, eine Stadt im Werden?" we identified precisely those urban patterns that we have since recognized and described as the inevitably specific.

Naples was the first city we chose to visit in our quest to identify and illustrate this "specificity." It seemed to us, that with the deceptive beauty of its position at the foot of a volcano whose fate it shares, for better or for worse, it could be seen as prototypical of the indissoluble, inextricable interplay of territory and power, and the difference that ensues from these two. The urban structures that have arisen in Naples are also visible elsewhere, but nowhere with such precision and clarity. They are seen in various guises in the other cities we studied, all of which have their own specific structures and cityscapes shaped by urban forces ranging from monocultures and mass tourism (Tenerife) to migration (Nairobi) and the collapse of existing power structures (Belgrade).

A TRIANGLE OF SPECIFIC FORCES:
TERRITORY–POWER–DIFFERENCE
Every city is inescapably tied to its own territory. The city affects its territory, but the territory also affects the city. Various forms of power drive these processes during the course of a city's history. Social and political differences are both the cause and the result of the impact of these driving forces. Territory, power, and difference thus come together in a complex construct whose specific vectorial interaction we regard as fundamental to any description of a city today.

The specific interaction of these three vectors is described in a separate text, which arose because we wanted to rigorously reexamine, for our own peace of mind, their validity as the basis for an appropriate and fullest possible description of a city. Interestingly, as we proceeded with this task we came across a more or less forgotten text, "Building–A Process with No Obligations to Heritage Preservation," published by Lucius Burckhardt in 1967.[1] Burckhardt has his own triangle of concepts: politics–man–environment,[2] which almost exactly corresponds to our triangle of power–difference–territory. Lucius Burckhardt's main interest was in a critique of the politics (power) that took urban planning in the wrong direction; this led him to the conclusion that there was a need to plan planning, which, in his view, should be determined both by the environment (nature) and by a fundamentally democratically organized society (man, difference). The concept of specificity that we are expounding in this publication of course does not primarily concern the practice of planning. Our focus is not on potential changes to the planning process but to its specific constraints. This is not a call to resist the changeability of cities and their transformation during the course of history–but it is evidence and proof that the specificity of cities constitutes a complex and stubborn construct that governs their transformation. In that sense, we regard specificity as a concept that is as valid a criterion for the description of the culture of urban living as it is in art or in the realms of science or the economy.

HOW DO CITIES DIFFER?

Jacques Herzog
Pierre de Meuron

At some point it had all been decided: history was finished. Reality was an illusion, a fiction, a simulation. Cities were interchangeable, a blind, indistinguishable backdrop for the one remaining urban activity: shopping. We thought virtualization and simulation would rob cities of their souls, would suck them up in a kind of body-snatching. End of history. Eternal life. But the bodysnatching only happened in the minds of a generation of thinkers and urbanists. What has actually happened? Nature has made a comeback. From nowhere? And terrorism has returned. History is beyond extinction, beyond control. Reality has suddenly become real again. And finite.

Terrorism is not an illusion; it is not a simulation. It has a very real impact on cities and city dwellers. The real damage may be patched up, but the aftershocks keep coming. The source of the shock is combated homeopathically, as it were, by using the same means. Suddenly terrorism is omnipresent, real and mentally, on the streets and in people's minds. The vulnerable beauty of American cities appears more radiant and seductive than ever before, but they have now acquired the museum-like touch of something that has survived. The American city, an urban model from times gone by.

On Sunday, September 27, 2003, much of Italy's power supply collapsed. Rome experienced a *notte nera*, a black night. All of a sudden, and worse still, on the night that was to be a *notte bianca*, a white night of brightly illuminated museums, when their doors were supposed to remain open and their bright lights on. Nature, in all its sublime rawness, quite literally reappeared overnight, a menacing force that people had been lulled into believing was under control.

These forces looming menacingly into view are not running riot on some deserted island far out in the ocean; they have the city in their sights as a platform and a stage, and their intention is to knock it fundamentally off balance. The city is painfully thrown back on its own historicity and reminded of its vulnerability. Urban conglomerates have always been subject to immanent, existential threats: sieges, conflagration, famine, rape, the plague, earthquakes, raids, floods, gangs, unemployment, outages, Mafia.

Every city evolves according to its own specific scenario of threats, which has formed during the course of history and which forces the city into an unmistakable, inescapable configuration. No city has ever succeeded in liberating itself from the real, simulated, and cultivated bonds of its local context in order to reinvent itself. Not even after real and radical catastrophes. On the contrary: the reconstruction of Germany's cities after the war aptly illustrates how much the (ideal) picture that cities had of themselves varied, leading to equally diverse scenarios of reconstruction. A diversity that now became more apparent than in all the previous centuries, before

bombs reduced the cities to the same heaps of rubble. And a diversity that has continued to grow to this day and that uses simulation to shape new urban districts.

Compare Frankfurt and Munich: on the one hand there's Frankfurt with its bourgeois class, its *citoyens*, who have always boldly taken the initiative to push their city forward and to use it as a platform for trade, business, and urban service industries. Munich, on the other hand, has its courtly traditions, its royal family that reinvented the city in the Italian style in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, in effect building a piece of Italy in Germany. Postwar Frankfurt chose to start with a tabula rasa and opted for a vertical skyline; Munich remained loyal to imagery imported from Italian royalty and followed a path of reconstruction and historical simulation. Frankfurt (tabula rasa) vs. Munich (reconstruction, historical simulation): the visible expression of cultural and cultivated differences. It almost seems as if the bombing had brought to light a specific urban character, which had hitherto lain dormant.

And what might be said about Rotterdam or Beirut or Jerusalem's new settlements compared to those in Tel Aviv? Every city cultivates and internalizes defense mechanisms against the deposits of real and imagined threats that have accumulated through time. Baudrillard puts it this way: for want of a real catastrophe, one must resort to simulation to induce equally great or even greater catastrophes.

Mass evacuation, gas attack exercises, barricades, terror/antiterror, Mafia/anti-Mafia. Nuclear-proof shelters sprawling through Switzerland's underground like an invisible replica of aboveground civilization are a characteristically Swiss form of urbanism. Possible only in a country where the withdrawal mentality and the need for security have acquired an almost hysterical reality.

Common to all of these defense strategies and scenarios is their indisputably specific modification of cities. These preventative or restorative interventions persistently change the built reality of a city in concrete terms. A kind of specific substratum forms. This substratum is not immediately recognizable or even visible, because it is not just some folksy detail or decorative afterthought, but a profound history that shapes and programs the artificial and natural topography of the city. As a result, cities are not becoming increasingly similar to each other, more interchangeable or even characterless; on the contrary they are becoming increasingly diverse. They drift inward and immerse themselves in their own worlds. Cities are singular species, with all the attendant fascination, as well as the unbearable and inevitable self-absorption and idiosyncrasy. This specific factor affects and permeates every city. It describes their ugliness and their beauty, their culture, subculture,

and lack of culture, their rise and decline, their real catastrophes and threats as well as their simulation and substitution. The inevitability and finiteness of cities.

FINITE CITY? REAL CITY? SPECIFIC CITY?
"Finite City" sounds too tautological and misleading because it takes to task the apostles of an imminent culture of immortality. "Real City" is ambiguous especially since we are interested only in the physical reality of the city and do not, under any circumstances, want to open the Pandora's box of a discourse on reality. Nor does "Specific City" fit the bill, unless the specifics target the mental morphologies and transformations that are causing cities to become increasingly wrapped up in themselves. Possibly "Idiomorphic City" or "Idiosyncratic City"? Or even "Idiotic City," because we are incapable of grasping this most complex and interesting of all things ever created by human hand? The Ideal City abdicated long ago, as did Aldo Rossi's Rational City and Rem Koolhaas's Generic City and Venturi's Strip. Not to mention Le Corbusier's Ville Radieuse. Lest there should be any misunderstanding: All of these attempts to describe the city, to comprehend and reinvent it, were not only necessary; they made sense. But today, they leave us cold. They do not relate to us because they refer to a world that is no longer ours. The time has come to relinquish our longing for labels, to abandon manifestos and theories. They don't hit the mark; they simply brand the author for life. There are no theories of cities; there are only cities.

All cities have one thing in common: their decline and ultimate disappearance. This one factor unmistakably shared by all cities paradoxically fosters the potential for fundamental difference. This difference no longer rests on the efforts of city planners. If today's planners want to contribute to the transformation of cities, they have to become accomplices and confidantes of the potential of threat. In even more pointed terms, they should adopt the single-mindedness and accuracy of the terrorists. They will have to be unbiased in their work, ignoring taboos and theories alike, and, as we have seen, inscrutable. Their work will have to address the physical, built reality of the city, where the life of the city is as unmistakably manifest as climate fluctuations are on the drilled cores of polar scientists. And it is there—in the physical body of the city—that those neuralgic spots are hidden, the "punctum" that Barthes talks of in his discussion of photography and that Baudrillard, with reference to the Twin Towers, has called "worthy" targets.

When the Twin Towers were struck with the precision of a surgical operation, the bumbling helplessness of contemporary urban construction was instantly made manifest. Hardly ever do urban projects truly impact and change cities; they serve only to preserve the status quo. They merely multiply what is already there. Urban construction today does not address Barthes's punctum nor any worthy targets; it simply ensues wherever there happens to be a vacant plot. Even so, there are Twin Towers in every city and their destruction affects urban dwellers everywhere. Terrorists see the destruction of symbols; urban dwellers see a massive attack on their neighborhoods and their homes. The specific, the unique, that which distinguishes us from others, the indestructible have proved vulnerable: we have to protect ourselves. Over and again. But how? The best protection would be to aspire to "indistinguishability," the "Indistinguishable City." And that is the greatest illusion of all.

SPECIFICITY: TERRITORY, POWER, AND DIFFERENCE

Marcel Meili

CONCEPTS: POWER, TERRITORY, AND DIFFERENCE

At ETH Studio Basel the description of cities is always founded on perception. Our aim is to understand the physical reality of what we are seeing: built structures, transformation, life as it is lived in built structures. In recent projects we have sought to gain a better understanding of cities by increasingly turning our attention to the ground, to the area, to the territory of cities, because this is where we have encountered particularly telling expressions of the difference between cities. These observations have led us to turn our attentions to another important concept: power. For the development of urban territories has always gone hand in hand with the exercise of various forms of power over the surrounding area, and today the exertion of political, economic, and social power still forms the basis of the territorial transformation of the environs of major cities. We have therefore learned to read the surfaces of territories like a sensitive skin, in which the specific patterns of urban transformation leave their mark with almost dermatological precision. This specificity also expresses the internal differences by which cities develop an important part of their own identity. Differences—even before borders and networks—were the main focus in our portrait of forms of urbanity in Switzerland (*Switzerland—An Urban Portrait*). Now two more concepts have come to the fore, which already implicitly influenced the organization of our portrait of Switzerland: power (which previously featured in the form of accentuated federalism) and territory (which previously featured as the urbanism of quiet zones, Alpine fallow lands, and resorts). The supporting roles alongside this group of concepts are still played by the other two key concepts in our portrait of Switzerland: borders and networks, as the basis of the organization of territory.

VECTORS

Although we consistently use these concepts (territory, differences, and power) as the framework for our descriptions of cities, these categories should not be regarded as immutable patterns of cities, but rather as vectors, as directional energies so to speak, with which a city strives for its own identity in the areas encompassed by these concepts. In our descriptions of particularities, we aim to identify the unmistakable configurations of the vectors for each city. And even if it may initially seem that each of these concepts has its own independent realm of meanings, we will show that in reality they are mutually interdependent and that every particular combination of vectors underpins patterns of specificity. The structure of the territory of Casablanca, for instance, cannot be described without taking into account the ordering power of the king; for Naples territory, account has to be taken of the Camorra. And it is in their interaction that these vectors create an unmistakable urban form. If, then, there is in fact a connection between the three concepts we are focusing on, they then open into a shared realm in their

background, where the vectors, as directional energies, form a particular spatial image: specificity. Hong Kong, for instance, has a unique connection to the natural formation of its topog-raphy, whose special characteristics has pushed it already from the earliest days of the regulative influence of the British authorities, to engage in state-led (implemented by the colonial powers) "territorial engineering." The ensuing settlements built in that landscape and the inertness of the ground itself without doubt constitute the most striking singularities of Hong Kong and still dominate its development today. We take the view that these three concepts cover the essential factors in urban transformation in the world today and it is their particular interconnection in different situations that gives rise to the specific profile of any city today. Moreover, it is our thesis that the main features of the specifics of cities today can be described in terms of the interaction of these three factors.

TERRITORY

Let us start with the category that, due to the history of its terminology, is perhaps easiest to grasp but that we have, with good reason, discussed in different terms: territory—which we have also variously referred to as environment, nature, landscape, or ground. Territory, as we see it, is a possibly large area whose concrete form, structure, and meaning can only be understood through its concentrated interaction with an urban center embedded in it. This interaction is underpinned by complex territorial networks (for example, transportation, economic controls, energy procurement), whose hubs are located in the city as the center of that territory. In our view, the particular characteristics of this territory—be these conditions arising from its natural landscape or the territory's confiscated original vernacular, economic, or social organization—are active in shaping the urban center. The territory has a lot to do with assertion or even occupation, and as such is closely tied into the matter of power. *Territory* thus encompasses, in the widest sense, the geographical area of an analytical survey of the impact of a city—its magnitude, in a sense. It includes the basis of the topographical noninterchange-ability of the city as well as the constraints exerted on it by nature. This realm is geographical, because as a rule—due to its size and morphology—it cannot be grasped in architectural terms but only in terms of pacing its dimensions. And territory also covers the area where a city exerts its typical influence on the countryside and organizes its traditional cultural, social, and economic stock, as well as its nature—where it turns "countryside" into city. Every city evolves its own, unique processes for these matters, with the result that a city's appropriation of its hinterland is a very productive category for defining the particularity of that city. It is more than anything else an expression of its specific urbanism.

TERRITORY AS "SECOND NATURE"

In Naples, a city with a very extensive territory, the geographical conditions in the shape of the constant threat from the volcano, have determined the basic structure of its growth, which has been largely informal and outside of the state's guidelines on land use. At the same time there appears to be a strong link between the various levels that determine urban transformation: basically almost all cities, including Naples, tend to turn their natural surroundings and the architectural manifestation of their territory into a form of second nature and to integrate this into their physis as a henceforth barely alterable manifestation (after Lefebvre). The transformed, urbanized environs of the city that once constituted the natural foundations of the city, now–as a "cultivated," built entity–almost appear natural compared to the urbanized landscape of the city; "cultural nature" that has become a reality, so to speak, in the form of an urban topography with "naturalized" artifacts that now materially impact on or even start to shape the city. Topographical changes, infrastructure, strongholds, or major buildings are thus perceived as the cultural landscape of the city. At the same time, an important role is played by the fact that as classical territorial activities relating to agri-culture, energy, transportation, the military, defense against natural threats, and tourism drive the historical transformation of a territory into its present form, a multitude of revealing physical relics are left behind (changes in the terrain, signs of culture, built structures) that become part of a second nature–in the sense that the cultural roots of their history have seemingly sunk into oblivion. In the case of Naples, in the way that this city has taken possession of its surroundings and its natural backdrop, we therefore see the special, "unique" transformation of its surroundings into a second nature. The suburbs–all those informal settlements–seem like rocky outcrops around the city. The sluggish movements of the settlements start to take on the air of biological processes. Their forms seem barely controllable any longer, but the culture deposited in the city's second nature is an indispensable part of the form of the city and one of the fundamental hallmarks of urban specificity.

SPECIFIC FORMS OF THE URBAN APPROPRIATION OF TERRITORIES

Like other instances of the appropriation of nature, the structure of the area around Naples is so singular that it almost seems like the city's own unmistakable fingerprint. It is not unusual that the nature of a city's surroundings becomes the core of the distinc-tiveness of that city, as in Venice or New York, for example, and as mentioned, in Hong Kong. In other cases it is the sociocultural or economic methods a city uses to respond to the particularities of its territorial conditions, the way that it intervenes in and reorders the traditional types of settlement and the economic structures of its territory. Naturally this form of confiscation is very often connected with agriculture and the need for food. Casablanca is such an example: in its efforts to achieve a sociological and economic balance, it has integrated into its own metropolitan structures numerous rural, agrarian, social, and cultural traditions practiced by immigrants to the city. In Havana, an urbanity barely accepted due to the revolution, it is even the case that the techniques designed to promote the development of the country (and its agriculture, being the main focus of the revolution) have also dominated the regime's few initiatives concerning urban transformation. In Havana the countryside has a presence in the city that might only be matched by few cities in the world. In Belgrade centralized control over the territory has somewhat dissipated: society there has, with considerable resourcefulness, largely come up with its own rules of occupation. In the elemental force of these occupation oper-ations some nature-like traits of society come into play–alongside techniques learned elsewhere by returning immigrants.

All methods of territorial appropriation have one thing in common: they introduce urban features into the territory, which then enter into a direct, mutually dependent relationship with the city. This ensues as various established, ultimately autonomous, modes of existence (such as agriculture, transportation, tourism, industry) that used to peacefully coexist in the countryside start to enter into complex relationships with one another or are driven toward this complexity by the center. And in that moment, in our definition, the countryside becomes urban, because differences start to emerge and to have an interactive effect. The city's erstwhile rural antithesis is no more.

TERRITORY AS A COMPONENT IN URBAN SPECIFICITY

The territory of a major city therefore is also city, it is part of the city's identity, as for example its old town. The form and order of the territory also constitute an unmistakable urban manifestation; in other words, the city goes far beyond "the city as a built place." The material and economic organization of the territory reflects the full complexity of the processes used by a city to transform "nature" or "hinterland" into "city." Much of this leaves its mark in the form of changes in the terrain, for instance, or in the cultivation of nature and in built structures. But perhaps even more so than in the built city, the character of a territory is revealed above all in the patterns of the social, cultural, and economic organization of these places: *espace vécu*, lived space, as Lefebvre put it. And the concept of territory also highlights the inescapability of the relationship of a city to the natural conditions of its territory; there are no technical or other, urbanistic means of any kind that a city can use to escape its geographical location. A territory is therefore a zone that can be described in concrete terms. It covers the area within which a city has, over the years, developed its own way of engaging with nature and history, where it has established its influence, has optimized

its urban economy, and—in order to contain potential conflicts—has synchronized its internal social structures with those of the territory. However, inevitably politics also manifests itself on the territory, since the appropriation or occupation of space occurs in competition with other urban systems or other territorial bodies. Against this competitive background, the efficiency of a city's appropriation processes are decisive factors in its success. Territory therefore involves forceful seizure and, as such, always raises the question of power as well as the methods of appropriation and economic organization.

We thus use the word *territory* to describe both the natural influence of a place on its settlement and the typical features of the individual form of the confiscation of that place by the society settling there. There is perhaps no clearer expression of the specificity of a city than the way in which it occupies its territory. It is of course possible to use these criteria to describe every form of human settlement in the landscape. However, at a certain point in the highly specialized formation and shaping of territory in these urban landscape structures, a critical mass of differentiation emerges that is only possible under the influence of an intricately structured, urban society. And at this point the territory of the city is no longer external, but an integral part of its existence and an unmistakable part of its urban form.

DIFFERENCE

With this reference to the differentiation of territory, another concept that is intrinsic to our definition of the city makes a return appearance: difference. Aside from our reading of urban situations, this concept is both comprehensive and decisive.

The first point to make here is that the term *difference*, as we use it in our portrait of Switzerland, should not be confused with *specificity*. Differences constitute an internal form of urban stratification: the urbanity of a city may be measured against its ability not only to withstand its internal differentiations, but also to use these internal differences in combination with one another as a motor to drive its own development. *Difference*, in the present context, thus refers both to sociological stratification as well as urban potential, for instance, in the creation of economic diversity and cultural wealth through the interference of differences. Whereas *specificity* refers to the formation of the individual characteristics of one entire city compared to other cities, the formation of internal differentiations also encompasses the individuation of single subjects or entire groups within urban society, like the genetic code of a city. In many cases the potential of this differentiation will be crucial to the formation of successful patterns of urban development for the whole city and, as such, a driving force for specificity, without being the same thing as specificity. In that respect the formulation of differences in a city becomes a key issue, since these determine which social energies can be combined to exploit the dynamic energy of differences and to promote their active input into urban transformation with the ultimate aim of urban individuation, that is to say, specificity.

Illustrative instances for the thesis of the key role of the interplay of differences for a city are seen in New York, Tenerife, and Beirut. New York is the epitome of a city that has made difference the core of its global identity. Tenerife has taken the opposite path. In the island, resort functions have been disentangled to such an extent that no qualities can ensue from contact between differences such as gated communities and local support services. By contrast in Beirut the tensions arising from its differences are so extreme that immense efforts have to be made to neutralize explosive friction between different zones; since the war the city has scarcely been able to draw any urban benefits from the wealth of cultures within it.

In terms of territory, the matter of difference is a key criterion for the urban transformation of the land around a city. Whereas functions and lifestyles in the countryside have traditionally coexisted in a relatively inert manner, rarely locking horns, it is the center that connects these various traditional forms of existence with one another and thus enhances their effectivity and enriches the countryside with difference structures that urbanize the territory. The interweaving of differences is the city's main method of urbanizing and annexing the countryside. The introduction of new forms of marketing of foodstuffs in the city of Havana is thus also a step toward the urbanization of agriculture.

In the modern city the economy, and hence the division of labor, are in all likelihood the main driving forces of internal differentiation. As we see it, specificity is backed by a coalition of different social energies that seek to give the city as a whole a collective identity comprising a range of distinguishing characteristics. The necessity to construct an urban profile increases in the global rivalry with other cities. This aspect of combined differences is of importance, because it is also in the differences that the divergent, anarchic traits of an urban society come to the fore, traits that may proliferate to the extent that they are no longer containable and could endanger the unity of the city. The way that a city deals with differences, the productive siphoning-off of the potential of differences—also by means of power structures—is thus the second specific fingerprint that may be used to describe the identity of an urban fabric. And in that sense, differences within any urban fabric have both a dangerous and a desirable character.

POWER

Territory thus paves the way for both of the other terms, *power* and *difference*, because it is only the interplay of power and difference that drives the transformation of nature and local, rural culture into a second nature. Without this transformation the territory would never be anything other than just countryside, the land around the city. It is only its transformation into a second nature that turns the territory into part of the city.

The term in this process of transformation that is hardest for us to define is *power*, because in so doing we find ourselves entering the realms of the highly complex, complicated history of this concept. We are using the term *power* here in a very narrow sense, as the factor that holds together the divergent forces of the differences in the city and that, in certain circumstances, even gives them form. With regard to territory, the power vector is the decisive criterion, in that it not only gives this area a form and a structure, it also makes it accessible and effective for the city. With a certain exaggeration, it could be said that power, in the context of the territory, is nothing other than the management of differences with the aim of reinforcing the center by urbanizing the landscape. Central power is the prerequisite for almost every attempt of a city to order and structure its territory. In one sense power in the city comprises the organizational, social energy that strives toward form. The modern metaphor for this is planning.

The power that emerges in a city as a form-giving force is usually, albeit not exclusively, in the hands of the state. In many cases power is in fact the necessary precondition for urban form, since by definition it seeks to rein in and neutralize the diverging forces of different interests within the city. The failure of this complex endeavor shows the common malfunctions of planning, whereas the grand formal gestures in the history of urban construction have often been an expression of the degree of an absolute concentration of power in the hands of the aristocracy.

Lastly, in connection with power, another basic concept in our definition of urbanity returns to the discussion: the border. As a consequence of the impact of the center the borders within a territory tend to fade away, to disintegrate, leaving diffuse zones between various levels of difference, because this interchange increases the effectivity of differences for the city: a typically urban concept of what a border is. Gentrification is one of these border-erosions. Regarding the city's delimitation toward the exterior however there is a different situation. Here the aim of urban power is, on behalf of the center, to extend the territory as far outward as possible, and the center defends this area against any claims upon it coming from other centers. This archaic-seeming confrontation between urban powers also typifies the vectorial impact of cities in rivalry today.

Power is not sui generis inevitably directed against difference. On the contrary, differences can form the basis of power systems. Since power organizes the balance of differences, it sometimes even creates differences in order to stabilize its own position. However, power is most definitely directed against the proliferating, anarchic, uncontrollable aspects of difference. And this duality is crucial to our argument. There is one particular configuration of power that, in most cases, makes it possible for complex social and urban patterns to develop in the first place, but it is also "power" that is constantly caught up in an existential struggle with the individual and collective forces that are seeking out uncontrolled ways to organize their individual or social existences: in other words, where people, regardless of their physical existence, are "urging" for individuation. The structuring and transformation of a territory by a city is inextricably intertwined with various manifestations of power. Almost always, stubborn, regressive forces hold sway in those territories, because the balance that has evolved there on the basis of village life only did so slowly and over very long periods of time. The urbanization of territories requires immense determination.

In a certain sense the city is therefore a particularly finely calibrated reflection of the impact and organization of power. Any attempt to uncover the specificity in this force field involves laying bare the vectorial forces that have the capacity to generate and establish identity-creating forms for a city, that will promote its success in this place and time. In many cases the organization of that power system becomes a decisive component in the formation of differences and specificities.

THE INTERPLAY OF TERMS

Following this outline it should be at least possible to imagine these three terms conditioning one another and what they can in effect describe of a city. Basically the construct is rather trivial, but perhaps for that same reason it may also be effective: the city has the size of its territory. In order to engage with or incorporate it into the urban organism, various urban power strategies concerned with the organization of space are set in motion. However, these power structures, today generally in the form of planning, are also at work in the core city, in order to extract at least a modicum of form from the transformation of the city. The driving force behind this genesis of form is the interaction of internal differences, the social, cultural, and economic stratifications of the city. And that raises our underlying question: what methods of implementation of specific urban form does this city develop in this place, with its existing historical and environmental conditions?

NAPOLI, ITALY

Jasmine Kastani
Christian Schmid

BEAUTY AND THREAT

Naples is located in a landscape of striking beauty. This beauty is the result of volcanic forces that have shaped the landscape over long periods, and are still continuing to shape it. The earth around Naples is in constant movement and therefore highly dangerous. The danger though, is not of nature in itself, but because the population has started to move into the dangerous zones and to settle there permanently. For the longest time people did not know of the danger that lurks underneath the ground. Time and again they rebuilt the areas that previously had been destroyed by volcanic activities. Even though scientific exploration of volcanism, which started at Vesuvius in the Age of Enlightenment, has steadily enlarged our knowledge of these dangers, it never had any immediate consequences for urbanization. Over the years settlements continued to encroach on the volcano. Eventually an urban belt has developed that, with its own second nature, encounters and confronts the first nature of the volcano. While the first nature remains in invisible and unpredictable movement, the second nature as built fabric has petrified to a stiff surface that cannot react to these movements anymore. Should Vesuvius erupt again, this petrified crust will rip apart and entail unimaginable destruction.

This specific dealing with nature has created an area of tension between beauty and threat that is not given by nature in itself, but is a result of the way urbanization is regulated. Illegality, and hence the widespread breaching of rules and regulations that allows for higher profits, has to be understood as a constituting element of the planning system of the Naples region. Frequent amnesties show that illegality has become a permanent component of territorial regulation. Accordingly criminal organizations such as the

Camorra are playing a vital role in the process of urbanization. One consequence is the dumping of highly toxic waste by the Camorra in the outskirts of Naples. The dangers of the Vesuvius have hence been overlaid in recent years by a second threat, though this time entirely man-made.

1 Naples and Vesuvius

NAPOLI, ITALY

VIEW FROM THE TOP

The volcano is dormant. Only a thin trail of smoke and faint smell of sulfur are evidence of the forces that operate underground. The gaze turns from the dark basalt rock formation and the debris fields of the crater toward the west, where a breathtaking view opens onto the bay: from the peninsula of Sorrento to the islands of Capri, Ischia, and Procida, to the Campi Flegrei (Phlegraean Fields) and finally to Naples, with its harbor, its dense, historic city center, the functionalist high-rise buildings of the new center near the train station and the far-reaching chaotic zones of urban development in the plains of Campania to the north. On the other side of the volcano, the valley of the Sarno River is almost fully covered by buildings and greenhouses, and further back, the ridges of the Monti Picentini are lost in haze. Along the volcano's slopes dense settlements with narrow and irregular streets stretch until the sea. Somewhere within this clutter of buildings one can just about make out the ruins of Pompeii, explored by thousands of visitors every day. Tourists photograph one another among the ruins and the petrified remnants of ancient inhabitants, caught in a death struggle, that have been excavated from the ashes of Herculaneum. Closer to the peak lies Boscotrecase, a functionalistic settlement where hundreds of families from the region of Pozzuoli who became homeless in the earthquake of 1980 have been settled. Villas and hotels dot the area further up, giving way to forest and blossoming bushes surrounding the bleak peak of the volcano's crater. Only a short distance above the last houses, in the midst of vineyards, one can recognize a haphazardly covered deposit: a waste disposal site that triggered violent protests in Terzigno when its reopening was prepared in October 2008. For several days the local population blocked the only access to the site, resulting in growing garbage heaps on the streets and squares of Naples, as so often in recent years.

Legend:
- 37.000 BC
- 3760 BC
- 79 AD
- 472
- 472–1631
- 1631
- 1697
- 1754
- 1760
- 1771
- 1805
- 1822
- 1839
- 1847
- 1858
- 1867
- 1870–72
- 1895–99
- 1903
- 1906
- 1929
- 1944

2 Lava layers from various eruptions

THE VOLCANO AS TRANSFORMER OF THE TERRITORY

Vesuvius is one of the most active volcanoes in Europe 2. Generations of scholars and scientists have explored and investigated the disturbances and eruptions of this area, where the Eurasian and the African tectonic plates are colliding. Large parts of the Bay of Naples, including the Campi Flegrei and the islands of Ischia and Procida, are the results of volcanic activity. Only the peninsula of Sorrento and the Isle of Capri are nonvolcanic, since they are offshoots of the Apennines.

The environment of Naples is in constant motion 3. Volcanoes began to erupt some 300,000 years ago. In ancient times, two large cones dominated the bay, rising to a height of about 1800 m. Between 35,000 and 12,000 years ago, several powerful eruptions wrecked the western volcano; its summit collapsed and left behind the plain of the Campi Flegrei—"the burning fields," where only fumes and bubbling mud pots remain—and where the ancient Greeks and Romans believed the entrance to the underworld is situated. The remaining eastern cone formed the volcano Mount Somma. During the past 25,000 years, several heavy explosions destroyed the crest and left behind a caldera, a large central hollow 4. The Romans called this volcano Vesuvius.[1]

From ancient times there has existed an intrinsic relationship between human settlements and the volcano. The original rural wealth of Campania was owed to fertile soils weathered from the ash and lavas. "Neapolis" (the "new city") was founded by Greek colonists, around 800 BC, as an offshoot of an older settlement. In 326 BC the town became a Roman colony, respected as a hub that transmitted Hellenistic culture. At the time, Campania was one of the most splendid regions of the empire, famous for the beauty of the landscape and the convenient climate: the Apennines protected the region from the north winds in winter, and the breeze from the Mediterranean Sea tempered the heat in summer. The fertile volcanic soil supported a rich and diversified agriculture with farm animals, vineyards, and gardens. Market towns, ports, and resorts flourished, and even many emperors decided to reside there. Vacation villas were built at the seaside, creating the illusion that a single city was stretching out along the coastline.[2]

This world was suddenly interrupted with the eruption of Vesuvius in 79 AD, which destroyed Pompeii and Herculaneum. This outburst is one of the most famous eruptions in the history of volcanology. It was the most powerful of all types of eruptions, now known as a Plinian eruption. Pliny the Elder, an important author, naturalist, and natural philosopher, was the most prominent victim of this eruption; his nephew, Pliny the Younger, observed the eruption and gave the first precise account of volcanic activity in history. After the eruption, the landscape was completely devastated. The top of the volcano formed a huge elliptic hole, stretching about 5 km from east to west and 3.5 km from north to south. An area of about 300 km[2] had been turned into a zone of horror, burned down and buried under lava and pyroclastic flows, ashes, and pumice; thousands of people vanished.[3]

After a long period of rest, further eruptions between 787 and 1139 built up a new, clearly distinct cone, rising from the bottom of the old caldera. Mount Somma, the old cone, was reduced to the northern rim, while subsequent eruptions have almost buried the lower southern rim of the caldera. Thus, the topography of the area found its present form: the partly destroyed old Mount Somma, and the new cone, which is today called Vesuvius.[4]

3 Movements of the earth: The Naples area forms a zone of complex movements of Earth's crust, where four plates are colliding. While the margin of the African plate is pushing north-westward and plunging beneath Sicily and Calabria in a vast subduction zone, the plate of the Tyrrhenian Sea is moving to the southeast, and the small Adriatic and Apulian plates are moving westward. Caught between these force fields, the Apennines have been folded, and the Italian peninsula as a whole has turned in a counter-clockwise motion. Fracture zones are reaching down to Earth's mantle; along the cracks, the blocks of the crust are moving against one another, causing sometimes strong earthquakes and volcanic eruptions, especially in the southern part of Italy. Mainly three volcanic systems are still active: Etna, the Aeolian Islands, and the volcanoes of Campania. The latter are the youngest of the Italian peninsula, and they display the greatest variety of volcanic activities.[5]

4 Stages in the growth of Vesuvius
1. 16,500 BC
2. After the 79 AD eruption
3. Present state

THE VOLCANO AND THE CITY

5 *Vesuvius after the Eruption* (1633), by Giovanni Battista Mascolo

6 *The Eruption of Mt. Vesuvius* (1771), by Pierre-Jacques Volaire

7 *The Eruption of Vesuvius in 1774*, by Jacob Hackert

8 *Vesuvius from Portici* (c. 1774–76), by Joseph Wright of Derby

9 *The Eruption of Vesuvius as seen from Naples, October 1822*, by G. Julius Poulett Scrope. Lithography published by V. Day & Sons, 1864. This was one of five explosive Subplinian eruptions which have occurred since the 1631 eruption. The eruption column rose up to a height of about 14 km.

In the following centuries Vesuvius remained quiet, and the inside of the crater was filled with vegetation. In the fifteenth century, Naples developed into the third-largest city in Europe, with a population of around 350,000. The fertile land and favorable climate made the region an El Dorado, with olive trees, vineyards, fruit trees, pastures, and gardens, which formed the economic base for wealthy towns, where the nobility had built ostentatious mansions. This flourishing world was suddenly interrupted in 1631 when Vesuvius, after centuries of repose, burst again into a Plinian eruption 5. It cleared the main vent of the volcano, the crest collapsed, and the cone lost around 500 m in height. The column of ashes soared 21 km into the sky, pyroclastic flows swept down the volcano's southern flanks, and lahars and floods razed the northern flanks. Large parts of the surrounding areas were devastated: between 4,000 and 10,000 people were killed, many towns suffered great damage, and falling ash and pyroclastic flows also ruined the countryside, woodland, and orchards.[6]

The following centuries were marked by irregular but intense activity, frequent eruptions of lava flows, ash, and cinders, providing an almost permanent spectacle for observers and visitors 6–9, which gave an important boost to the tourist sector. The marvelous landscape, topped by the permanent fireworks of the volcano, together with the historical sites of Herculaneum and Pompeii that were excavated in 1738 and 1748, made Naples one of the most glamorous tourist destinations of the time.

The fate of Naples changed after the unification of Italy in 1861. The former wealthy capital of the kingdom of two Sicilies lost many of its functions and jobs, as most of the people had worked in the bureaucratic sector or as servants for the nobility. The subsequent declining financial situation hindered further productive investments. In the early 1880s a series of cholera epidemics struck the city. The degradation of the living conditions and high unemployment led to a mass emigration movement—a very unusual phenomenon for the cities of that time. Emigration continued also in the early twentieth century, when efforts to industrialize the region were hindered by corruption and the absence of an efficient infrastructure.[7]

Until 1906, the cone of Veusvius grew again. Subsequent eruptions damaged the uppermost part and reduced it to a height of 1281 m. Since the last eruption in 1944, the volcano has undergone a dormant period. This is not a sign for optimism for the future, however. The longer the volcano remains dormant, the more explosive it might be.[8]

10 Vesuvius today

11 Portici

12 Torre del Greco

13 Torre Annunziata

14 Boscotrecase

URBANIZATION OF VESUVIUS

The period after World War II was marked by a retarded industrialization and strong migration from the southern part of Italy to the much more industrialized northern part, and also the northern countries such as Germany, Switzerland, and Belgium. In Naples, the loss of population was more than compensated for by immigration from rural areas. Naples was already very densely populated, and urbanization turned to the periphery, thus creating strong urban sprawl, especially in the northern part, toward Caserta, and in the area around Vesuvius. In this rapid, chaotic, and often illegal urbanization, urban settlements more and more approached the volcano. Between 1951 and 1991, the population living in the 18 municipalities situated around Vesuvius increased from about 353,000 to 583,000, and the number of houses in the area more than doubled from 73,000 to 176,000.[9] Urban space was forming a ring that encircled the entire volcano, and even proliferated higher and higher up the cone.

Urbanization around Vesuvius shows many different characteristics. Along the well-connected coastline between Naples and Torre Annunziata developed a highly complex and very dense urban fabric, forming a kind of linear city. Toward the sea, a number of towns like Portici, Ercolano, and Torre del Greco 11–13 had grown over the centuries, and had long been seen as independent towns. They have a very dense, built-up structure, with narrow and angled streets and small ports. In between and above these towns, large villas with gardens had been built since the eighteenth century. Later, most of these gardens were filled with houses. In the last decades, the region was oriented more and more toward Naples, developing toward a kind of an urban belt that belongs to the most densely populated areas in Europe. Living conditions in this area are sometimes difficult; it does not offer many jobs and services, and the daily commute to Naples results in chronic traffic jams. Toward the slopes of Vesuvius, less dense settlements with villas and detached houses are stretching out, nicely situated within the idyllic scenery and often with a beautiful view over the Bay of Naples. In the upper part, a series of hotels and restaurants were built in recent years. The area looks like a peaceful and privileged residential zone, despite the fact that it is marked by strong social differences.

The area to the southeast of Vesuvius, around Pompeii and in the Pianura Sarnese, is different in character. It forms an amorphous urban zone that nonetheless conserves local peculiarities. Cultivated fields, orchards, and vineyards surround

15, 16 Settlement areas around Vesuvius, 79 AD and 2012

centers such as Boscotrecase, Boscoreale, and Terzigno 14, while San Giuseppe Vesuviano and Ottaviano are increasingly surrounded by industrial and commercial activities. In contrast, the area behind Vesuvius, north of Mount Somma, is much less densely settled. It is furrowed by deep valleys covered by extended woodlands alternating with orchards and vineyards, and still forms agrarian landscapes with rustic villas, chapels, shrines, and rural houses. The small towns in this area with medieval origins are decidedly different from those of Roman origin found along the seaside.[10]

In the last twenty years, urban development in the Vesuvius area considerably slowed down. The region of Naples still suffers the consequences of the lasting deindustrialization process that started with the deep economic crisis in the 1970s and proliferated during the following decades. Until today, the economy of Naples never fully recovered, and the unemployment rate for young people is very high. As a consequence, the population in the area around Vesuvius decreased, notably in the overcrowded areas along the coast, resulting in a total population loss of about 70,000 between 1991 and 2011. Nevertheless, urbanization continued in the region, strongly driven by illegal construction. Between 1991 and 2001 the number of houses still increased by about 6 percent in the Vesuvius region, resulting in a kind of "wild" urbanization that scatters over more and more parts of the territory 16. Many of the illegal and semi-legal buildings often don't meet the usual norms and safety standards and are particularly vulnerable to possible volcanic events.[11]

THE RED ZONE

For a long time, the danger coming from volcanic activity was ignored, despite the fact that eruptions have destroyed many settlements. They were often rebuilt as soon as the ashes cooled down. Torre del Greco was partly destroyed in 1631, 1737, 1794 and 1861, and San Sebastiano al Vesuvio was rebuilt over the lavas that destroyed parts of the old town in 1944.[12] Reports and studies on the volcanic activities of Vesuvius stretch back for two thousand years and have given us some of the most important scientific findings of volcanology. However, the first discussions about an emergency plan only started after the eruption of 1872. The plan has proven as ineffective as the plans from 1906 and 1944 that were established after eruptions but never applied in reality.

In 1995 the Dipartimento della Protezione Civile published the first national emergency plan for Vesuvius. This plan can be seen as a result of the joint efforts of volcanologists, architects, planners, and social scientists in raising public awareness on the danger that is lurking below the surface. It takes as its baseline the Plinian eruption of 1631, identifies three areas of different hazards, and consequently defines three different risk zones 13, 18. It provides that the red zone of Vesuvius, with a population of around 500,000 people, has to be completely evacuated before an eruption occurs. However, the warning time before a possible eruption is very short. Original plans counted almost one week for the evacuation of the population. Later this time span was reduced to three days. Actual calculations consider twenty-four hours or even twelve hours as the maximum warning time for potentially dangerous events.[13]

The basic idea of the plan from 1995 was to evacuate people according to a complicated strategy utilizing buses, trains, and boats. However, the plan received strong criticism for its inadequacy: The rails might be damaged by earthquakes that often occur before an eruption, and the urban areas surrounding the ports are so densely built and the streets so narrow, that congestion and traffic jams would make evacuation almost impossible. Finally, the plans were adapted to these criticisms, and now propose an evacuation only by buses. But the new plan is still confronted with serious questions: The labyrinth of narrow roads around Vesuvius, already congested on normal days, could become a trap; streets might be slippery because of ashes and rain, or completely blocked, by lava, mudflows, or traffic accidents. Furthermore, it is in no way plausible that frightened inhabitants will follow in a disciplined way the official orders, and that finally all the inhabitants of the areas in danger could escape in the short time span between the first signs of alert and the possible volcanic outbreak.

Zones affected by an outburst of vesuvius
- Red zone of Vesuvius
- Red zone of Campi Flegrei
- Blue zone
- Yellow zone
- Urban settlements

17 Risk zones: The plan of 1995 identified three different risk zones: blue, yellow, and red. The delimitation of the zones is not following precisely the areas of expected risk but includes entire municipalities as the zoning serves as a planning tool. The red zone of Vesuvius encompassing 18 municipalities and a population of around 500,000 people, faces the greatest danger, since it includes the immediate area surrounding the volcano. It could be affected by the immediate impact of volcanic hazards with huge destructive forces such as pyroclastic flows and lava. The red zone of Campi Flegrei is an area affected by the bradyseismic events of new volcanic eruptions. The yellow zone is less dangerous than the red but potentially affected by the expected fallout of ash and lapilli with the possibility of the collapse of roofs, damage to agriculture, and problems for air traffic, railways, and roads. The blue zone corresponds to the valley of Nola, which faces the same dangers as the yellow zone, but may be additionally affected by floods.[14]

Parco Nazionale del Vesuvio
Red zone of Vesuvius

18 The Red Zone

LIVING ON DANGEROUS GROUND

<u>19</u> Eruption of Vesuvius in 1944

The volcano as such is not dangerous and not a threat—its possible eruption is just the result of geophysical forces without any intention. The danger and the threat only arrive when people are approaching the area in motion. In view of all the difficulties to evacuate the people, it might be more appropriate to completely stop further construction in the whole area.

However, all attempts to stop or at least slow down construction in the danger zone have failed almost completely, and any legislation trying to restrict further development of the area is strongly challenged by illegal construction, which has a long history in the area, as in many other parts of Italy. It started already in the 1960s, and intensified after the devastating earthquake in Campania of 1980 that caused the death of more than 2,700 people and made 300,000 people homeless. The construction of urgently needed residential buildings was accompanied by the massive abuse of public subsidies and the widespread practice of illegal construction.[15] Most of the illegal buildings were formalized in 1985 by an amnesty conveyed under Prime Minister Bettino Craxi for the whole of Italy as a one-time action for people who had violated zoning laws and built without permission of local authorities. In 1994, during his first term as prime minister, Silvio Berlusconi decreed another amnesty, again with promises that it would never be repeated.[16] These amnesties obviously did not slow down illegal construction around Vesuvius—on the contrary, they have to be seen as a kind of regularization and normalization of the practice of illegal construction.

A new situation only arrived with the emergency plan from 1995, which strongly restricts construction in the red zone and additionally established the foundation of a national park on the uppermost parts of the volcano in order to stop completely further construction. This park is under the control of the national legislation and thus local municipalities are not anymore able to bypass the law. However, the new legislation proved to be not very successful. In 2003, following another national amnesty, Italy's highest court struck down a popular appeal to award amnesty also to illegal constructions in the red zone of Vesuvius—more than 50,000 people sought the amnesty.[17] It turned out that even in the national park, about 800 structures, from restaurants and resort villas to house additions such as balconies, had been built without permission between 1995 and 2003. In this period, only 30 have been removed.[18]

<u>20</u> Settlements around Vesuvius

21 Volcanic activities: The map shows a possible scenario of volcanic activities in the Naples region. They are transforming the territory by a variety of physical forces: *Lava flows* move slowly, melting and burning everything laying in its way. *Falls of ash and pumice* occur in both moderate and violent eruptions. They can clog lungs, cause slippery roads, and damage car engines; they can pile up on rooftops and make them collapse; and they present a major hazard for the transport systems that are vital for evacuating the population. *Pyroclastic flows* are the most spectacular forms of volcanic activity. They are huge and sometimes glowing clouds of scorching hot gas and volcanic fragments, ranging in size from dust, ash, and pumice to large rocks, which are expelled at great speed in a turbulent aerosol-like mass. They rush across the ground at speeds up to 500 km/h, and their temperature can reach 450°C. During their unstoppable advance, they devastate everything in their path. *Lahar* is a type of mudflow or debris flow composed of a slurry of pyroclastic material, rocky debris, and water. The material flows down from a volcano. *Earthquakes* and *tsunamis* are further elements of the transforming forces unleashed by volcanic activity. Tsunamis occurred in the major eruptions of 79 and 1631, and earthquakes happen frequently.[19]

After a period of more than fifty years of dormant volcanic activities, the danger seems to be far away, and the threat appears to be completely abstract in contrast to the very concrete questions and problems of everyday life. Not many people have still a direct experience of the last volcanic eruption of 1944 **19**. Why should anybody leave this wonderful landscape and give up the social networks that sometimes developed over generations? And if people are willing to leave—where should they go? The whole region of Naples is already very densely populated, leaving not much space for the construction of new towns and neighborhoods that could allow the massive relocation of people from the red zone.

Legend:
- Lava flows
- Pyroclastic flows
- Lahars
- Mudflows
- Ash fallout
- Bradyseism
- Urban settlements

WASTELAND: THE CAMORRA AND THE TERRITORY

22 Vele di Scampia: Vele di Scampia is one of the most emblematic places of *Gomorrah*: "The big, wide streets are airier than the tangle of the old city center, and I could imagine the countryside still alive under the asphalt and massive buildings. After all, space is preserved in Scampia's very name, which in a defunct Neapolitan dialect means 'open land.' A place where weeds grow. […] Chronic unemployment and a total absence of social development planning have transformed the area into a narcotics warehouse, a laboratory for turning drug money into a vibrant, legal economy. Scampia and Secondigliano pump oxygen from illegal markets into legitimate businesses." (Roberto Saviano, *Gomorrah*, 63–64)

Nowhere are the dialectics of beauty and threat more telling than in this area. There are many psychological as well as economic reasons to ignore the threat of Vesuvius completely. But the actual situation is even more severe: In an astonishing parallel move, the threat coming from the natural forces of volcanic activity is today doubled by a new threat entirely imposed by social forces: the illegal deposit of toxic waste. Illegal dump sites are scattered all over the territory of Campania, even invading and threatening the geologically more-or-less secure zones 23. Thus, the historic landscape dominated by the dialectics of beauty and threat is superimposed with a new landscape of artificial, man-made disaster. This process can be understood as an additional layer of urbanization, which transforms the urban landscape once again.

The illegal traffic and deposit of industrial waste began in the 1990s, when the Camorra opened a new branch of its illegal businesses, and started to transport toxic waste from northern Italy, where most of the country's industry is concentrated, to the south, disposing of it at the lowest costs. In contrast to the Sicilian Mafia or the Calabrian 'Ndrangheta, the Camorra can be understood as an urban form of criminal organization, originating in the large reservoir of urban poor that crowded Naples in the late eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.[20] It formed a rather loose assemblage of gangs operating in the immediate surroundings of Naples, with no established coordination or centralized structure. Its original activities were illegal gambling, extortion, and smuggling. Through the mass emigration of urban poor in the late nineteenth century, the subsequent industrialization and the rise of trade unions and the socialist party, the Camorra lost an important part of its social base.[21] However, the postwar period provided new opportunities for illegal activities. The contraband and black market industries that revolved around the port of Naples constituted the springboard for a new upswing of the Camorra. Starting with the smuggling of cigarettes, it soon reinvested the revenues in more profitable traffic, like drugs and counterfeit goods.

The specific role of the Camorra in the urbanization process of Naples can only be understood if the territorial logic of organized crime is highlighted.[22] As illegality is the constitutive part of this logic, the control of the territory forms a basic precondition. Despite the fact that the businesses of Camorra are highly integrated into global networks, its organization is still strongly

23 Cava Sari dump site in the area of Terzigno, inside the Vesuvius National Park, May 2012

24 Naples, June 21, 2011

embedded in the local territory: the places related to the supply of the big consumer markets of Naples, the roads linking the towns and their agricultural hinterland, the routes for the smuggling of all kinds of goods, the ports and Customs.[23] The weak economic base of Naples and the forced urbanization allowed the Camorra to extend this territorial base from the port and the inner-city areas to the newly urbanized, scattered, and chaotic settlements on the outskirts, where the bosses placed their fortified villas, where dilapidated housing estates were turned into drug markets, and illegal businesses often merged with the informal economy providing subsistence to poorer social groups 22.[24]

Control over the territory allows control of the circulation of goods, control of social circuits, and finally also enables the imposition of a different use of the land. As illegal waste trafficking is even more profitable than illegal construction and speculation, the Camorra started to deposit toxic waste in illegal landfills and natural caves. In some cases, waste was even sold to farmers instead of fertilizer and spread over cropped fields. As the market grew, the Camorra developed a sophisticated system in which waste is sent to several storage and treatment sites until it is buried or dumped on land or in watercourses. By 2008 it was estimated that there were more than 2,500 contaminated sites in Campania. The province of Naples alone registered 1,186 recorded sites.[25] The presence of toxic waste in Campania has been recognized as an important health risk in many reports, and it aggravates massively the existing social inequalities: the population most affected by contamination is in most cases also economically disadvantaged.[26] It also presents a real menace to food production, bringing into danger some of the most famous agricultural products of Campania, as the *mozzarella di bufala* or the tomato *cuore di bue*.

The waste crisis finally arrived at the very center, the city of Naples itself. Over the years, in the absence of effective management and regulation, the Camorra has managed to take control of the local waste system. Naples produces more raw garbage than any other Italian city; recycling is almost nonexistent. Even today most garbage ends up in landfills, as all sorts of obstruction and failure impeded the construction and opening of incinerators.[27] The Camorra's incursion into urban waste management had the severe consequence that household waste was mixed up with toxic industrial waste. As a consequence, local residents started massive protests as soon as new dump sites for "ordinary" waste should have opened. Each time one of the sites reached the end of its capacity or was closed down for reasons ranging from regular controls, the interference of the Camorra, or magistrates' enquiries and sequestrations, the collection of waste slowed down and piles of waste started to

25 Toxic waste: The province of Caserta, north of Naples, is the area most affected by illegal toxic waste because its geography of vast plains with numerous natural caves is particularly well suited to hiding waste. The province is also under the control of the powerful Casalesi clan, pioneers of the trade. The northern outskirts of Naples form another important area of waste criminality; it is called "Terra dei Fuochi" (Land of Fires), because it is notorious for its ever-rising columns of smoke from illegal waste burning. The area behind Vesuvius in between the municipalities of Acerra, Nola, and Marigliano has become known as "Triangolo della morte" (Triangle of Death), due to alarming increases in cancer and mortality in recent years.[29]

fill the streets, creating another business opportunity, as rogue collectors started to take the waste out to the countryside to burn or bury it, often paid by local residents who wanted to get rid of the trash in their streets and backyards.[28]

The first waste crisis in Naples arrived in 1994, when waste treatment capacity was beyond saturation. Since 2001 a state of emergency has been declared almost every year, and emergency funds have been released to deal with the problem. But even today, the new incinerators are still not finished. In May 2008 Silvio Berlusconi promised to tackle this crisis as a priority activity of his newly elected government. But only two years later, in October 2010, garbage piled up again in the streets of Naples 24, while demonstrators blocked trucks transporting waste and clashed with police forces in Terzigno and Boscotrecase, protesting against the decision made by the government to dig a new landfill in the environmentally protected area on the slopes of Mount Vesuvius.

New incinerator   New Dump

RDF production plants

Area of Caserta

Illegal Dump

RDF production plants

RDF production plants

Triangle of Death   Closed Dump   RDF production plants

Existing Dump   Land of Fires

Closed Dump

Closed Dump   New Dump

Closed Dump

Closed Dump

Illegal Dump   Closed Dump   New Dump
Reopened Dump

● Dump site and RDF (refuse-derived fuel) production plants
�277 Contaminated area from toxic and nontoxic waste
■ Urban settlements

FIRST AND SECOND NATURE

In Naples, the relationship between the volcano and the city is highly contradictory. It changes over time—not only as a result of the changing forms, rhythms, and intervals of the eruptions, but also as the outcome of different forms of the production of urban space. In Roman times and still in the seventeenth century, the volcano and the threat it incorporated was inconceivable and incomprehensible for people; it was a divine intervention into human life without any possibility for prevention. Therefore, it had no real impact on the settlement of the area—people took advantage of the beauty of the place and the rich natural resources it provided, and had a complete lack of knowledge about the potentially dangerous character of the area.

With the beginning of modernity, this relationship changed. The scientific examination of volcanism started, the volcano lost parts of its dark and incomprehensible nature and was turned into a spectacle: the nightly scenery illuminated by the eruptions of Vesuvius became one of the most famous tourist attractions of the time, and brought a steady flow of visitors to Naples. The excavated ruins of Pompeii and Herculaneum that so vividly illustrated the threat added to the touristic attraction of the region. The threat and the beauty of the landscape became constitutive symbolic and material elements of Naples and were finally transformed into economic assets.

Urbanization in the second half of the twentieth century shows again a completely different pattern, which is in no way comparable to earlier periods, and in which the volcano plays again a different role. Astonishingly, the threat is still relegated to the realm of a possible but improbable event in the future, set against a very concrete present with many difficulties to solve and many possibilities to take advantage of the landscape formed by the volcano. As a result, urbanization follows a structure that is already inscribed into the territory and is set out in the planning rules and territorial regulations with their specific dialectics of legality and illegality.

In this process, a second nature is created that in many respects is opposed to the first nature formed by the volcano. Whereas the first nature is in a permanent but unpredictable motion, the second nature follows a different logic, which leads toward the permanent formation of settlement space and the production of a fixed and petrified built environment. In turn, this built environment represents an important long-term investment that might be seriously devalued if the entire area was to be officially declared as uninhabitable and further urbanization would be completely stopped. Thus the economic logic stabilizes the existing urban structure and reinforces the rigidity of second nature. The clash of these contradictory logics finally creates a very dangerous situation: the unstable and moving ground of first nature is permanently superimposed by a very rigid and immobile second nature that forms a kind of an artificial crust. If the unpredictable forces of the underground are awakened again, a disaster will be almost inevitable.

Regardless of this threat, urbanization of Vesuvius proceeds just like any other urbanization process in the region. As illegality is a permanent and almost constitutive element in this process, and criminal organizations are becoming endemic and even an important element of the local economical system, the areas around the volcano are treated like any other piece of land—as potential assets and as instruments to generate extra profits. As a consequence, the system of illegal construction also invades the risk zones, and even more so, creates new risk zones. In this logic the deposit of toxic waste is just another form of the illegal use and transformation of the land. The urbanization of Vesuvius and the production of toxic land are both the result of a specific mode of the production of space, where illegality plays a key role and where organized crime succeeded in getting control over parts of the territory.

The full range of the contradictions shaping Naples becomes visible if Capri, the "other side" of Naples and the ultimate vanishing point of the region, is set into the picture 26. Capri is not affected by most of the volcanic activities, and it is not part of the territory of the Camorra. The island that can be seen from most parts of the Bay of Naples represents a possible other world, an almost utopian place untouched by all the threats reigning in Naples.

NILE VALLEY, EGYPT

Mathias Gunz

URBANIZATION OF AN OASIS

The Nile Valley is a linear oasis surrounded by desert. Since ancient times, this spatial situation creates a double condition: while the desert is hostile land for human settlements, life in the oasis relies on the water of the river Nile. This lifeline, which forms a highly refined linear network of distribution, has a fixed supply–Egypt's water quota has been unchanged since 1955. The strong population growth Egypt is struggling with in the last decades makes this lifeline a tight corset of limited resources. The Nile Valley is still inevitably bound to the physical reality and metabolism of its territory.

In recent years the specific urban character of this territory changed, and also the relationship between the center, Cairo, the sophisticated metropolis par excellence, and the Nile Valley, its former agrarian hinterland. Today one finds in Upper Egypt an astonishing hybrid urbanity, a dense network of outgrown villages, archaic and seemingly without history, that has the motility and connectivity of a metropolis while still being based on the structures of a traditional rural society. The omnipresence of security forces gives away what can well be called the most surprising feature of this territory: its relative calmness and stability in the face of an enormous distribution conflict.

This surprising normality can only be understood when reading Egypt's urban structure not as a metropolis on a rural background surrounded by lifeless desert but as a specific constellation of three partially autonomous but highly interlinked configurations: Cairo, the Nile Valley (including the Delta) and the desert as a possible future potential. There is an apparent complex balance of pressure and stability between the three configurations. Some aspects of this balance evolved historically, some have been introduced more recently. The very existence of such a balance shows that the areas of the Nile Valley cannot be easily changed. Exposing it to uncontrolled urban sprawl is just as little an option as radically reforming its agrarian structure. The Nile Valley is not only important for food production but it also ties a large part of the population to the agrarian land and the traditional lifestyle connected to it.

In recent times the solution is sought in the desert, where dense housing areas and–in a second parallel linear oasis–water-efficient agriculture have been developed, though with limited success so far: transplanting the village society from the valley to the desert proves to be very difficult. Another unsolved question is the relationship to Cairo, where governmental pressure is the least effective and–as witnessed–social and economic problems culminated to the point of explosion. It seems as if the valley's stabilization comes at the price of the capital city's paralysis.

1 Garden

NILE VALLEY, EGYPT

2 Desert

NILE VALLEY, EGYPT

3 City

DESERT, GARDEN, AND CITY

4 "Within the subtle topographic distinction between the flat valley and the desert every meter of altitude is decisive. After all it is only a soft ridge of barren hills that separates the abundant 'garden of life' that is the Nile Valley and the 'land of death' that is the desert. The edges itself are historically a preferred location for villages, since the raised terrain served as protection from the annual floods."
Nicolas Sanson, *Royaume et désert de Barca et l'Egypte*, 1679

5 Abundance of resources: Life in the Nile Valley 15th century BC

The majority of Egypt's territory is made up by the Sahara and Libyan deserts, known for hosting some of the world's hottest temperatures and an almost total absence of rainfall. Out of this extremely inhospitable environment the river Nile carves a meandering 100-kilometer-long line of life, a stretch of arable land 4 rarely wider than 20 kilometers before it expands into the Nile Delta at Cairo. This region—Cairo and the Delta—is called Lower Egypt, while the Valley itself roughly between Cairo and Aswan forms Upper Egypt 6. This distinction—at that time into two separate kingdoms[1]—existed already in Ancient Egypt, whose success as a civilization came mainly from its ability to adapt to the natural conditions of the Nile River Valley. The predictable flooding and controlled irrigation of the fertile valley—demanding a strict and centralized power structure—produced a surplus of resources which allowed the development of a sophisticated culture 5. This balance of two equal and partly sovereign entities changed with continuous foreign influence and the accompanying integration of Egypt into larger networks of trade and distribution. While Alexandria and Cairo became multicultural metropolises, Upper Egypt remained in its rural state, serving as a provider of crops and cheap labor. Today a dense particle field of rural villages expands along the Nile in Upper Egypt with a population of roughly 24 million inhabitants—about as much as the greater urbanization around Cairo. Its largest city, Assiut, lies about 375 kilometers south of Cairo and has a population of ca. 500,000. The last third of Egypt's population is then found in the Delta, with very few people living outside the reaches of the Nile: despite making up only 5.5 percent of Egypt's total land area, the Nile Valley and Delta house 99 percent of its population.[2] Contrariwise this illustrates the great spatial potential of the desert. It is not surprising that many Egyptians see the country's future there, as experts will not stop repeating that any piece of desert can be cultivated if not for the lack of water.


Cairo

Assiut

Aswan

6 Egypt, ca. 1: 450,000

WATER AND POWER

Egypt is the last in a line of ten countries that share the Nile, and, since it has almost no rainfall, acutely depends on the Nile for water. Through a series of dams and barrages Egypt's water quota (5.55 billion cubic meters per year since 1955) is carefully distributed over the territory so that almost none ends up flowing into the Mediterranean 7. The trickle of water that ends up in the Delta has become so thin that saltwater intrusion is becoming a serious problem.

On the other side of the country the Aswan High Dam represents the nexus between Egypt and the upstream riparian states. Built from 1960 to 1970, it allows complete regulation of the Nile's waters. By enabling multiple planting cycles per year, this forceful act upon the river produced a paradigmatic shift in Nile water use. The Nile's riparian states are organized in the Nile Basin Initiative 8, which "seeks to develop the river in a cooperative manner, share substantial socioeconomic benefits, and promote regional peace and security."[3] As the region's dominant power, Egypt has aggressively secured water rights from its upstream neighbors. Colonial-era treaties signed between Egypt and Great Britain in 1929 and 1959 grant Sudan and Egypt about 90 percent of the Nile's water and Egypt the right to veto any upriver project that would reduce the water arriving at Aswan. This prerogative is increasingly challenged by up-stream countries. In May 2010 the states of Ethiopia, Kenya, Uganda, Rwanda, and Tanzania signed an agreement to seek more water from the River Nile—a move strongly opposed by Egypt and Sudan.[4]

The mechanisms of distribution in this tense geopolitical context demand constant recalculation of a highly sensitive, age-old empirical balance. Internationally negotiated water quotas are translated into a numeric water budget for every governorate, district, and commune, tuned and enforced by a central bureaucracy in Cairo. Meanwhile, farmers view the highly technical, multilayered water network with the fatalism of encountering a natural phenomenon, well aware that their lifestyle relies on the Nile's waters, yet unaware that this supply is far from assured. Water, this is clear, is not seen as a commodity in the Nile Valley but its free and plentiful distribution as a public task. Water management here, as in many other places, is the main manifestation—and justification—of central power in the territory.

7 Reduced to a trickle: The Nile water is systematically distributed as it flows through Egypt (Ministry of Water Resources and Irrigation).

8 The Nile Basin Initiative is only the most recent incarnation of Nile water contracts and treaties going back to colonial times (Nile Basin Initiative).

9 Since 1973 Egypt's agricultural imports—wheat, maize, soybean—outweigh its agricultural exports—cotton, rice, oranges (FAOSTAT).

SCARCITY

It appears that the Nile Valley has been put in motion not so much due to new external forces arriving from the international or global context, but to an internal densification and urbanization. Egypt's enormous population growth and its accompanying urbanization create enormous compression within this environment of limited resources. Within a living environment restricted by the Nile's limited water resources, urbanization almost always occurs at the expense of productive farmland. In one of the most fertile regions of the world, self-sufficiency is increasingly threatened 9. The linear oasis has become a pressure cooker where more and more people and activities compete for the same space. The compression of the villages and their incremental expansion onto the arable land has permanently shifted the land–population equilibrium and changed Upper Egypt from an agricultural producer to mainly an exporter of cheap labor in just fifty years. The Upper Egyptian as a cheap service provider, particularly as security personnel, has long become an integral part of metropolitan life, for example, in Cairo. At the same time there are more than one million Egyptians temporarily working abroad,[5] the majority in the Gulf states. Overall remittances from the Egyptian diaspora amount to around 10 billion USD.[6] The Nile Valley has itself become a consumer, an urban metabolism without the infrastructure of a city. Global modes of production and distribution have arrived in the Nile Valley but unaccompanied by integrative force. Preindustrial modes of life meet global dreams of luxury in a region that seems not to have found its place yet in a globalized world. Still, while Cairo shows all of the symptoms of an overspilling metropolis, Upper Egypt has so far been hiding its urbanization behind a scenic rural coulisse. In the villages the physical manifestation of growth is almost inconspicuous and organic. This may be the reflection of a change in tide in the pressure equalization between the metropolis and its hinterland. Traditionally, rural Upper Egypt has been a support structure for Cairo, supplying it with produce. Today it is the Nile Valley that relies on Cairo for supply, for balancing its overpressure and artificially stabilizing its crumbling rural economy.

NILE VALLEY, EGYPT

10 Concealed growth: In 2010 Assiut Governorate's yearly population growth rate (2.3 percent) was one of the highest in the country.

STABILITY GRID

Probably the most powerful and relevant lever between Cairo and the Nile Valley is agriculture 11. Although in 2013 agriculture made up only 14.1 percent of Egypt's GDP, still one-third of Egypt's workforce is involved in it (in rural areas as much as 50 percent). This labor-intensity is directly linked to Egyptian agriculture's small-scale field structure (average holding size < 1ha) 12, its traditional tools and techniques, and—consequently—its low productivity. This archaic agriculture—in some aspects unchanged since Pharaonic times—forms a sort of stability grid, binding the ever-growing population to the land and thereby upholding a traditional and stable hegemony. Under the field structure lies the distribution system of the Nile water. Its fine network of hierarchical canals reaches every inch of the territory, bringing with it the power of the central state. At the same time it locks the Nile Valley into a lifestyle that can no longer sustain its existence. The continuous loss of arable land to urbanization, and the growing population associated with it, have made Egypt—once the breadbasket of the Roman Empire—the world's largest importer of wheat.

Technocrats have determined that based on the current model of agriculture in the Nile Valley and a constant supply of water the maximal arable land is already reached. Any further expansion of arable land can only happen at the expense of existing agricultural land—unless production methods are modernized. This modernization would first of all mean a change from the current surface irrigation to more efficient methods; it would also mean giving up traditional crops for plants with a higher tolerance for salinity, wind, and wastewater. Such far-reaching mitigation would certainly involve the mechanization of work, which would be accompanied by the consolidation of farming plots.

In the Nile Valley, modernity comes as both a threat and a potential. A radical modernization might dissolve the village network—including its traditional rural mode of life—very suddenly and trigger unpredictable consequences for both the rural areas and the cities. It seems that Hosni Mubarak—although an advocate of modernity—never dared to seriously expedite such an extensive modernization. After all, stability was arguably his main commodity in dealing with the West; the biopolitical threat of an unrooted territory was great enough to accept inefficient food production in exchange for relatively high employment. Rather than reforming the Nile Valley, the government aimed to create in the desert a second, more efficient incarnation of it that would be able both to house the growing population and to feed them through a modern, industrial agriculture.

11, 12 Irrigation network and field structure around Asiut. The traditional form of land irrigation and cultivation lies at the base of the Nile Valley territory and almost like a genetic code has been determining life in the Nile Valley for thousands of years.

MOBILITY: THE URBANIZED VILLAGE

A look beyond the Pharaonic territorial underlayer of the Nile Valley shows a life that is much more urban and modern than would be expected 14. One indicator for this is the high level of individual mobility: almost all citizens have access—economically and physically—to a transportation system characterized by a high density and a wide permeability 15.

Rather than being planned by the state, the mass-transit system has been formed by the demand of the passengers, and is executed by private-sector operators with minimal state intervention. The government assumes an authoritarian stance in order to protect passengers by mandating vehicle registration and renewal, and imposing penalties on dangerous driving. In a fragile balance of formal and informal forces, and of governmental regimentation and private initiative, a demand-driven transportation system that meets the needs of local, regional, and national connections could develop. Mobility has become vital in a rural landscape that has long since ceased to be self-sufficient. As in many other places, peasants here are forced to seek work in the cities; what is specific to this particular context is that they stay rooted in the Nile Valley, send all money home, and, in most cases, eventually return to their hometowns. The Nile Valley has never seen real rural flight. Instead, it has a long tradition of seasonal migration and commuting. The transportation network allows a form of human settlement in the villages that is not exclusively based on agricultural production. This overlaps the stability grid of miniature land holdings with another, highly elastic network that allows the village to remain the basic unit of urbanization, although under completely different preconditions. The result is a specific living environment that is premodern and globalized at the same time: commuting peasants, satellite-equipped huts, farming policemen, and villages extended with remittances from Riyadh and Doha—an entire population oscillation between Pharaonic farmer and postindustrial service provider. The Upper Egypt Nile Valley, long an isolated vassal of the city, now exists in mutual dependency with Cairo.

13 Assiut is one of multiple transportation exchange centers interlinked along the Nile. It is part of a condensed network of passenger and cargo flows with varying intensities and transit modes. Parallel structures and different shortcuts within national, regional, and local levels of transport make this system serviceable to almost everybody in the Nile Valley.


14 Street scene in the Nile Valley

15 Outskirts (Assiut)

EXPANSION INTO THE DESERT

16 How to conquer the desert (2009): 1. Go to the desert; 2. Dig a well (minimal depth 30 m) or steal waste-water or join Mubarak Graduate project; 3. Flatten the land by tractor; 4. Clean the soil from rocks and stones; 5. Mix the filtered soil with industrial or organic fertilizer or soil from the Nile; 6. Water the soil together with the seeds and let dry. 7. Repeat 2 to 3 times; 8. Petition the government to sell you the land for a low price in recognition of the improvements you have made on it.

■ Existing fertile land (old lands): 8,333,000 feddans
■ Land to be reclaimed (new lands): 1,338,000 feddans

17 National Development Plan for 2017

The strict and immediate division between hostile desert and arable land is a traditional feature of the Nile Valley. This is also reflected in the administration of the territory, where only arable land is considered to be land with a private owner, while the desert is considered no-man's-land and belongs to the state. The desert becomes land if and only if it is made arable. Historically, this process has been limited by the scarcity of water, but also by the topography of the land. Although the balance between available resources and human extension has been constantly renegotiated with the introduction of new technologies, most radically in the twentieth century, the antagonism of livable oasis versus inhabitable desert has remained a constant.

Today, with its rapid population growth, this static conception seems no longer an option for Egypt. Cairo is already one of the densest metropolitan regions in the world and the villages of the Nile Valley have long outgrown themselves, consuming the valuable fertile land their economy is based on. While the transportation system allows a de-escalation of rural growth on a regional basis, remittance transfers and financial flows release pressure on a national or international level. Yet when looking for a long-term solution to Egypt's population—land disequilibrium, eyes still turn to the desert. As experts proclaim that "any desert land is potentially urbanizable," its seemingly infinite unlocked spatial potential is the projection surface for dreams, visions, and scientific number games of all stripes. Expanding Egypt's territory into the desert has become a national obsession—and according to many, its only hope. In the desert should come into being all that Egypt lacks: industrial parks, service-oriented business districts, mechanized agriculture with efficient drip irrigation, and so on. At the same time the desert should absorb all of Egypt's problems, such as the many unemployed university graduates. They are sent into the desert to reclaim land.

While the state has been the biggest protagonist and patron of this grand project, the same pattern is repeated on a smaller scale by private actors who—often informally—reclaim small farming plots along the desert's edge 16. As desert land only becomes property when made arable, urbanizing desert is made to seem like producing something out of nothing. By allowing this private desert reclamation the state creates at least the illusion that Egypt can escape the tight bonds of its environment. At the end, as new fields can only be won at the cost of existing ones, this form of reclamation remains more or less a zero-sum game. Naturally any large-scale reclamation of fertile land is

based on the availability of additional water resources. The state's national development plan to reclaim 3.4 million feddans by the year 2017, at an annual rate of 150,000 feddans, 17 comprises a chain of desert cities, without agriculture, along the Nile Valley edge as well as the construction of new green islands in the Sinai, the Western Desert, and along the coast. These new lands will be fed by either deflected Nile water, fossil groundwater, or desalination plants along the coast.

These larger plans are still in development and their effects are not yet noticeable in the Nile Valley. What one can see is that the desert edge is being transformed from a sharp line into a fluid zone in which countless actors engage in a variety of uncoordinated, sometimes overlapping activities 18. Fresh occupations, failed occupation attempts, and unrealized projects all lie next to one another, loose and seemingly unrelated. The valley edge, similar to the edges of many contemporary cities, has become a *terrain vague*. This stands in great contrast to the old lands of the Nile Valley, where each piece of surface has a clear function and the corset of limited resources allows for almost no movement. The desert cannot replace the Nile Valley; it also cannot extend it without tapping into its limited water resources; but—and this is probably the hope—between the state's desert projects, it can break up the rigid constraints of scarcity and allow for new motility, not least within the valley itself.

· Desert
Anonymous Reclamation
Military Zone
Desert City
Industrial
Cemeteries
Antiquity Protection
Waste Water Treatment

18 Map of actors occupying the desert edge around Assiut.

DESERT CITIES AND THE NEW VALLEY

19 Sayed Karim, Project for Nasr City, 1956: Early projects such as Nasr City were based on the ideologies of Heroic Modernism and Arab Socialism.

20 City, 2010: Planned as a city expansion, it has since become an integral part of the city.


21 Mena Garden, 6th of October City, 2010. Where Egypt's wealthy fulfill their fantasies of luxury, comfort, and security. These all-villa gated compounds are often accompanied by Americanstyle shopping malls, golf clubs, and exclusive private universities.

Planning for new towns or cities in the desert started immediately after Egypt's independence under the direct order of Gamal Abdel Nasser 19, 20. Both Anwar Sadat and Hosni Mubarak continued to give highest priority to state-initiated urbanization projects with the goal of decentralizing and redistributing Egypt's growing population.

In the 1970s Anwar Sadat launched the first generation of desert cities as independent satellite towns. Most of them have since struggled to develop an independent economy and therefore have never reached their intended size. Later, in the third generation of desert cities, the focus was shifted from Cairo to the national scale. Every larger city along the Nile Valley was mirrored by a twin desert city. The development of these cities has so far seen very little dynamic. The prolonged lack of public and social amenities and working places has assigned the Nile Valley's new towns such as New Assiut the role of a highly dependent extension to their "older sister" in the valley. New Assiut was laid out for 100,000 inhabitants, offering a business center, a university, and lavish public infrastructures. So far only secondary houses and public housing have been realized; the population has stagnated at 1,761. The complex village economy of the Nile Valley cannot be replaced by commuting farmers, it appears. For the time being, the desert city leaves one with an uncanny perception of ghost towns, seemingly suspended between a slow, never-ending construction process and the already commenced decay.

On the private side these state initiatives are rivaled by a series of gated community developments in the desert around Cairo. 6th of October City, a first-generation desert city, was planned as an independent industrial city and beachhead for desert urbanization with its own governorate reaching deep into the Western Desert. It is geographically disconnected from the city center but close to the Giza pyramids, making it attractive for leisure and tourism. Since the Camp David Accords of 1978 and the movement from socialism toward neoliberalism, foreign investors have started to develop gated communities in 6th of October City—with great success. While the average population has considerable problems finding job opportunities outside their established networks, Egypt's upper class has the capital and flexibility to leave the congested city center for greener suburbs 21. As neoliberal counterparts to Nasser's and Sadat's desert city they absorb a high amount of water resources but contribute very little to Egypt's housing problem, as they are only financially accessible to less than 5 percent of the total

22 Agriculture in the desert as part of the New Valley Project also called "Murbarak's Pyramid": President Mubarak in *Al Ahram Weekly*, 1997: "Leaving the narrow Nile Valley and fanning out, in a planned and organized manner, throughout the country, has become an unavoidable necessity. In view of these facts, the conquest of the desert is no longer a slogan or dream but a necessity dictated by the spiraling population growth. What is required is not a token exodus into the desert but a complete reconsideration of the distribution of population throughout the country."

population.[7] Since the 1990s a new generation of desert cities around Cairo—New Cairo and Sheikh Zayed City being the biggest—are built exclusively on the principles of neoliberalism and with foreign investments mostly from the Gulf Region.

While the desert cities aim at taking pressure from the agricultural land in the Nile Valley by outsourcing the housing needs to the valley edge, other projects go much further. Their goal has been to permanently expand Egypt's lebensraum deep into the desert, for example by establishing a second fertile valley parallel to the Nile 22. The biggest such initiative, the New Valley, or Toshka, Project wants to divert 10 percent of Egypt's Nile water allotment directly from Lake Nasser into the Sahara Desert. Here, in the so far sparsely populated New Valley Governorate, this water will be used to establish an idealized version of the Nile Valley. This means, next to housing, the installation of large-scale, industrial, export-oriented agriculture. The final aim of the megaproject is to increase Egypt's inhabitable land from 5 percent to 25 percent of its territory and to house 20 percent of its population.

The idea of a second Nile Valley had already been proposed as part of Gamal Abdel Nasser's original plans for the High Dam in Aswan, but it was abandoned in 1964, only to be revived by Hosni Mubarak in 1997 and to now become Mubarak's greatest and most controversial legacy. The Mubarak Pumping Station in Toshka is the centerpiece of the project and was inaugurated in 2005. It pumps water from Lake Nasser to be transported by way of the—Abu Dhabi—donated—240-kilometer-long Sheikh Zayed Canal through the valley, to transform 2,340 square kilometers of desert into agricultural land. The New Valley Project is supposed to be completed in 2020 and become home to more than three million residents. But this ambitious goal seems to be severely threatened. The essential problem is that the Western Desert's high saline levels and the presence of underground aquifers in the area act as a major hindrance to any irrigation project. If the land is irrigated, the salt will mix with the aquifers and reduce access to potable water. The only objective met so far is the diversion of water from Lake Nasser into what little of the Sheikh Zayed Canal has been built. Since Mubarak's downfall the future of the megaproject is in question. Was it just a mirage, a quick fix for all of Egypt's social and demographic problems? Mubarak's successors, the Muslim Brotherhood's Freedom and Justice Party, were against continuing Toshka as planned. The stance of the current administration, the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces, is unknown.

NILE VALLEY, EGYPT

<u>23</u> New Assiut

URBANIZATION OF LIMITED RESOURCES

24 Villages that grow into cities: Nile Valley

25 Turning fields into houses: Brick production from fertile Nile mud.

Our observations on the triangular relationship between Cairo, the Nile Valley, and the desert reveal, at least in part, how the central power of the city occupies its territory or hinterland. The current frontier of this occupation is the desert. In the upper Nile Valley the grasp of the metropolis has created a specific form of urbanization, a curious hybrid between traditional rural and modern urban life. Specific and astonishing in Egypt is first of all the stability of this Nile Valley landscape. It seems that the central power, concentrated in Cairo, is unwilling to subject the linear oasis to uncontrolled urban sprawl but also unable to transform it into an efficient agrarian production landscape. For centuries the city has shaped its territory to provide for its need. Over time and under continuous pressure, it seems, this process of urbanization has structured and solidified the landscape to the point where any movement is virtually impossible 24, 25. Every square centimeter of Nile Valley soil has a crucial function and defined ownership, so that one part cannot move without colliding with others or grow without overrunning others. Within an environment of scarcity there exist almost no buffers, fallows, or voids that would facilitate the motility of the whole system. As we have described, the desert edge has in fact developed into such a buffer, although more mentally than physically. The desert provides land but without water this land is worthless.

It is exactly these constraints or natural limits that Egypt has tried to overcome repeatedly and with drastic means. The Aswan High Dam has practically installed a new nature in the valley—with both positive and negative consequences. Current engineering projects, such as the New Valley project, have a similar scale. They will create new natural systems and balances whose qualities are not entirely predictable. So far despite enormous efforts Egypt has not been able to escape the physical reality of its environment.

Meanwhile the frail, and arguably unsustainable, balance in the Nile Valley is kept in place by a variety of outlets—most of which are connected to Cairo. We have discussed the highly efficient transportation system allowing for temporary or even part-time migration to urban centers. Another such outlet is the education system; Assiut houses a university of 70,000 students. With few qualified jobs in the city, most graduates end up in the Gulf region or in Cairo, hoping to get a job in the state's bloated bureaucracy. Tellingly, many of the graduates are sent into the desert to reclaim land. The military is another stabilizing force in the Nile Valley. Not only does its omnipresent security forces suppress any kind of unrest, but it is also a major employer. Most of these outlets were once created to counteract the inequality between Cairo and the peripheral regions. As such they are not effective in Cairo, where it seems all the problems of the country cumulate to the point of complete standstill.

If we talk about the interdependence between the city and its territory this means not only the city's power over the territory but also its powerlessness. The city ultimately is unable to distance itself from the embrace of its territory, its soil, and its nature.

BELGRADE, SERBIA

Marcel Meili

THE STABILITY OF THE INFORMAL

Belgrade is a curious case. Just as people began to fantasize about an interwoven network of European cities, Yugoslavia and its capital Belgrade found themselves faced with an international boycott. Consequently, Belgrade's specificity at the turn of the millennium appears to be a forced specificity. Much of what has happened in the city since the 1990s does indeed have its root cause in its isolation. However, a closer look reveals that the city's transformation during this time reflects and magnifies tensions that shape developments worldwide, offering a sort of case study of a city caught between tradition and globalization. Seen from a different angle, it becomes clear that where the city does assert its independence, this is not due to its isolated political position.

A clear idiosyncrasy in Belgrade's transformation is its limited dimension. In nearly all of the cities that lost their historical identity within a short time as a result of new, effectively generic patterns and strategies that completely redefined the urban landscape, these upheavals led to massive growth. Belgrade, too, grew in the 1990s, but its growth was largely restricted to the residential sector. In contrast, industry, commerce, and public sector stagnated to an alarming extent under the international embargo. Yet in Belgrade it was the building activities themselves that ushered in the city's transformation. Within a very short time, a whole system of checks and balances that had maintained equilibrium between the public and private in this modern socialist city were suddenly sidelined and replaced by other, only vaguely defined and often contradictory, development strategies. And nearly all of these were taken from the international repertoire. Hence, the revolution in Belgrade's urban development was less one of scale than of rules.

The distinctiveness of this development lies less in its structure than in its dialect, for the specific way in which these strategies were adopted could be described as a form of developmental dialect. In the course of the project we developed a dialectical formula to characterize the processes involved: "instability of the formal" and "stability of the informal." It became clear that Belgrade experienced its transformation as a conflict between the failing impetus of the project of the modern city and the rampant growth of an informal city in an almost organic process. Surprisingly, however, the undermining of traditional urban forms immediately brings forth new, flexible (and often disjointed) regulatory systems and (often precarious) stabilities that have nothing to do with building codes or master plans. In hardly any other European city did urban planning slip from the grasp of the authorities—and the public at large—as swiftly as it did in Belgrade. Conversely, Belgrade must be one of only few places in Europe in which so many players are involved in so many different ways in stabilizing the informal.

RAMPANT VILLAS

Padina is an unusual stretch of city. We called it the "Wild Rich," but in fact it adds much more to the image of spontaneous, uncontrolled urbanism in Belgrade than just a fashionably picturesque note. More than any of the other wild quarter, it contributes to an understanding of the specific kind of informal urban development that has unfolded in this city since the 1990s.

Padina grew out of a relatively modest illegal development that sprang up when agricultural workers moved here in the 1940s. In the mid-1990s, this small collection of basic houses on a slope in southeastern Belgrade has turned into a genuine illegal villa district for a rich (or nouveau riche) stratum of urban homeowners, some of whom are quite influential. The sudden growth of the district took little account of the building codes, and questions of ownership remained unsettled. The result of this process, which appears to have ended for the time being, is a district consisting of more than 1,000 homes. While these houses openly and sometimes flamboyantly display the wealth, taste, and security requirements of their owners, few obvious signs of their informal origins are visible even on the reverse of the bourgeois pose. For it is not just the splendor of the porticoes and marble balustrades that distinguishes Padina from the conventional image of an informal district: despite its background of rampant growth, the development presents neither the anarchic exuberance nor the anarchic hygienic and supply conditions usually associated with precarious settlement. At first glance the district is not recognizable as the product of an illegal building program.

Padina is thus a neighborhood that lacks nearly all of the features of the developments for which the phrase *informal urbanization* was coined: slums, favelas, bidonvilles, shantytowns. These terms refer to illegal developments of improvised dwellings in or around large cities, mostly by migrants striving to find a foothold in or on the edges of the urban economy. The economic and housing conditions are nearly always desolate. Another common feature of such development structures is the general disregard for laws and regulations on various levels of social, economic, and housing organization. Though settlements of this type existed on the peripheries of European cities such as Lisbon and Athens until well into the 1980s, since their clearance the phenomenon has been considered as characteristic of the so-called Third World.

Its unexpected, almost operetta-like glitter makes Padina an unusual case, not only within Belgrade but in relation to any other city as well. The profile to be discerned behind its glamorous façades, however, ultimately connects Padina with many other less spectacular informal urbanistic operations in Belgrade. It is this distinctive profile that has made the wild urban expansion of 1990s Belgrade a touchstone case in global informal urbanization.

According to local estimates, around 200,000 informal dwellings have been constructed in Belgrade to date, as much as an entire city. Within this picture, only the shantytowns of the Roma have all the common features of informal structures: living conditions in these camps are no better than in the bleakest African bidonvilles or the most desolate favelas of South America. A very small number of the other illegally developed neighborhoods and dwellings in the city date back to the period before and immediately after World War II and were indeed established at that time, as almost everywhere else in the world, by a destitute rural population migrating to the cities.

This limited early urbanization by spontaneous settlement was expanded during the 1960s and 1970s by the kind of open informal practice that in this period became common in many other fast-growing but weakly developed cities as well. People added to existing structures, found makeshift solutions, appropriated all sorts of spaces for housing purposes, squatted in vacant buildings, and established irregular settlements, all of it illegally. These were reactions from below to the failure of housing construction to keep up with industrial growth. In Belgrade some of this makeshift housing gradually achieved a certain urban stability and even led to changes in the (socialist) laws. These transformations were not, however, essentially different from experiences in Latin America, for example, where marginalized groups made a stand against the deficient housing supply in metropolises unable to meet the demand arising from repeated spurts of growth. In Belgrade the volume of this type of housing remained relatively modest, and informal practice was repeatedly forced into a kind of dialogue with state institutions so that at least an appearance of legality was preserved or established.

It was only when the scale of operations rose sharply in the 1990s that what had begun as a manageable form of irregular growth spun out of control. In the decade in which Yugoslavia collapsed, nearly all of the links that had bound informal urbanization to existing social, economic, political, and legal frameworks were severed, and previously unknown phenomena and strategies evolved. These have nothing in common with either the decades-old practice of corruption undermining the law in Naples, for example, or the uncontrolled spurts of development in Mexico City. Wild construction in the 1990s in Belgrade appeared in two unexpected and complementary forms: on the one hand, there was the mass construction of single-family homes and on the other, the clever architectural manipulation of existing buildings.

1 Padina, informal neighborhood in southeastern Belgrade.

BELGRADE,SERBIA

On the residential side, the unbridled informal urban growth also began to pull in large parts of the middle classes and soon embraced conventional urban patterns and architectural types that had previously been rare in illegal construction. This development was largely driven by people building their own homes. The trend toward building one's own home had been evident in the 1960s and '70s, too, as a response to the socialist government's inadequate housing production, and had even led to a cautious relaxing of the rigid regime of state construction. In retrospect, the individual construction of private homes, which was tolerated within certain narrow limits, emerges as a modest formal precursor of the wild districts of the 1990s.

The new production, meanwhile, flagrantly flouts administrative and legal restrictions. Yet while the volume is exploding there is, astonishingly, no wholesale abandonment of urban patterns. On the contrary, despite their illegal status, such neighborhoods tend to adopt the regular and even conventional features of the state-defined urban programs that preceded them. Wild growth, precariousness, and desolation are thus largely precluded. That does not make Belgrade's informal urbanism inventive, however—at least not architecturally.

Creativity is apparently more likely to emerge at the other end of the informal spectrum, where it flourishes on a breathtaking scale. The misappropriations, inhabited kiosks, and mushrooming building extensions (with an added floor that is wider than the base), the concealment, the deception, and the practice of building on a limited scale on limited plots— all these informal activities have generated an almost baroque architectural idiom that is unprecedented in illegal urban development. It is true that getting around building codes through architectural trickery has long been standard procedure, especially in southern European cities. Without a doubt, however, Belgrade in the 1990s raised this technique to a completely new level in terms of both quality and quantity. And this phenomenon, too, is ultimately a reflection of the very specific conditions under which Belgrade's wild urbanization evolved in the 1990s.

It is the coldly calculating deliberateness, the logic behind the unbridled urbanistic energies that makes Belgrade's informal urban development significant beyond the specific case. Between the two poles marked by the "mushroom houses" on the one hand and the marble columns of Padina on the other, at least to a certain extent the operations follow a general unspoken plan. The wild petit bourgeoisie of single-family dwellings and the countless bizarre subversions of building codes implicit in the transformations are part of an experiment in a type of urban development that is self-regulating and free of state authority. Based on an illegal form of probity and a simulation

of lawfulness, it shifts conventions from society to the private sphere—into the gray zone created by the eclipse of state law.

The development of these strategies is, of course, due first and foremost to the collapse of a state power that was once highly effective. It was not just the national economy that was buried in the debris of that collapse, but also the once-functioning administration. Yet this crisis scenario is not unique to Belgrade. It may be seen in other cities in central and Eastern Europe, too. Elsewhere, however, the logic of international investment quickly acquired dominance over the city plan. Why does Belgrade show different, unique symptoms? And in view of this distinctiveness, why is the city's informal urbanism a paradigmatic case for the significance of the informal, not only for the cities of the South but above all for those of the North as well?

INFORMAL: A LEXICAL ENTRY

The concept of the informal derives—outside of the art world—from economics, and it was first used in the early 1970s to describe long-established local shadow economies in African and later also South American and Asian cities. What characterizes informal economies is that industry and commerce evade state control and the tax regime. They can take the form of minimal systems of exchange or of whole networks of companies eluding administrative supervision. In such economic systems families, clans, and sole proprietors, but also small paternalistic or criminal groups are the primary players. They pay no taxes and fall through the cracks of all efforts at legal regulation. In consequence, however, they are also excluded from any protection under labor laws and social or economic regulation. Frequently their systems of trade and exchange cannot be clearly distinguished from those of the formal economy, since informal economies represent a broad spectrum of phenomena with widely divergent economic and social environments loosely held together by the shared goal of tax evasion.

The term was later adopted in urbanism, where its meaning remained similarly open. *Informal urbanization* describes a variety of spontaneous development types mainly in the so-called Third World. Here, too, a single pair of criteria served as the basis: the term is used for forms of development that emerged from squatting or from constructing without land ownership or without observing building codes. From the outset and in the majority of cases studied and described, the buildings in question were residential structures. Most of them were constructed by members of an impoverished lower social stratum who had moved to the city from rural areas or had immigrated illegally. These social groups are still at the focus of descriptions of informal development activities, the illegal origins of which nearly always result in housing conditions that are in constant crisis.

The developments to which the term *informal* has been applied are extraordinarily diverse; in fact their social stratification, legal situation, economic function, and building typology offer little basis for comparison. Beyond the construction process, informal, corrupt, or criminal economies within these shantytowns frequently lend significant added impetus to growth. At the same time, informal neighborhoods differ considerably in the way these economies influence their everyday existence, and in the way they are connected to the city's other formal or informal circular flows.

In many cases, informal areas undergo a limited and often labile process in which architectural patterns emerge as identi-

2–4 Gazela, Roma settlement in Belgrade

fiable local informal typologies. The transitory and improvisational character of these areas thus makes way for a perceptible if rather weakly articulated collective architectural form. For the transformation of the city, this moment is of extraordinary significance, since it marks the point at which the precarious, ephemeral, individual, and illegal aspects of the genesis of this type of housing overlap with the archaic features visible in the early stages of any city's organic growth as the enduring patterns of a future city begin to emerge, as if seen through frosted glass.

As part of this process, many of these neighborhoods experience a partial or de facto legalization which within only a few decades can significantly alter their internal relationships. The form of legalization reflects the legal and social constitution of a city at a given point in time. For *legalization* is simply another term for reappropriation in a dual sense: exterritorial forms of habitation are reclaimed by state authority and "repatriated" into the official social, political, and economic systems.

Over the course of the thirty years in which the concept of informal has evolved, it lost much of its original contour as an anthropological term for locally specific cases. (This is particularly true of urban planning discourse.) While informal urbanization continues to be described as a phenomenon almost exclusively affecting cities outside of Europe and North America, it can no longer be defined as an aberration or paraphenomenon of urban planning. In many cities in Africa and South America, urban growth has largely slipped from the legal and administrative control of the municipal government. In Mexico City, for example, more than half the inhabitants live in neighborhoods with an informal background. The spectrum extends from legalized lower-middle-class developments that demonstrate considerable stability to the corrugated-iron camps in which the unemployed eke out a meager existence. In many southern metropolises, what was once discovered as the informal city has become the dominant form of urbanization.

The field for the economic definition of informalism has become even more open. On the local level, formal, informal, and even criminal circular income flows not only overlap, they are also mutually dependent. It is therefore impossible to consider them as separate phenomena. And these hybrid circular flows are increasingly attracting the interest of the North, where the strategists of transnational economies are fascinated by the unfettered lack of transparency and regulation characterizing the forms of production and existence of the South. Integrated into larger circular flows, the informal networks act as shock absorbers or sponges for a volatile global economy—or at least that is how the phenomenon has been described in recent economic debate. In this view, what was once an uncontrollable

side effect of bad management in Third World cities emerges as a functional component of national economies in the South and, within the larger framework, of the world economy. It is also the context in which the majority of southern urban populations live.

Economists have therefore begun consistently to use the term *informal* in their descriptions of the global economic system. They see a direct link between illegal operations dismantling the weak mechanisms of state control in the South and the economic deregulation achieved by legal means in the North. These are two sides of the same coin. In the North neoliberal destatification employs political mechanisms to remove the economic and social rules from the realm of law in order to hand them over to issue-based negotiations between unequal groups. In the South, by contrast, informalism is the long-term accumulated result of uncontrolled processes with a wide variety of authorships, platforms, and mechanisms. Born of economic predicament and consolidated in often dubious forms of self-regulation from below, the breaches of legality in the cities of the Third World ironically turn out, when seen from today's wider perspective, to offer a spectrum of elastic options for globally organized economic (and political) organizations that are largely anchored in the North. By this logic, the bidonvilles are about to emerge as the working-class neighborhoods of the First World.

BELGRADE: A SPECIFIC PROFILE

Belgrade is, without a doubt, a city of the North, though few other cities in Europe have such an extensive informal sector. That is true even in comparison with other cities in formerly socialist Eastern Europe, where transformation was also associated with massive deregulation, sometimes achieved in the political arena, sometimes resulting in obscure ways from the turmoil of transformation. In our view, it is precisely its unique quality of rampant, unrestrained building activity that lends Belgrade such eloquence as a model for future metropolitan development under global conditions. But in what way is Belgrade really unique? What is its specific profile?

DELAYED POLITICAL TRANSFORMATION

In comparison to other formerly socialist countries, Yugoslavia was slow to produce new political structures and a new elite after the old ones had been brought down. The breakup of the federal state lasted a full fifteen years, for long stretches of which, in Serbia at least, large parts of the state organization, the party apparatus, the old elites, and the administration remained in place. Although the political administration lost much of its effectiveness and influence, many cadres from the old system retained their positions. In the confusion surrounding the state collapse and especially during the wars of secession, genuine parastate networks formed in which some politicians, state administrators, the army, the police, but also business leaders, beneficiaries of privatization, and rising war profiteers were involved. As political and administrative authorities ceased to function, informal functional equivalents to state power emerged and took over from the state. Members of the old elites appear to have played a crucial role in this context. Under these highly contradictory conditions in 1990s Belgrade, personal patronage, clientelism, and corruption became the de facto basis for the functioning of society and the economy.

BLOCKED ECONOMIC TRANSFORMATION

The delayed political transformation was not, however, solely responsible for the hobbling liberalization of the Yugoslav economy. Although by the 1980s at the latest, the strict regulations of a planned economy had been substantially relaxed under the socialist regime, this process was not accelerated by the breakup of the federation. Instead, the international embargo and the collapse of the national economy presented considerable obstacles to liberalization, with economic sanctions preventing international investors, state contracts, and

aid programs from becoming the kind of driving force in the transformation of the state sector that they had been in other Eastern European states. The old organizational structures essentially prevailed until the agony of the stagnant remnants of the economy had reached its end.

This national isolation and depression was one of the reasons why informal urbanism in 1990s Belgrade overwhelmingly took the shape of autonomous private housing. Private construction as an expression of immediate individual needs evolved relatively independently of other sectors of the economy, which were also marked by corruption and preferential treatment. The informal city of Belgrade was thus a kind of hyperliberalized private city in a blockaded national economy in a state of extreme crisis. Under such conditions, construction (and small commerce) was largely deregulated *before* the rest of the economy, a momentous split that is unusual on such a scale.

There is an irony to this development. While illegal building activities deliberately weakened the state, they also prevented housing production from breaking down completely. The considerable funds required for building derived in no small measure from privatized war profits and from less-than-transparent business activities conducted under the shadow of political and military confusion. From the outset, then, the new informal sector had features of the self-regulated, nonstate stabilization that can arise in an existential crisis, where subversive and compensatory procedures overlap.

The economic misery prevailing at the time must not be underestimated. When wild urbanization emerged as an economic and social pattern, the situation in Serbia's economy was extremely desolate. It was not just the housing market that was on the brink of collapse; when Slovenia and Croatia withdrew from the federation in the early 1990s, the chaos of war brought economic conditions in the remaining rest of Yugoslavia to the edge of the abyss. As late as 2005, after the wild years had ended, when Belgrade was celebrating its shining rebirth as a (party) city, Serbia's gross domestic product per capita was not even half that of Croatia, barely a quarter of Slovenia's, and about an eighth of Austria's.

UNDEFINED MILIEU

Is there any other European city in which a minister of a republic government lives in an illegal district, in the immediate vicinity of known criminals and a discreet middle class? One unique feature of the informal city in Belgrade is that this form of urban development is no longer tied to a specific milieu or a clearly describable stratum. On the whole these housing developments offer a social spectrum that is as broad and diversified as that of

the legal housing projects of investors and private parties. They are more open than the state housing projects were, too. As the result of private construction programs, they cover a wide range of standards and typologies for a clientele that is restricted, if at all, toward the bottom of the spectrum, since they do not include large collective residential buildings. Their only common feature is that they are realized in serene disregard of all planning and legality. The stratified differentiation of the urban geography by means of distinct, socially selective neighborhoods remains within limits. Only Padina, with its elevated milieu, temporarily achieved an atypical sociological clarity that, however, is already on the wane again.

IMMIGRATION

It has been reported that a considerable part of the pressure on the housing market in the 1990s was caused by Serbian refugees from regions in Croatia, Bosnia, and Kosovo that were affected by the civil war. Remarkably, however, the driving force behind the informal urbanization of Belgrade must be sought elsewhere, even though refugees did play a role in building illegal districts. This is significant because, both in the "Third World" and in the old frontier towns of the North, immigration was the engine of most informal transformations. Its physical and cultural effects manifest themselves not only in illegal housing structures, but also in illegal markets, subcultural institutions, and often in religious shadow organizations as well. In most places the informal sector is an important point of entry at the start of long-term cultural and demographic transfer. This is also true of European and North American cities, where the informal sector occupies only a small space within the economic and urban organization. In Belgrade, by contrast, the illegal sections of the city show few signs of ethnocultural enrichment. Nearly all those moving to the city—mostly war refugees—are themselves Serbs. Even more unusual, it was not they but residents of Belgrade—and those who returned to Belgrade from other parts of Europe—who built major parts of the informal districts. Serbian migrants from Serbia and from other parts of the former Yugoslavia played an important role, too.

OCCUPATION

Oddly enough, Belgrade's large illegal neighborhoods exude something of the calm confidence one might associate with ancient settler cultures: predictably and rather quietly, the new settlers gradually move into the open land, where the first groups of dwellings have already formed, to add another dwelling. In their uniformity and seemingly sensible arrangement, these neighborhoods convey neither a sense of haste nor of

improvisation or external pressure. The process of an unspectacular and almost coordinated appropriation of land resembles a situation prior to the establishment of the rule of law rather than one that is in conflict with the law.

NONLAW

In addition to these large housing areas, there is a striking spectrum of small-scale informal and paraformal techniques that continue the city's centuries-long organic growth. They essentially involve the expansion of existing buildings or the clever use of very small parcels. Yet even taken together, these operations do not equal the volume of the new informal housing areas. The sometimes bizarre results do, however, give a clearer understanding of the specific informal strategies used in Belgrade, since the illegal additions and conversions are by no means built in complete disregard of existing laws. Either they bend existing laws with grotesque forms of deception or almost sophistic interpretations of specific paragraphs; or they deliberately break certain laws while following others. Informal building in Belgrade is very much based on existing law, but on its flip side, as it were.

Hence informality does not necessarily mean complete illegality. Most of the informal parts of the city have a carefully coordinated profile of legal, legitimate, and illegal components. The municipal administration also contributes toward establishing this delicate balance. Housing developments can be clearly illegal in terms of both planning law and land ownership and yet—for an appropriate fee—be connected to the service infrastructure, accommodate legal businesses, and enter into contracts. It is not even possible to determine clearly in every case whether a given project is illegal in terms of property rights and building codes. Some buildings are based on disputed ownership or on municipal master plans with no legal force; or their illegal status is adjusted in a flimsy, paralegal fashion in later versions of such plans.

Such ambiguous attempts to regain legal and planning authority, but also the arbitrary tolerance shown by the administration, can cause considerable informal activities by builders speculating on an anticipated legalized status. This simultaneous validity of law, nonlaw, and future law on the same field and with the same players is unlikely to be found to this extent in any other European city.

TERRITORIAL SEGREGATION

The large number of small- and large-scale informal techniques makes it nearly impossible to localize the boundaries of informal developments in Belgrade, nor is it easy to recognize them at all. Belgrade's informal city thus lacks the status of a complementary phenomenon that it typically has elsewhere. This is also true of its economic structure, since its organizational forms are very open and unspecific. In Belgrade, informal urbanism is a special form of urban organization where various qualities are present in different degrees, and it is often spatially and functionally bracketed, smoothed out, or assimilated by the formal city. A clear territorial segregation into distinct urban sectors is hence not a specific feature of Belgrade's informal city. Despite the lack of official control, Belgrade has retained its typical urban flow of gentle transitions from one neighborhood to another and from one era of construction to another.

This morphology clearly distinguishes Belgrade from the metropolises of the South: The patchwork structures of the latter, in which affiliations, restricted access, and economic barriers determine the interaction of clearly distinct, often completely self-contained zones, have no equivalent in Belgrade. Where it exists at all, urban segregation is a remnant of the socialist state. More than that, it is precisely the informal activities that blur the boundaries and undermine the old order even into the present.

FORM AND NONFORM

Informalism in Belgrade has neither encouraged an innovative architectural idiom nor led to genuinely autonomous building patterns beyond the conventional urbanistic practice. Wild urbanization does, however, bring together the set pieces of ordinary cities to form an unusual urban dialect. This makes itself heard, as it were, in the atmosphere of Sunday calm—as unintentional as it is surreal—found right in the middle of the city, for Belgrade's suburban idylls of brick homes is not just suburban but also urban.

Considering how the informal operations in this city are organized, the new houses are almost bound to be conventional. For the strategies employed in building them are in no way anarchic or explosive; rather, they are precisely limited and have been carefully weighed so as to achieve predictable, practical effects. They come to bear in a limited zone that only slightly transgresses existing law, with some of the designs based on speculation about the effects of expected legalization. In other respects, the laws of the market are as effective here as elsewhere: limited funding, limited availability of building materials, unlimited hopes and aspirations. These neighborhoods demonstrate that it is not so much the zoning plan that forces big dreams into petty rules but, conversely, the petit bourgeois dreams that find a homeland in zoning plans … Belgrade's new architecture thus documents the battle over a normality that evades the law, and at the same time boldly asserts a new, different normality that is not all that far from the old one.

5 Kotež, informal neighborhood in northern Belgrade.

Even where the architecture does take on bizarre and fantastic forms, in conversions and extensions, it is ultimately guided by the same, very deliberate, subversive impulse with respect to tottering laws and authorities, and by no means by any innovative notions of design. Grotesque expression of informal architecture in Belgrade is almost invariably the result of the exaggeration or all-too-liberal interpretation of the existing building rules. This camouflage, this archaic drive to deceive can assume proportions that raise the question which legality the architects are pretending to negotiate at all. It is a game of wits with no serious opponent that, however, may prove important in the future as a test and as an experience.

If the zoning plan of Belgrade was drawn up in the tradition of modern urbanism, then these would-be architectures, these multistory pitched roofs, these added stories burying tiny old houses underneath them, and the single-family homes that cling to office buildings like parasites are, theoretically, virtuoso postmodernist operations.

PRIVATE NETWORKS

It is astonishing, almost breathtaking, how quickly informal structures in Belgrade regain stability once the crisis of their eruptive, illegal construction has been mastered and they enter into use as private dwellings. Most of the informal neighborhoods in the cities of the South have specific or even idiosyncratic private, communal, and public organizational forms beyond the individual and the family: the spectrum ranges from authoritarian clan and gang structures to self-organization in initiatives, cooperatives, barter circles, and neighborhood networks. In Belgrade, by contrast, house construction is achieved with help from one's personal milieu, while the need to coordinate neighborhood issues, such as infrastructural problems, is met by strictly limiting negotiations and agreements to the practical problem at hand. Civic action groups and cooperatives are virtually unknown here. This may have to do with the strong tradition in Serbian society of networks based on family and friendships that are not primarily defined by location or function—that is, by neighborhood or the world of work. That is probably the reason why, quite soon after they are established, such districts develop the impersonal social life of any European neighborhood of single-family homes. But their rapid incorporation into a private world also reveals the practical effectiveness of private networks: almost as soon as the buildings are finished, there is little uncertainty left that might necessitate cooperative action.

THE PARASITIC CITY

There is, however, at least one quality that Belgrade's private housing production has in common with that of all other informal cities and that distinguishes it fundamentally from the idea of the planned modern city, and that is the radical neglect or privatization of public concerns and institutions. Even the larger spontaneous developments have no structures apart from those meeting individual necessities or elementary collective ones. Beyond rudimentary technical infrastructure, such as streets or sewer systems, these neighborhoods do not provide for urban spaces, public institutions, schools, or even commercial offerings. For their supplies they rely on the existing city; even elementary functions such as stores, restaurants, and small service providers do not seem to be attracted to the new developments. Organizing these sorts of needs is therefore left to the individual inhabitants, and new neighborhoods frequently form parasitic growths on the edges of large planned developments from the 1960s or '70s, where at least schools are nearby.

But in Belgrade even such modern planned communities did not have adequate public institutions; not even the flagship project of New Belgrade's central zone offered the functions originally planned. The hyperprivate lifestyle in an informal development that ensures provisions by means of an individual, citywide map of supplies thus has a surprising parallel in the underserviced urbanism of Belgrade's socialist modernism. This weakness of the informal city is thus not due entirely to its illegal origins but has a long-standing tradition in Belgrade.

LEGALIZATION

In informal cities throughout the world, legalization is an important engine of transformation. In Belgrade the government issued, for example, a legalization decree in 2003 which, however, was never implemented. Apart from a variety of obstacles, there were two main reasons for its failure: First, the decree ran aground on the unresolved long-term consequences of the nationalization of land after World War II. In many places, the lack of clarity regarding ownership rights effectively prevented new property situations' receiving legal form. Second, the feeble administration was simply not up to handling a program on the scale that would have been necessary for the clarification of ownership rights—nor can its interest in such a program have been very great. The enormous bureaucratic obstacles to legalization of old construction projects and the approval of new ones thus provoked a renewed disregard of official procedures, though under very different circumstances.

Hence the legalization process did not mark a clear break in informal practice but, rather, blurred the boundary between

legal and (new) illegal practices even further. Because of the unsettled legal situation and the high costs of the official procedure, legal projects came into competition with informal building projects that could be legalized later. A class society of building permit applications emerged. Rather than going through the arduous legal permit process, a well-off or well-connected client had an informal shortcut available as a way to create a construction project that conformed approximately to the laws and could be approved subsequently. The result was a fundamental legal uncertainty.

The once rather wild building activities from below—which still exist—led to a dual market, an unexpected side effect of which is that the informal emerges as an effective market mechanism. While the municipal authorities have regained a measure of control over informal construction processes, this is far too incomplete and unstable to bring the city back to its previous practice of socialist state planning. Instead, Belgrade seems to be moving remarkably close to the contemporary urban planning practice of other European cities.

THE MISSING LINK

If we choose to believe the economist Elmar Altvater, three forces are shaping the current transformation of social structures worldwide: urbanization, globalization, and informalization. Other scholars today are also studying informalization from a global perspective, as a large-scale mechanism pushing back state regulation and public systems of checks and balances. Points of contact are beginning to emerge between neoliberalism in the North and informal processes in the South: "neoliberalism from below" is Gregory Wilpert's name for the transformations by which Third World informalism offers itself on the global market as a highly elastic and mobile form of social and economic organization. Informal neighborhoods are, in a sense, a collateral component of this offer, since they provide a degree of geographical stability and supply of labor force for the global market, despite precarious living conditions.

Belgrade's informalism occupies an unusual position in this international network of relationships between the North and the South because it is not aimed at the world market. There is no intention of offering freely available or flexible conditions as unregulated alternatives. On the contrary, the city is exploring the possibilities for converting its once wild, informal structures to the legitimacy of another, new normality. In a sense, it is extending feelers into the zone on the global map in which the spheres of neoliberalism and informalism meet geographically as well.

In the context of Serbia's integration into Europe, which is essential to its existence, the government is finally beginning to address the negative long-term consequences of its wild, informal decade. The biggest problems are the legal uncertainties, unsettled property claims, and the lack of guarantees of ownership. For under these circumstances, it is impossible to attract the international investment that could accelerate growth. At the time of the embargo and during the subsequent international marginalization of Serbia, these aspects played a minor role, which ultimately accelerated the collapse of the existing laws. The scale of adverse effects is only now becoming visible, particularly in comparison to new European Union members like Romania, Bulgaria, and Slovenia, or the candidate state Croatia. Without legal security, particularly in the urban property market, Serbia has no chance in the competition for international capital. For everywhere else in Eastern Europe, a provisionally stabilized real estate market served as a kind of entry zone for the flow of international monies.

But what does it mean to establish a new normality in urban development and the related markets under such conditions? Belgrade's political promises to reestablish state authority

6 Roof extension mushrooming out over an existing building: "Russian pavilions," Karaburma, Belgrade

obscure the fact that the object of this new normality will in all likelihood not be the old legality or a regenerated state and legal authority, nor yet the city master plan of (socialist) modernism. Everything suggests that the players of informal practices—first the private parties but even more so their professional successors—will not relinquish the room for maneuver they have acquired. The new owners are no longer interested in the old game, and they are very influential.

It is for this reason, too, that most of the outward evidence of normalization so far point in a different direction. From the first legal compromises intended to bring the rampant spread of buildings under control right up to the recent, barren effort at legalization, all attempts have failed to bring urban growth back within the range of the old state planning and control authority. One major reason for this is probably the decidedly ambiguous experience of the 1990s, when informal practices in a wild market demonstrated far too much practical efficiency under chaotic circumstances.

Normalization may therefore be expected to mean that, in the future, informal practices will be integrated into a new form of open law—a very heterogeneous legality embracing various kinds of situations and acknowledging a range of customary rights within a much more flexible, more undefined, and less controllable set of procedures for planning, approval, and adjudication. The result is likely to be an architecture of negotiation, with urbanism at the mercy of the free play of forces.

The contours of this new situation can already be discerned in Belgrade today. First, in order to stabilize itself, the city has to guarantee legal certainty and ownership in those areas that are strategically important in terms of international investments. However, that encompasses neither all construction nor the entire territory of the city. Planning and legal control is instead limited to protecting the real estate market from massive arbitrariness, while anything beyond that remains a matter of negotiation. For only by permitting a great deal of latitude will the city be able to curry favor with international investors by making individual offers. The areas most affected by this will probably be the center of the city and of course the designated investment zones near the river. Where the wild city has created large-scale realities that cannot be untangled, in turn, the functioning of the city will continue to depend on the successful ad-hoc moderation of the existing illegal situation. This artful, appeasing cultivation of customary rights may well be expected to become a permanent feature of Belgrade's urban management. In the less stable zones these processes are well under way; the inhabitants clearly believe in the self-healing powers of the urban corpus.

It is therefore conceivable that within Belgrade, few parallel territories will evolve, with different economic systems at each

7 "Padina at night"

level. A uniform legal practice can no longer be applied in these areas, and in fact a differentiated legal topography is already evident where the legalization of informal and formal projects is concerned. The marked differences with regard to the effectiveness and implementation of master plan regulations in various parts of the city are another clear symptom.

At the moment when the old plan and the associated laws lose their authority, room to negotiate opens up in place of the predetermined norm of law. Negotiation thus replaces the anarchic spectrum of informal practices, most likely in the form of a haggling dialogue with the official administration, in which extremely varied situational criteria may be expected to tip the scales: precedents, economic pressure, political expediency, factual constraints, prestige, old boys' networks, and downright corruption. In these negotiations, pressure and tactics will be just as significant as the vague legal norm. Now all the crafty strategies and experiences from the informal campaign of the 1990s will be secularized, so to speak—as a proven repertoire of legal dodges and design tricks to come to a successful conclusion in negotiations with the state.

In these negotiations, the city authorities will initiate side calculations that reflect its economic weakness and limited room for maneuver. In exchange for privileges, it will seek to shift to developers as many of its formerly public obligations as possible. Perhaps parts of the school system will be "sold," as well as responsibility for local security, infrastructure and services, and parts of public transportation. At least in the areas of consumption, housing, and security, separate, self-contained territories and zones could emerge, some of which may even be gated. The city plan, once marked by soft transitions, will come out in sharp contrasts like the spots of a leopard's skin. In this critical interplay of forces in a continual process of negotiation, informalism will have achieved its goal, in a sense, having reached a kind of plastic stability that is constantly being molded and remolded, based on the operative efficiency of a legal form of informality.

As an autonomous form of urbanism, this system has a good chance of evolving into a kind of prototypical "Belgrade mode." The new model is not so much the result of a carefully considered program but, rather, of a process-based form of Darwinism intensified by the practical conditions in a city that was first destroyed politically and then unleashed economically. Except that the once uncontrolled, informal energies are being converted into a legal play of forces deliberately left open to further players.

While many questions raised by the city plan will be decided by pressure, money, and connections, as they always have been, in the scramble of incipient negotiations the reestablished

public institutions may be expected to develop limited strategies to seize upon specific projects and claim them as key issues of urban development. From among the tangle of valid laws and regulations, some will crystallize more clearly in the process, namely, those on which the state will strive to assert itself. These core objectives of the official administration will replace the traditional claim to authority and the comprehensive planning horizon, instead focusing state activity on a limited number of specific problems in an effort to transform the city that is unlikely to be very transparent. Conversely, and here the experiences of the 1990s come into play again, investors and developers will base their projects on what they consider legitimate or common sense. Both on their own motivation and in competition with the legal urban planning framework, they will thus appeal to established practice or make promises of progress that may be difficult to refute. Just what the common good is will thus be debated in future negotiations like never before.

Once informal urbanism has achieved this state of legalization in the form of an open practice of negotiation, the effects will be scarcely different from those of the massive deregulations that many highly developed cities experienced over the past decade. Whether it is the competition over the location of large companies, the promises of Western capital to invest in Eastern European cities, or the extensive development of the Mediterranean coast for tourism—these operations have long since shed the corset of public planning, building codes, and policies. Unless they are the direct result of corruption, solutions will usually be found in a relatively open struggle for the authority over land. In this tug-of-war, economic or political pressure from private parties may well wrest urban planning concessions from the state. The scenario of an architecture of negotiation in Belgrade thus closely resembles the play of forces in large projects in those European cities that, a dozen years ago, set out to abolish the state-controlled urban planning procedures they had carried over from the legacy of modern social democracy. Belgrade thus emerges as the missing link between the informal sector of the South and the advanced liberalization of cities of the North.

8 Padina, the "Wild Rich"

NAIROBI, KENYA

Shadi Rahbaran with Manuel Herz

TERRITORY **POWER** DIFFERENCE

PARALLEL POWER SYSTEMS

Migration has had a fundamental impact on Nairobi's urban formation. Its short history of urbanization has been shaped by the inflow of different social groups, each inscribing its distinct social, cultural, and physical urban forms into the territory. As a result, parallel power systems have emerged, impairing the role and limiting the authority of the local government to act as a single dominant ruling body. The different and segregated urban patterns in Nairobi are indicative of the coexistence of these multiple power systems.

Nairobi's urban structure has its origins in the racial and spatial segregation exerted as an urban order by the British colonial power. Exclusion of Africans from the city and spatial separation of European, Indian, and African inhabitants were at the core of all master plans since the foundation of Nairobi as a railway camp in 1896. The independence era in the 1960s was marked by a massive influx of African immigrants in a very short time, which transformed the then existing racial segregation to a new ethnic, and especially economic, segregation of the city. The subsequent postindependence phase inherited the urban footprint of segregation while experiencing continued substantial immigration. Numerous high-density single-story and multistory disintegrated informal neighborhoods grew rapidly; substandard urbanization affects today more than 60 percent of the population. The context of Nairobi's complex colonial and postindependence political trajectory and its economy of patronage have reinforced the ethnic, spatial, and economic differences in the city. They contribute to the formation of multiple power structures which in turn influence the urban fabric of Nairobi.

Kibera, the UN Blue Zone, and Eastleigh are three neighborhoods that illustrate how these different urban patterns and their related power systems were formed and how the urbanization of Nairobi as a whole has emerged. Kibera, one of the largest slums of Africa, highlights the rural-urban and urban-urban migration and its relationship to urban poverty, which is formalized by multiple actors from within and outside of Kibera's borders. The UN Blue Zone, on the other hand, illustrates how the presence of global institutions, such as the United Nations and numerous other NGOs, leads to the immigration of professionals and the experts, and directly influences urban space and local economy. The case of Eastleigh conveys how the vivid urbanization of this neighborhood is driven by the immigration of Somali refugees into Nairobi and consequently portrays the refugees as urban catalysts. These three examples exemplify how multiple power systems are generating parallel processes of urbanization and constitute through their interrelationship Nairobi's urban formation as a city.

Rosslyn

Garden Estates

UN GIGIRI COMPOUND

Karuru Forest

Gigiri Forest

Dandora

Parklands

Mathare

Westlands

EASTLEIGH

CBD

Kilimani

Industrial Area

KIBERA

Lang'ata

1 Figure ground plan of Nairobi

KIBERA: FORMALIZED PRECARIOUSNESS

Kibera lies on a flat ridge plateau, which is divided by two polluted rivulets running southeast toward the Nairobi dam. Organized along geographic and ethnic lines, Kibera has twelve (2007) villages of extreme population density crowded into homogenous single-story buildings. It has an immeasurable population of half a million to a million inhabitants.[1] The former Kenya-Uganda railway track forms the northern boundary of Kibera, with the Nubian village of Makina lying on its other side. This single railway track, being one of the few points of entry into Kibera, does not really serve the settlement and its commuters with its train, but is used as the main pedestrian thoroughfare and commercial path when the train is not in service 2. The muddy path penetrates the densely built fabric of Kibera and dissolves into a labyrinth of identical mud huts that are tightly held against one another.

Walking through Kibera, one is constantly aware of the daily challenges of extreme poverty, which can be recognized on all levels of urban life. Lack of water, sanitation, housing, toilets, infrastructure, and security, among many other primary living needs, is persistent. Unfortunately, Kibera lives up to its reputation of being the slum with some of the worst living conditions in Africa. Yet it is one of the most documented, studied, and analyzed slums in the world. The presence of numerous nonprofit organizations, such as UN-Habitat, AMREF, UNICEF, World Vision, and many others, is remarkably visible. Upgrading initiatives funded by donors and the public and private sector have been and are constantly active. The question as to why the significant physical and financial aids over the years have had no significant impact on the urban quality of Kibera still remains largely unanswered.

2 The railway line cutting through Kibera is one of its few open spaces and used as a pedestrian throughfare.

FROM A NUBIAN VILLAGE TO A SLUM

3 King's African Rifles, ca. 1930s. Kibera was originally intended as a relocation center for Nubian soldiers serving the British colonial rule during World War I and World War II in places like Somalia, Abyssinia, Madagascar, and Burma.

The name Kibera is derived from the Nubian word *Kibra*, meaning "forest." In 1912 Kibera was still covered with trees when Nubian soldiers were informally given the right by the British colonial government to occupy the area. Kibera was cleared for living and agricultural use upon the settling of the servicemen and their families 3.

Nubians originally migrated from Sudan and Uganda, where they had served as soldiers for the British in East Africa. They were the chief support fighting against the Germans in (present-day) Tanzania during World War I and played a vital role in defending Kenya and British East Africa during World War II. Soldiers who could prove twelve years of service in the British army were allocated a plot of land in Kibera on their discharge as "compensation" for their uprooted history. However, in the context of colonial tribal and ethnic policies, Nubians were classified as "detribalized natives" not belonging to any Kenyan tribe or ethnic group. This status precluded any formal rights for Nubians to own land on Kenyan native reserves. This is the origin of the insecure and ambiguous land use in Kibera which has been the source of conflicts up to the present time.[2]

4 Small one-story, single-room residential shacks are pieced together out of wattle and daub walls (tree branches with clay construction), found objects, and rusted corrugated metal roofs. These dwellings house up to eight people and do not have basic living infrastructure such as running water or toilets. Kibera itself does not have a sewerage system.

5 Typical interior of a shack

6 Pedestrian path and the market along the railway

ECONOMY OF SPACE AND DENSIFICATION

Until the 1950s and before the declaration of a state of emergency following the Mau Mau uprising—the guerrilla movement comprised mostly of the Kikuyu against the colonial power, which led to Kenya's independence, with J. Kenyatta as its leader—Kibera consisted of a homogenous Islamic Nubian community. With a few Kikuyu labor settlers and some squatters at its perimeter, it had then a population of approximately 2,000 inhabitants. The village of Makina still remains predominantly Nubian. However, by the late 1950s and prior to independence in 1963, large new groups of settlers of other ethnic groups began moving into Kibera. The colonial government was recruiting certain ethnic groups for administrative work by this time. However, they were still banned from living in the city.[3] Concurrently, the established Nubians of a few generations recognized the advantages of becoming landlords of land that was "free" and not subject to tax. They welcomed the new settlers and invested in the inflow of these rural immigrants by extending their houses and building new structures for rental purposes. This resulted in growth and densification that lacked planning and infrastructure and set the stage for the emergence of the slum structure. The urban economy of land was tolerated by the colonial administration, despite a few attempts at eliminating Kibera, but formal land ownership was never authorized. Ultimately, this tolerance served the colonial rule. In this way it profited from the African settlers' labor power without having to invest in any kind of urban planning or to provide minimal services.[4]

This phenomenon gave rise to two decisive urban moments in Kibera, which continue to enforce the slum structure of the settlement and define its urban pattern up to the present time: firstly, the ambiguous use of land through landlordism on unauthorized land; and secondly, an urban order of densification lacking service provision and thus appropriating maximum profitability.[5]

NAIROBI, KENYA

7 Looking over Kibera. Even though several hundred thousand inhabitants live in Kibera in highest density, there is not a single multistory building.

INDEPENDENCE AND CLIENTELISM

The continuing rural-urban migration of the independence era turned Kibera into an even more favorable place in Nairobi for migrants. Due to their kinship and ethnic ties and the access to "affordable" single-room accommodation, the new wave of migrants could easily settle in Kibera. The new capital city, overwhelmed with rapid urbanization and the demand for housing, also had to face the ambiguous Kibera agreement: the former colonial rule had tolerated the Nubians as tenants at will, who could be evicted without notice, while the Nubians considered Kibera to be their exclusive ethnic reserve. The government's reaction to this dilemma was to declare Kibera governmental land, upon which the Nubians had the rights to the buildings but not to the land. The local administration provided informal rights to occupy land to other ethnic communities in the same way. Even today the land in Kibera is exclusively owned by the government, while most of the structure owners are either Nubians or Kikuyus.[7]

The consequences of this policy have been severe for urban life in Kibera. Continued uncontrolled and unauthorized development further amplified the by now already existing complex social, ethnic, urban, and power structures, which in turn opened doors to lucrative investments in substandard informal housing. Since the local administration controlled the allocation of land, influential individuals and politicians gained access to the land and housing market. By the mid-1970s, Kikuyus represented the majority population of Kibera. They held influential positions in the administrative authorities, which were perpetuated through political patronage. The consequence of this development was the emergence of the reputed "ghost landlords,"or absentee structure owners[8] with powerful ties to the village chiefs and elders (Wazee wa Vijiji) and their network 8. At the present time, various ethnic, religious, and institutional forces and their complex web of client-patron structures influence the urban formation of Kibera.[9] Informal planning, targeted densification without infrastructure for maximum profit, and clientelism with strong ethnic ties continue to define the rules of urbanization.

8 Nairobi has a complex system of urban governance. It consists of an elected city council, National Assembly representatives, and the provincial administration and chiefs in certain territories. Kibera has four chiefs—appointed by the provincial administration—and eleven assistants to the chiefs.[6] This administrative chain is informed by the selected villages' elders (Wazee wa Vijiji) and their influential networks and relations to the local actors in the villages for protecting personal interests and consequently maintaining the power and spatial structure of Kibera.

9 Despite its problematic urban qualities, Kibera is home to many different income classes.

ACTORS AND INTERESTS

While struggling with the rapid urbanization and the continuing influx of rural-urban and inner-city migration, the government has become dependent on donations and financial and collaborative aid from the World Bank, UN-Habitat, international and local nonprofit organizations, and other alliances for providing basic public services and infrastructure for Nairobi. The case of Kibera is unique, as the government is caught in a contradictory situation regarding providing public services. While it may be involved in delivering some infrastructure for Kibera, it still classifies its dense urbanization as informal and most of its inhabitants as squatters on government land.

The government's aid dependence has resulted in an abundance and duplication of nongovernmental agencies which also function as urban actors beside the numerous ministries of Kenya, the local Nairobi City Council, the UN, the village chiefs, the structure owners, and the tenants. These multiple actors compete, collide, or control access to resources protecting their own interests (see the case of Katwekera Tosha sanitation access project) 10–12.[10]

For instance, while the government of Kenya in collaboration with UN-Habitat or other NGOs tries to implement planned slum-upgrading programs, purported structure owners decelerate such improvements—whether initiated by the organizations or the tenants themselves. Upgrading could be a threat to the ownership of the structures, since it implies exposure of the unofficial status of the landlords, many of whom are absentee landlords, such as political leaders, members of parliament, and councillors. There are cases where the government has been able to implement upgrading operations to a degree. However, many of these have been executed in isolation, with little impact and no possibility of evolving at all, as they have not taken into account the influential social, political, and ethnic network structure in the villages.[11] Furthermore, constant incompatibilities limit any attempt at urban improvement or transformation and thus give rise to self-perpetuating urban poverty, which in turn impairs the improvement of the infrastructure and basic services. The (non)interaction of the multiple actors from inside and outside of Kibera have resulted in a formalized urban organization's preserving its informal status as a settlement.

10 One of the few pit latrines in a typical setting of human and animal refuse, garbage, soot, and other waste. Kibera itself does not have a sewerage system. Thus the infamous "flying toilets" (disposing of excreta in a plastic bag and throwing it away) and other disposal methods of waste are common.

11 The Tosha Bio-latrine project holds eight toilets, showers, offices, and a community meeting center under its roof. The community of Katwekera initiated this project after raising funds in the community and constructed the Tosha with community members and the NGO Umande Trust, with support from technicians, a planning team, external experts, and donors. Several structure owners had to demolish their structures to make way for the building.

12 Numerous NGO agencies and governmental organizations are simultaneously involved in upgrading projects.

NAIROBI, KENYA

13 Activities of everyday life in Kibera

THE UNITED NATIONS AND NGOS IN NAIROBI

The political stability of Kenya during its postindependence era provided an adequate environment—in relation to its neighboring countries—for its capital city to be chosen as a United Nations (UN) headquarters in 1974. Furthermore, the convenient geographic location presented an ideal place for managing projects and operations in other regions experiencing political and civil wars and conflicts, both in adjacent African countries and further afield.

14 Footpath to the main UN building on the Gigiri compound, flanked by the flags of the UN member states.

URBAN PARALLEL

With a headquarters in Nairobi, the United Nations has had a close relationship with Kenya since 1974, affecting its socioeconomic and governance development and having an impact on its urban transformation. Today, Nairobi is one of four United Nations headquarters, along with New York, Geneva, and Vienna, and houses about twenty of the main UN agencies, including UN-Habitat and UNEP, in its Gigiri compound situated in the affluent northwest part of the city 15–18.

Thus, Nairobi has developed into a prime international hub for developmental aid and represents a node for diplomatic activities of the global political network. The UN's diverse mix of employees reached approximately 3,300 staff members in 2006, with a total of 4,600 across Kenya.[12] The UN's workforce consists of professional staff (who are predominantly international and earn a higher income), the general staff, and the Special Service Agreement (SSA) staff, mainly consisting of temporary subcontractors. The latter two positions are predominantly of Kenyan origin. Thirty percent of UN employees are foreign residents and make up an important part of the expat community,[13] along with members of the diplomatic missions, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), and foreign consultancy firms and businesses.

Despite the fact that the UN mainly acts worldwide, the local presence of such a potent intergovernmental organization in Nairobi with certain extraterritorial privileges has produced its own urban footprint in the city. Inevitably, it has generated a parallel urban support structure amid Nairobi's urban disparities to facilitate its local social and economic needs. To provide for the large expat community, a large service industry has developed over the years to supply housing, education, shopping, and medical and recreational facilities, all of which are located in the affluent areas to the west and northwest of the city 19–21.

This service infrastructure has made Nairobi an attractive key site for numerous NGOs, allowing them to plug into and use the urban resources produced by the presence of the UN in the city. The latest directory of the NGOs Co-ordination Board[14] lists 2,250 organizations based in Nairobi alone, and about 5,000 in Kenya. The parallel urban condition has proven to be highly efficient and beneficial for NGOs, which in contrast to the UN and the local government (see previous chapter) are also involved in local and national operations, mainly focusing on "slums" and informal settlements.

The majority of these projects and implementations by the UN and NGOs in Nairobi are in the informal areas in the east and south of the city. Nevertheless, almost all of them are managed from UN and NGO offices located in the affluent neighborhoods to the north and west of Nairobi, typically housed in spacious buildings or converted mansions and often located in gated communities. This separation—humanitarian organizations residing in the west, but pursuing upgrading projects in the east—uncannily echoes the racial and economic footprint that Nairobi has experienced during its colonial era and beyond. Seeing the development of urban infrastructure serving the expats, one can only wonder about the effect if they resided close to their upgrading projects.

15, 16 In 1974 the United Nations received 56 hectares of land as a gift from the Kenyan government in the Gigiri area, located in the lush and pleasant northwest suburbs of the city. A diverse staff from 83 nations works in 37 buildings (2007) located on the compound.

17, 18 In 1975 the first phase of the four buildings was completed by Matiso Meneces International in the Gigiri complex.

19 Nakumatt Junction shopping center

20 The Village Market: like Yaya Centre, Nakumatt Junction, and others, this shopping mall is tailored for higher-income, international, elite immigrants.

21 Most of the upper-income living areas are located in the northwest of Nairobi, today encompassing the so-called Blue Zone. A minority of the expatriate professional staff still prefers Karen and Langata, the estates in the southwestern part of the city. Mansions are the dominating typology in this area.

Composition of Donors

USA: USD 105M
China: USD 56M
UK: USD 55M
Sweden: USD 38M
Japan: USD 34M
Germany: USD 33M

IMF: USD 76M
World Bank: USD 39M
UNICEF: USD 13M
UNEP: USD 1.3M
UN-Habitat: USD 0.5M

EU: USD 61M
Foreign NGOs
in total: USD 9.5M

22 Total development assistance to Kenya (2006), listing the main donors

USD 679 M

23 Total development assistance to Kenya. The total amount of UN wages for both national and international staff accounts for more than USD 150 million a year. (The UN and Kenya, 2006)

ACTORS IN THE LOCAL ECONOMY

The urbanizing power of the UN and NGOs is not only manifested in the spatial impact of their support infrastructure and developmental interventions, but also in their beneficial role in the local economy. This role is especially indicative of their urban influence.

The United Nations acts globally in Kenya and at the same time is among the country's biggest employers, creating a substantial percentage of the total income generated through international currency in the country. The 2006 United Nations' report on its history with Kenya gives an account of the UN's contributions to the country's socioeconomic development since independence. Over USD 350 million flows into Kenya's economy annually through the UN, which surpasses the country's income from coffee exports.[15] General expenses such as services, purchased goods, and wages for domestic staff account for the majority of these funds. Less than one-third is invested in aid and direct program assistance. The UN's presence in the local economy for Nairobi is not only felt through the aforementioned accommodation of its expat and local workforce, but also through its organized international events. The UN hosted more than 1,500 international conferences in Nairobi in the year 2003, mostly in the Gigiri compound but also elsewhere in the city. These regular annual events indirectly contribute to the tourism industry and activate other amenities in the city such as high-end hotels, restaurants, and retail and other facilities in the central business district and in the western neighborhoods close to the Gigiri compound.[16]

The nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), consultancy firms, and diplomatic missions drawn in by this parallel economy in Nairobi also play an important role as urban actors, which further reinforces and boosts the financial system. The high number of NGOs—representing private companies, state-funded organizations, international welfare organizations, and churches—involved in developmental aid and cooperation programs, for instance, contributes to the economy through extensive international donations, which in turn encourage work and commerce opportunities 22, 23.

Considering that few other cities in the world host this number of organizations which operate with developmental agendas, the economic potential of the UN and of NGOs is a critical generator of urbanization.[17]

24 Housing and educational, shopping, medical, and recreational facilities for the expat community are located in the affluent areas to the west and northwest of the city.

25 The offices of humanitarian aid institutions are located in different parts of the city than where their projects are carried out, and the international employees live in different parts of the city than the local Kenyan employees.

THE BLUE ZONE: PROFESSIONAL MIGRATION

The bombings of the UN headquarters in 2003 in Baghdad, following the 1998 US embassy bomb assaults in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, caused a change in UN security measures. As a consequence, the authorities launched a survey of the city of Nairobi, which resulted in the creation of an approved zone, called the Blue Zone. In this zone the level of security and quality of life was regarded as sufficient for the international staff. Today the majority of foreign staff lives inside the perimeter of the Blue Zone to the north and northwest of the city, more or less coinciding with the living areas before the establishment of this designated zone. However, with this classification, the UN has stimulated another immediate impact on these high-income areas: further infrastructure has been developed, attracting private-sector facilities such as shopping malls, luxury hotels, recreational facilities, and schools, and increasing rental prices and security features. This zoning further contributes to the existing economic and social differentiations 24, 25.

Ultimately, the professional expatriates (immigrants) of the UN and the numerous NGOs in Nairobi have created their own urban landscape which is illustrative of their economic and urban power. However, despite the fact that this power structure rests upon a social and humanitarian agenda, its urban potential for social involvement and integration measures has not been exploited. Rather, there seems to be an increased social and urban disconnection, which enhances the existing segregation and polarization in Nairobi.

NAIROBI, KENYA

<u>26</u> The Gigiri compound has its own flora and fauna and has become a base for migratory birds, with 600 different indigenous species of trees.

EASTLEIGH: REFUGEE MIGRATION

Refugees often represent the weakest and most vulnerable members of a society. They are conceived of as a unanimous mass, warehoused in refugee camps, and more often than not don't have the possibility to influence the context and circumstances of their lives. The physical location of refugee camps is a key factor for this powerlessness. The spatial distance to a social, cultural, or economic context limits their opportunities and creates dependency on humanitarian aid. Cities and urban regions, on the other hand, can provide refugees with the possibility of exchange and thereby a level of independence. The case of Eastleigh is a remarkable example showing how a community of Somali refugees has succeeded in organizing its own livelihood in striking difference to other neighborhoods in the city.

<u>27</u> Street scene in the center of Eastleigh

NAIROBI, KENYA

FIRST AVENUE

It has been raining throughout the night. The air, still wet, is saturated with the smell of rotting food. Hundreds of minibuses and trucks force themselves through narrow streets. Diesel exhaust flows like thick black pulp from exhaust pipes and fills the air with a nauseating stench. The streets are covered ankle-deep in mud. Dense masses of people move and push themselves in a perpetual flow through the narrow gaps left by the cars. Hawkers sell plastic buckets and coat hangers, T-shirts and jeans. Somali street vendors offer household goods or plastic jewelry. The few existing sidewalks are filled with parked minibuses and pick-up trucks unloading goods or packing them in adventurous configurations on top of the vehicles' roofs. A continuous strip of shopping plazas flanks both sides of the road.

First Avenue 28–30 is the main street of Eastleigh, an area of Nairobi located two kilometers east of the city center. Shaped by the dominating presence of Somali refugees, it is one of the most intense and striking places in the Kenyan capital, and at the same time a center of the global trade network. Also called "small Mogadishu" for being a dislocated proxy seat of the government of a disintegrated country, Eastleigh represents the second-largest contiguous Somali community outside of Somalia itself. Because of the relatively well-established infrastructure in Nairobi, it has assumed the administrative functions of the barely operating capital of Somalia, Mogadishu. Eastleigh is populated predominantly by unregistered refugees who are not in possession of legal documents and basically live informal and illegal lives. Thus Eastleigh is a "nonplace": located in the very heart of Nairobi, but ignored by the administration of the Kenyan capital; being densely populated, but having a population that is "nonexistent" and "hidden in plain view."[18]

28–30 First Avenue, in the center of Eastleigh. Eastleigh was founded in the early 1920s. It is based on a gridded master plan with avenues running north to south and approximately eighteen streets running east to west. When founded, the neighborhood was profiled for an Asian population and became one of the main Indian quarters of the city.

31, 32 Eastleigh has grown tremendously since the early 1990s, when Somali refugees started to move into the neighborhood. What was once a relatively central, yet calm, quarter developed into one of the most intense and busiest neighborhoods of the city. The images shows a street corner on First Avenue in 1991 (top); and the same location in 2007 (bottom).

33 Delivery of goods: Eastleigh is one of the densest neighborhoods of Nairobi. It is specifically marked by the fact that neither spatial distinction between different functions nor zoning exists. Logistics, vending, and storage all take place in the same spaces. Additionally, housing, education, and spaces of recreation and worship occupy the same areas as the shopping facilities.

AN IMMIGRANT NEIGHBORHOOD

The toppling of Somali President Siad Barre in 1991 triggered a civil war in the country at the horn of Africa. Suffering from famine, lack of basic necessities, and the destruction of its infrastructure, Somalia slid into a condition of anarchy and lawlessness. Within a short period of time hundreds of thousands of Somalis fled into Kenya. They were placed in refugee camps near the city of Dadaab, where they eked out a dismal existence in this disconnected part of the country. The Kenyan government, which during the 1980s and '90s had practiced liberal and generous refugee policies and had granted refugees full mobility within the whole country, now opted for much more restricted regulations when facing this increase of the refugee flow. From then on all refugees had to reside in the camps and were not allowed to take on work. The refugee camps in the east of the country became virtual prisons. Considerable numbers of the Somalis were traders from Mogadishu, coming from an urban background and not used to the rural way of living in the camps. Having sold off their goods and real estate before their escape to Kenya, they arrived with gold and cash. With the lack of trading possibilities in the camps, they started moving to Nairobi, especially to Eastleigh. The neighborhood thus became an immigrants' quarter for Somali refugees, who settled in Eastleigh illegally. Initially the refugees traveled to Nairobi with the aim of resolving administrative affairs in order to move on to London, Dubai, or the United States. Guesthouses and other lodgings were constructed where they could pass the time waiting to receive their exit visas.

One of these guesthouses was Garissa Lodge, located on First Avenue. The refugees, lingering for months to settle their administrative affairs, started spending their time doing business and trading. As they could not set up their own infrastructure, they started doing business from their hotel rooms. Garissa Lodge slowly transformed from an accommodation space into a trading house. A now legendary Somali refugee and businesswoman was the first to recognize this trend. She bought Garissa Lodge and completed its transformation into a shopping mall. This nucleus of Somali trading centers in Eastleigh quickly multiplied and was replicated in many varying constructions along Eastleigh's central road. Trading therefore acted as an attractor, and the number of Somali refugees in Eastleigh started to rise. Today an estimated 100,000 people live in the streets of "small Mogadishu" 31–33.

NAIROBI, KENYA

34 Porters and day laborers are an essential element for the functioning of the logistics in Eastleigh.

35 Amal Shopping Plaza on First Avenue

ARCHITECTURE OF SHOPPING

The Amal Shopping Plaza 35 currently represents the most developed and sophisticated standard of shopping mall in Eastleigh. Located next to the former Garissa Lodge, it is the highlight of retail environments in this urban refugee settlement. Over six floors, products from all over the world are sold for the lowest prices. On the ground floor cheap textiles are sold in bulk. The individual shop units, each approximately six square meters, are completely filled from floor to ceiling. Trading takes place in a small niche within the merchandise or in the corridors in front of the store. A functional separation between storage and shopping does not exist. More than 160 stores offer commodities in this condensed way. Higher-quality clothing is sold on the first floor. On the second floor, two or three single units are joined into larger stores selling shoes, TVs, and mobile phones. The more service-oriented businesses are located on the third floor. Travel agents offer flights to any destination worldwide, and offices of the global Islamic banking system, Hawala, can transmit money within minutes to places all over the world. A clinic run by the Aga Khan Trust offers medical services to the local population.

The individual levels of the Amal Shopping Plaza are connected by a sequence of intersecting and cascading staircases, ramps, bridges, spiral stairs, elevators, galleries, and access corridors 36–38. Various internal atriums bring daylight down to the lowest floors 39, creating a complex three-dimensional structure of shopping areas, circulation spaces, and communication zones. It is an architecture that simultaneously merges aspects of the informal and vernacular with the highly formalized and conventional. Elements of a standardized repertoire of shopping malls, such as galleries and atriums, are compressed and densified and then combined with functions such as mosques, money trading, or bulk shopping. Three separate circulation systems exist parallel to and within each other: a complex system of stairways, with cascading flights, intermediate landings, and connected bridges that are used as the main circulation system by the majority of visitors; ramps which are used to roll, carry, or push the commodities to the individual shops, though also used by the general public; and two elevators installed mostly to symbolize modernity and comfort, as they were the first elevators to be built in Eastleigh, yet are hardly used on a daily basis. Together with the atriums and galleries, they create a complex space of seemingly free movement in any direction and in all three dimensions, where shopping, trade, delivery, supply, storage, bargaining, dealing, and

36–38 Three circulation systems–staircases, ramps, and elevators–provide access to the six floors of the Amal Shopping Plaza.

39 Lower basement, where merchandise is predominantly sold in bulk.

40, 41 The top floor features a popular Ethiopian fast food restaurant, located right next to the mosque of the Amal Shopping Plaza.

transactions all take place simultaneously: a shopping center on acid. The Amal Shopping Plaza was constructed in 2003. Since then a number of additional shopping malls have been built and more are in the planning phase or undergoing construction. Shopping malls have recognized architecture as a medium of identification and a means to achieve a notion of uniqueness with their customers. They compete with the most expressive facades, shapes of windows, and systems of stairs and ramps, as well as with their size, in order to attract more customers.

A GLOBAL TRADING HUB

42 Eastleigh is one of the main hubs of the privately organized system of minibuses–Matatus–that provide most of the local transport in Nairobi. In order to attract customers, Matatu owners often decorate their vehicles in a very elaborate fashion, with illustrations, bodywork, and fancy sound systems.

43 A travel agency in Eastleigh: many of the Somali inhabitants of Eastleigh are registered as refugees, officially still living in the refugee camps near Dadaab in the northeast of Kenya, close to the Somali border. They regularly need to travel back to the camps in order to be present for the roll calls and registration counts that the UNHCR (United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees) carries out. In addition, families usually have several members living in Eastleigh as well as in the Dadaab camps. Several travel agencies in Eastleigh provide regular bus services between the two destinations.

The civil war that broke out in 1991 has continued more or less unabatedly and has created a Somali diaspora that extends over the whole world. Somali refugees live all over Africa, on the Arabian Peninsula, and in North America, Europe, and East Asia. With the help of this Somali diaspora, a global trading network—with its center in Eastleigh—was developed. Transactions are prepared and conducted via Somali middlemen and contact persons in Dubai, Hong Kong, Minneapolis, or London. The merchandise reaches the Somali neighborhood mostly via Dubai and Mombasa, Kenya's port on the Indian Ocean. Scores of trucks enter Eastleigh daily to supply the individual shops with goods. Neither central distribution points nor storage facilities exist in the neighborhood. As is the case in the shops themselves, there is no separation between retail, wholesale, trade, storage, or warehousing. Semitrailer trucks and 18-wheelers with huge containers squeeze through the narrow streets of Eastleigh and stop in front of a shopping mall, where the goods are unloaded by hand. Streets are blocked for hours and traffic comes to a complete standstill.

It is not only merchandise that reaches Eastleigh from all over the world. The Somali traders of Eastleigh are able to take advantage of global price differences in their wholesale purchases, due to their low transport costs and evasion of import taxes. Thus they can offer their merchandise at very competitive prices. What started as a local market, and whose relevance hardly extended beyond the neighborhood itself, quickly gained influence over trade of the whole region. Today the people who take advantage of the low prices offered by the Somali refugees come from all over Nairobi, and even far beyond. Customers, middlemen, and other shop owners come from all over Kenya, Uganda, and Tanzania into the Somali neighborhood to purchase goods in bulk, which they then resell in their home regions. Eastleigh, this dense, messy, and most striking neighborhood of Somali refugees, has become one of the main trading centers of East Africa.

44 The Somali community has been overtaken by its own success, and the capacity of the neighborhood has reached its limits, with no more potential for growth available. Eastleigh has become one of the densest areas of Nairobi. In addition to the population, thousands of traders, shoppers, and merchants pass through the neighborhood with their cars, trucks, and minibuses.

45, 46 Growth strategy: Branches of the Amal Shopping Plaza have opened in South Africa and Somalia. Simultaneously, and as a response to Eastleigh's capacity limitations, the Somali trading community has started to settle in areas outside of the inner city of Nairobi, like Thika and Athi River.

LIMITS OF GROWTH

With all the urban qualities and the intensity and vibrancy that Eastleigh exhibits—maybe more than any other area of Nairobi—its quality of life is problematic. The air is heavily polluted and playgrounds for children do not exist, just as there are no parks or recreational areas. Through its success as a trading hub, the neighborhood has increased manifold in density. As rental fees continue climbing, the quality of life remains unsatisfactory, and the lack of expansion areas within the neighborhood becomes more and more obvious, the question arises how Eastleigh will develop in the coming years. It is ever more apparent that the neighborhood and its residents must develop new spatial strategies, because the pressure of the rising population cannot be accommodated and a further increase in trading facilities locally is not possible.

Within Nairobi, Somali traders have started developing areas and individual streets outside of Eastleigh. Taking over individual shops in streets near the central business district, they are expanding rapidly. A dislocated piece of Eastleigh, with all its density, distinctive sounds, smells, and visual qualities, is swiftly moving into an area previously held by other trading communities.

The investors and owners of the shopping centers are developing larger-scale strategies of expansion. In 2006 the Amal Shopping Plaza opened a brand-new mall in Johannesburg. Currently the management is in the process of establishing itself in cities in their home country. A branch of Amal Shopping Plaza has just opened in Mogadishu and two further malls are currently under construction in the cities of Bosaso and Galkayo. In a strange reversal of the principle of dislocation, it is now Somali refugees in Nairobi who take advantage of the diaspora as their base to invest in their home country 45.

In the meantime, the Eastleigh business community is considering how smaller cities on the periphery of Nairobi can be identified as new areas of settlement for Somali refugee traders, and how development of trading infrastructures in these towns can be started. The focus lies on the cities of Thika and Athi River, lying approximately thirty kilometers northeast and southeast of Nairobi's center, respectively. Somali refugees will thus be pioneers in a process of metropolitanization that the Nairobi city council has been planning for years, but has so far been unsuccessful in implementing 46. One cannot deny the irony of Somali refugees, unwelcomed and unwanted by state institutions and the city administration, pursuing this process of metropolitanization more constructively than the city council seems to be capable of.

REFUGEES AS SPATIAL ACTORS

Somali refugees have developed an intense neighborhood with urban qualities—but also pronounced problems and deficiencies—that can hardly be found in any other part of Nairobi. As the center of a hectic, efficient, and very professionally run global trading network, Eastleigh provides all of East Africa with goods for daily needs. The striking feature of this phenomenon is that such a sophisticated hub has been developed by residents who, being illegal, are deprived of all rights that come with citizenship, and yet exhibit an intense urban culture—far more highly developed than that of their host country. Eastleigh is probably unique in its current form. It exhibits a conscious understanding of urban operations and spatial practices.

As the limits of the neighborhood's capacity have now been reached 47, the refugee population is devising alternative strategies of expansion and diversification. Different places within the city are strategically selected and occupied: the relations between Nairobi and its neighboring countries, as well as between Eastleigh and the refugee camps, are utilized and taken advantage of. Furthermore, the services of the neighborhood, and even the neighborhood itself, are being outsourced, dislocated, and replicated elsewhere. Faster than the Nairobi city council, the Somali refugees have realized the benefits of a large-scale metropolitan region and are implementing it long before the apathetic and self-obstructing local administration can develop concrete ideas or plans. Somali refugees in Nairobi have proven to be practitioners of spatial planning par excellence, with abilities that have been perfected due to the need to survive in a more or less hostile territory, the efficient mobilization of financial interests, and the clever exploitation of a well-connected network of different players.

48 The new Beijing Shopping Centre under construction on First Avenue.

NAIROBI, KENYA

49 Matatus on First Avenue

MIGRATION SHAPING THE CITY

Nairobi, just over a hundred years old, has grown to be one of the most varied and international cities of the contemporary world. Today it is a city of approximately four million inhabitants and exhibits continuous rapid urban growth. This growth is not only due to a natural increase in population—that is, caused by a high birth rate—but is predominantly based on in-migration. Most of this immigration is either rural-urban migration or migration of foreigners from other countries. Our initial assumption was that these different forms of migration have created different forms of power. As migration is often tied to specific neighborhoods, power in Nairobi is often localized and spatialized. We have seen in the preceding pages how rural-urban migrants, Somali refugees, and international experts within the UN and NGO sphere have settled in Nairobi. Their neighborhoods have developed—with a substantial level of autonomy—into separate power bases that are largely independent of any central governmental authority.

Can we state that the phenomena that we observe in Nairobi have a general quality, in the sense that they represent urban processes that have become characteristic or paradigmatic of the contemporary city? In fact, they only become relevant for urbanism when we can observe similar or comparable phenomena in other cities as well, as they would otherwise just be eccentric oddities or quirks without much relevance beyond the city of Nairobi. In spite, though, of their paradigmatic quality and thus transferability, the very specific way that these phenomena come together and materialize in Nairobi remains particular and specific.

The economic success of the Somali refugees—as just one of the examples—is a consequence of their flight from their homeland into Kenya, which has a certain geographic proximity to Somalia. It is dependent on a global Somali diaspora that has bases in some of the major global trading hubs, such as Hong Kong or Dubai. Furthermore, it relies on a relatively efficient logistical infrastructure that is able to import goods at low cost into Nairobi, often circumventing taxation. The reasons for the specific choice of Eastleigh as a Somali neighborhood lie in the history of a few Somalis who had originally settled there in the 1960s, as well as in the fact that the housing typologies, originally constructed by the Indians who lived there before the Somalis, lend themselves to the domestic tradition of the refugees. We can perceive the case of the Somali refugees as being thoroughly inscribed into processes of globalization: from the war that started in 1991 and the international intervention by the UN and the African Union, with a massive presence of US and Ethiopian troops among others, via the international refugee regime governed by the UNHCR (United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees), to the Somali diaspora dispersed all over the world and to the trading infrastructure and global payment system that this economy is based on. Thus, the Somali trading hub of Eastleigh is both an element and a product of globalization. But it is also highly specific to Nairobi. It is probably valid to claim that this combination of refugee settlement, economic success, and urban culture could only develop in Nairobi, as the right ingredients—such as proximity to home country, efficient infrastructure, demographic size, relative weakness of the local political authorities, and physical grain of the chosen neighborhood—were in place.

Globalization is often described as a process of homogenization: under its effect, all cities end up having a similar character, featuring the same products, dominated by similar housing estates and shopping malls, consuming the same culture, etc. What Eastleigh (and by extension, the international Blue Zone of the UN, and the shantytown of Kibera) shows us is that precisely under the influence of globalization a highly specific and extraordinarily precise and particular urban condition can develop, which can only exist in this one location. Eastleigh shows us that globalization does not—or at least, does not only—result in a homogenization of urban conditions, but at the same time also in very novel and heterogeneous situations that are particular to the geographic location where they have emerged. Nairobi, with its young age and rapid development toward urban complexity within a mere hundred years, seems to represent one of the laboratories for these urban conditions, which are constantly being reinvented.

50 The Kenyatta International Conference Center, by the Norwegian architect Karl Henrik Nostvik, is one of the icons of Kenya's independence.

HONG KONG, CHINA

Rolf Jenni

TERRITORY **POWER** DIFFERENCE

ENGINEERING TERRITORY

With its very specific urban form, Hong Kong has continuously developed within a time span of only sixty years from a colonial settlement partially dominated by spontaneous and informal urban growth, to a highly controlled and formalized global city. After the proclamation of the People's Republic of China in 1949 and the resulting massive immigration of refugees, a rapid modern-ization process started in Hong Kong: the colonial government implemented a systematic control of the territory and its people, combined with mechanisms of market economy—a strategy that continued with some modifications after the handover of Hong Kong to the Republic of China in 1997. This combination of market liberalism and state control might seem contradictory at first glance, but in the case of Hong Kong it became an economically very successful and efficient developmental and urbanistic model.

Since land that can be urbanized is a scarce resource, especially in the central parts of Hong Kong, the government used the crown land under its control as a strategic tool for the develop-ment of the territory and the governance of its inhabitants. It developed a highly sophisticated system of urbanization that was based on strong control measurements, both in a technical and regulatory sense. The result is an extraordinary population density and a far-reaching engineer-ing of the territory. A review of the history of Hong Kong's state-led housing development as well as the strategic role of the public transportation and infrastructure system reveals these complex mechanisms at play.

Simultaneously it seems that the entrepreneurial economic climate of Hong Kong in turn also accepted and eventually even enabled niches of tolerated informality outside of the top-down controlled system: the spaces of the ephemeral, extralegal and self-organized, as the everyday life activities in the streets that constitute to a large extent the urban and cultural identity of Hong Kong. The growing awareness of the public for those urban phenom-ena and its increasing resistance vis-à-vis the reckless urban renewal efforts by the government in the last years manifests a new phase in Hong Kong's urban development.

1 Territory of the Special Administrative Region (SAR) of Hong Kong.
1,104 km², 7.1 million inhabitants

CITY ON THE ROCKS

2 The possibility of the city to grow is constrained by the limited area of flat land: Since the gradient of most of the slopes is more than 1:3 and the soil is of very loose consistency, the city develops only on the scarce flat land at the foot of the hills.

3 City and nature: The reforestation campaign after WWII was one of the first measurements to "generate a new image of the city"–the contrast between the city and nature.

4 Strategic geopolitical position: Since 1842 most of the trade between East Asia and Europe passed through Hong Kong. Until World War II, Hong Kong was the most important trading place for the British in East Asia.

5 In the face of China: View over the Frontier Closed Area toward the skyline of Shenzhen.

The territory of Hong Kong 1, covering an area of 1,104 square kilometers is characterized by a steeply hilled topography, almost entirely covered with a homogeneous, dense vegetation. This particular landscape makes construction difficult on most of the region's territory. While denser urban areas, a type of satellite city, are scattered over the whole area of the so-called New Territories, the main concentration of the urban fabric is located around Victoria Harbor, on Kowloon Peninsula and the northern Hong Kong Island. This area marks the nucleus of an astonishing history of territorial annexation: Hong Kong's foundation is built on a piece of land—a conglomeration of rocks and hills—on first sight inappropriate to urbanize from a physical point of view 2. It was this location where originally an old fishing village was located, until it became British in the mid-eighteenth century due to its strategic position within the Pearl River Delta.

During the first and second Opium Wars (1839–42/1856–60) between the British East India Company and the Qing Dynasty Hong Kong gained geopolitical significance through its position along important shipping routes 4. It was appropriated by Great Britain in three steps: With the Treaty of Nanking in 1842, Hong Kong Island—the former fishing village—became British; in 1860, with the Convention of Peking, the Kowloon Peninsula was annexed as well; finally, in 1898 Britain enlarged its possession to include Hong Kong's New Territories after negotiating a leasing contract in the Second Convention of Peking of 1898. The contract was set to expire after 99 years, determining the timeline until the handover to the People's Republic of China in 1997.

Until today the administrative boundaries of Hong Kong, defined in the Second Convention of Peking in 1898, have remained unchanged: mainly surrounded by the South China Sea it is delimited in the north by the border city of Shenzhen, a 10-kilometer-long linear city along a highway with a population of 12 million inhabitants. Shenzhen was built up in only three decades as a production site for global markets and as a window toward the western world strategically located between the Special Administrative Region[1] of Hong Kong and mainland China. The so-called Frontier Closed Area 5, 6 separates the two territories. It is a pristine fenced piece of nature, facing rampant urban development on both sides.

Within this territory Hong Kong's population of 7.1 million inhabitants occupy a built-up area of only 14 percent of its total surface 3, 7. This strong concentration is partly the result of the search for control over the land: While Hong Kong Island and the Kowloon Peninsula became Crown Land that was under

6 The Frontier Closed Area was introduced in 1951 in reaction to the massive migration influx from China. It was expanded in 1962 up to 28 square kilometers, while in 2006 a reduction of the area to 8 square kilometers was proposed by the government.

7 7.1 million inhabitants are concentrated on a built-up area of only 14 percent of the territory, resulting in a density of about 30,000 people per square kilometer.

8 Politics of class: Is the high-density housing typology for equality, or is it simply efficient land use and its physical consequences? This "culture of efficiency" is on the one side rooted in the limited spatial conditions, but consequently also by Hong Kong's steady economic development.

the full control of the colonial government, the land of the New Territories remained—at least partly—under the influence of the old village communities. Therefore, the colonial government tried to concentrate urban development mainly on their own land, thus facing severe geological constraints. Because massive technological efforts and costs are needed in order to construct on the hills and steep slopes, most of the urbanized areas are located on the scarce plain areas and flat foothills at the waterfront.

However, the high-density policy of the government was not only a result of these physical limitations, but also of the deliberate policy of the government to restrict buildable land in order to raise its market prices. Since the colonial government offered very low tax rates in order to attract new businesses, the land became an important resource for income. The high-price land policy and additional land reclamations became the perfect instruments for generating financial revenues. This territorial strategy, based on the two simple but vital assets—trade and land—was already established by the colonial regime in 1841 and has been applied ever since. It continued even after the handover of Hong Kong to the People's Republic of China. This strategy materialized in the well-known high-density urbanism of Hong Kong 8, with about 30,000 inhabitants per square kilometer and an average residential area of about 11 square meters per person.

9 Nature as background for the city: The Peak, Hong Kong Island

CONSTRUCTED TERRITORY

This physical limitation of the land represents the basis from which to understand Hong Kong's specific urbanization and the nature of its territory. Whether it is the densely built-up urban area or the seemingly natural hinterland, the surface of Hong Kong can be described as a highly artificial terrain. During the last sixty years, Hong Kong has developed various engineering techniques to deal with those physical and spatial constraints: from land reclamation to slope stabilization and drainage systems, to housing bases and high-density housing typologies, the history of these achievements reveals the constant struggle of the city to deal with its physical limits. It also tells the story of how these techniques have led to the specific character of Hong Kong's territorial surface today.

A case study of a small sample of Hong Kong's surface (in the Kwai Chung area, in the northwest of Kowloon), exemplifies the coexistence of very heterogeneous structures, functions, and sociospatial entities 10–12. It reveals in a paradigmatic way the different types of highly constructed and controlled urban terrain: A third of the area is reclaimed land that was constructed for the port between 1960 and 1970 with the steep slope of its original topography now completely altered. Today the new artificial terrain contains a dense mixture of infrastructure facilities such as the container port, the Tsung Kway Highway, local road networks, the metro station of the airport express, and public housing projects built in the 1980s. In a highly organized way every square meter of the surface has a specific function designated to it and is occupied by various uses, such as car parks, greeneries, or workshops. Further up the hill the entire slope is covered with a "second skin" to protect the hillside from landslides 13. This protection is a technological shell with integrated controlling systems, drainage channels, and a network of pathways and stairs. The road leading to the public-private housing neighborhood from the 1980s carves out parts of the slope, and continues further uphill to a private housing estate at the top, with a terrace and a privileged view of the harbor and surrounding fence.

This constructed territory generates new urban forms with overlapping structures and meanings, typically in their specific dense coexistence and increasingly in conflicting overlaps. The economic pressure unleashed upon the existing urban fabric, with its traditional physical and social structures, manifests itself in growing efforts of the government to increase the efficiency in the use of the territory and to promote and impose urban renewal projects 15. Most of the highly controversial projects are today initiated and developed by the URA, the Urban Renewal Authority of Hong Kong. This is not only reflected in the demolition of historical building substance, but also in the increasing disappearance of various informal urban phenomena in the city, such as squatter areas or illegal constructions on balconies and rooftops that are being dismantled under the banner of hygiene and safety.

The notions of safety and hygiene, also used in the discourse and field of cultural anthropology to describe urban spaces in Hong Kong,[2] may help to reflect on another form of control of the territory: Most of the inner-city areas of Hong Kong, with its endless interiorized spaces of connected hotel lobbies, shopping malls, and metro stations, are marked by slick and antiseptic surfaces. The city has steadily developed an expertise and specialization in order to deal with these concerns while simultaneously allowing the smooth handling of everyday life and the fostering of economic efficiency 16.

This specific character of Hong Kong's surface reveals the perception of a highly engineered urban territory. It is a physical reality in which every square meter is designed, constructed, and organized, and where nature is transformed into an artificial, technical landscape while continuously erasing traces of history.

10–12 Kwai Chung area in 1964, and 2002: Due to massive land reclamations for the port area in the 1960s and 70s, the original topography has changed its character completely.

13 The entire slope is covered with a concrete skin to prevent landslides due to the loose soil consistency of the hill. This protection includes controlling and drainage systems as well as a network of pathways and stairs.

14 Public transportation network and reclaimed land In Hong Kong: Land reclamation was introduced for the first time in the 1890s. Today 12 percent of Hong Kong's urban area is located on reclaimed land, virtually all of which is connected to the public transportation network.

15 Land reclamation 2008, Hong Kong Island–Star Ferry Pier area: while Land reclamation was stopped in Victoria Harbour due to environmental issues, it is still an important factor for the governement to generate revenues by leasing the newly constructed land.

16 The notions of safety and hygiene as a means to control the territorial surface: Metro-Station, Hong Kong Central

17 Interrelation between city and topography or culture and nature: Nature–epitomized as exuberant vegetation–is also used as a camouflage to hide all kinds of infrastructural facilities located in the hinterland– whether it is technical or recreational– that assures the existence of the city and makes the city work. A closer look at the hills and territorial hinterland reveals a highly technically equipped landscape, a constructed nature of reservoirs and artifical water basins, water treatment plants, and power stations, networks of roads and power lines, carefully arranged and orchestrated with a large number of country parks.

18 Two generations of housing in Hong Kong: View from So Uk public housing estate toward the privately developed housing towers on Kowloon Station.

19 The proclamation of the People's Republic of China (PRC) and the UN embargo on China in 1951 led to the massive immigration of refugees.

20 Shek Kip Mei squatter settlement before 1953

21 "Made in Hong Kong": The Wing Loi Industrial Building is one of about ten remaining "vertical factories" in Kwun Tong, located near the harbor and built in the late 60s, when extensive production space was needed in the city. Today, many floors of the building are still occupied by dyeing and laundry companies.

22 As a consequence of the devastating fire in Shek Kip Mei, the colonial government built a 29-block resettlement estate on the site of the burned-down shanties to house the homeless victims. Eight blocks were constructed in 1954 with the financial aid of the United Nations. Within the following years the so-called emergency housing was demolished and replaced by 21 H-Blocks.

MASS HOUSING AND SOCIAL ENGINEERING

One of the most remarkable features of Hong Kong's controlled urban landscape is the dominance of the typical housing towers. The endless repetition of the unique typology of slender towers of stacked units is obviously not only the result of the forced densification due to the scarcity of land. The outline of the historical development of public housing in Hong Kong demonstrates that the housing policy has been increasingly employed as an instrument of social engineering.

First attempts toward modernization started already in the period between the turn of the century and World War II. It consisted mainly in the institutionalization of health policies, and in the implementation of an urban policy aimed at alleviating precarious living conditions in slum areas and squatter settlements through massive land-reclamation projects.

The situation changed drastically in the late 1940s after Mao Zedong's proclamation of the People's Republic of China, followed by the UN embargo against China during the Korean War 19. This historic sea change subsequently led to massive flows of refugees and the rapid overcrowding of Hong Kong and presented an important turning point for the city-state. It also led to a complete reorientation toward a new economic base. The massive migration from China offered a large number of labor forces to the colonial authorities. At the same time, industrial families from Shanghai, escaping the Communist regime, brought their expertise and financial power to Hong Kong, establishing factories for the production of cheap, mass-produced items for a global market 21.

In 1953 a devastating fire in the squatter area of Shek Kip Mei 20 almost destroyed the complete district and left 50,000 people homeless overnight. As an emergency measure, the government built resettlement blocks on a nearby site 22. These were soon replaced by the first high-density public housing typologies: seven-story H-shaped blocks called "Mark I" 23, 24. Each building consisted of two residential wings, with the room units placed back to back, and access provided by an external corridor. These houses offered merely room units with no amenities. Communal sanitary facilities were provided on the cross piece at each level. Each building had a capacity of approximately 2,500 people.

In retrospect the disaster is often seen as a turning point in the housing development of Hong Kong. The economic measures introduced by Deng Xiaoping in China during the late seventies and early eighties—coinciding with the global liberalization of market economies—subsequently led to a gradual

23 Mark I (first public housing type): Each unit was 11 square meters in size and accommodated five people. Cooking for the family was on the access corridor outside the front door. In a later stage, the back-to-back room units could be merged into one larger space with access from both sides.

24 The design of the buildings recognized the needs of such a large-scale neighborhood: shelter was not the only component. The ground floor was left open for community use, providing space for shops, workshops, and services.

involvement of the private sector in Hong Kong since the mid-eighties and the beginning of the nineties.[3]

The introduction of Deng Xiaoping's new economic policy and the establishment of the Special Economic Zones—especially in the border city of Shenzhen—allowed the outsourcing of industrial production to the mainland and offered the possibility for foreign direct investments. These conditions marked a turning point in the economic development of Hong Kong, changing from a manufacturing to a service-based economy in the late eighties and early nineties and finally developing into a global city.

Due to the growing wealth of the middle class the private housing market experienced a strong upswing, further fostered by political promotion. A government document commented that private sector participation should "promote social stability and a sense of belonging in Hong Kong by improving the living conditions of the underprivileged while maximizing the opportunity for residential property purchases." Although the impending handover of the government was not mentioned in the document, it was obvious that subsequent to the signing of the Sino-British declaration, strengthening the sense of belonging and social stability was of special importance.[4]

The gradual shift from the government's involvement in the housing programs toward a more market-oriented attitude has been reflected in the development of new housing typologies, both in the public and the private sectors. After decades of linear-organized housing types, such as the so-called Mark-Generations, public housing gradually changed toward the more efficient cruciform typologies 25. These towers were equipped with elevators though still using corridors and galleries for circulation. The emergence of the very specific slender tower type has various historical, economical, and legal reasons. At first it is an architectural reaction to a cultural phenomenon and the concept of a minimum subsistence level (Existenzminimum) in the Asian and especially in the Hong Kong context. The fact that the sizes of apartments have not increased substantially demonstrates the persistence of this culture of dense cohabitation; it further shows the dramatic effects of the high-price land strategy still pursued by the government. This is materialized through the highly technical and functional constraints of the building codes in order to serve economic efficiency in a very pragmatic way. A vertical core with one staircase and four to six elevators serves a maximum of eight apartments with small-sized rooms. Every room in an apartment requires windows for air circulation and daylight. These regulations result in the highly intricate cruciform plans of the Hong Kong towers which today exist in manifold variations 26–30.

25 Mei Foo Sun Chuen (1965–1978) was the first private housing estate in Hong Kong, At the time of completion, the 99-tower complex was considered the largest private housing development in the world, accommodating 80,000 people in 13,500 apartments. The estate was built on reclaimed land and is today completely absorbed by the surrounding urbanization.

26 Tai Koo Shing (1974–1986) was another early private housing development consisting of 61 residential towers and built for nearly 60,000 inhabitants.

27 Tin Shui Wai New Town (1987–1993) consists of both public and private housing estates for nearly 270,000 inhabitants. The new town was constructed on 2.4 square kilometers of reclaimed fishponds and wetland, representing one quarter of the flat land in the New Territories.

28 Tung Chung New Town (1994–) consisting of four Private housing estates and a public housing project (home ownership scheme). The new town targets to have 250,000 inhabitants in the near future.

The survival and further refinement of the typical Hong Kong residential towers is one of the most astonishing features of the controlled urban landscape. The history of public housing in Hong Kong demonstrates how housing policy has been employed as an instrument of social engineering. It is not only the territory that is the object of control by the hegemonic power but also the social environment: the control over the population by providing basic infrastructure for everyone is as such inextricably linked with the modernization and subsequently with the economic success of Hong Kong.

29 View over Sha Tin New Town, with public and private housing estates. Development started in 1970 (current population: 630,000 inhabitants).

30 From public to private housing: The gradual reluctance of the government in the public housing programs toward a more liberal attitude in the private market is reflected in this illustration: while the public housing types have hardly transformed over time, an increase of variations of private-housing types can be recognized.

Mark I/II

Mark III/V

H Block

Linear Block

Twin Tower

Trident I

Harmony II

Harmony I

until 1953 | 1955 | 1960 | 1965 | 1970 | 1975 | 1980 | 1985 | 1990 | 1995 | 2000 | 2005

31 View from one of the residential towers of LOHAS Park onto Junk Bay.

PUBLIC TRANSPORTATION AS URBAN GENERATOR

Similar to the housing sector, public transportation is another important aspect of the instrumentalization of public infrastructure. The first metro line in Hong Kong was introduced in 1979. Beyond its basic function of providing transportation, at the beginning particularly for bringing workers from their housing estates to the factories, it gained an important role in the urban development of the New Territories. Today, public transportation accounts for up to 90 percent of the total transportation demand of Hong Kong, by far the highest share in a city worldwide 32, 33. Furthermore, the construction of public transportation infrastructure has become one of the key elements in the urban development process.[5]

This system has led to a new and highly profitable urban typology: the infrastructure node, which today serves the government as the main device to generate high land value 34, 35. Infrastructure nodes are characterized by high accessibility and high density of stacked programs. The system has been steadily refined and has become the main model of urban development. Transportation nodes developed from simple railway stations into a complex, sophisticated, and highly densified urban hub combining a wide range of urban functions, commercial programs, sports and health services, schools and residential uses. The vertical organization, and hence the proximity of its different functions, is decisive for the efficiency of such "meganodes" 38. The so-called podium—a table-like structure on top of the metro station—allows for flexibility in the arrangement of the housing towers, while offering various additional integrated programs to its users and dwellers. The nucleus of the node itself is not yet lucrative for the government. The Mass Transit Railway Company (MTRC)—a private corporation with 76 percent of its shares owned by the government—is primarily financing the infrastructure functions of each station with the profits of the directly linked private developments and commercial programs. The complex development process for a station covers a time span of about twenty to thirty years, starting with the decision of the government to develop a new metro line together with MTRC. A master plan, based on the government's implemented zoning plan, forms the basis for the subsequent joint-venture agreement between MTRC and private developers. After the payment of the land premium to the government, each of the private developers continues with the planning execution phase while simultaneously starting an extensive real estate marketing campaign. In a long-term perspective the areas in the vicinity of the station are becoming more attractive for additional private housing development and hence generating further revenues for the government through rising land prices 36.

32 Metro lines and territory: The system has a total length of more than 210 kilometers of rail lines.

33 Urban areas, metro lines, and "meganodes": The system includes 155 stations, including 86 railway stations and 69 light-rail stops.

34 Illustration of the main principals of the node.

35 The massive infrastructural features of a station are financed via the directly linked private developments and commercial programs.

36 Profit in billions HKD: Profits from real estate development have increased since the late 1990s.

37 Transportation network—total control over urbanization The direct relationship between infrastructure and property development—conducted by the government and in concordance with the Mass Transit Railway Corporation MTRC and private developers—led toward a new and highly profitable urban typology: the infrastructure node. This node-network-system and its typology serve the government today as a device to generate high land value through accessibility and high density of vertically organized programs.

38 Kowloon Station. Largest mega-node in Hong Kong.

The site of LOHAS Park, with a view to Junk Bay and Hong Kong Island in the back; to the left, Tseung Kwan O New Town, 2008

40 View of LOHAS Park from below the podium.

package nr 1 site F   package nr 2 site AB   package nr 3 site E

package nr 4-12:

site G   site G   site C / D

site K   site H   site I

41 The top of the podium is developed within packages and phases by different developers.

42 View from above: The surface of the podium can be read as a radical form of the concept of constructed topography: a completely artificial surface, highly controlled and technically equipped, a mimicry of an urban space with parks, sidewalks, and streets 30 meters above the city.

INTERIORIZED CITY

One of the most recent projects of this kind is LOHAS Park, a condensed and isolated city-island with a size of almost one square kilometer. LOHAS is an acronym for "lifestyle of health and sustainability." The project addresses customers who favor sustainable living and "green" (ecological) initiatives, hence a relatively upscale and well-educated segment of the population. Upon completion the project will provide accommodation for more than 50,000 inhabitants in 50 high-rise buildings on a 32-hectare site, and will be the largest residential development in the territory 39–41. Built mainly on reclaimed land in the Junk Bay, it sits on top of the train depot at the final station of the Tseung Kwan O metro line, which was completed in 2002. The surface of the podium of the station has been parceled into separate phases that are being developed by different developers. Together these clusters will form a single entity in the final stage of the project. The strategy of privately owned public space is crucial for the usage and occupation of the in-between spaces on the podium. Governmental incentives are being provided to developers in the form of a Bonus Plot Ratio if they coinvest in public service facilities on the podium.[6]

The MTRC claims that the podium will be open to the public and can be used by everyone. The gradual privatization of public areas is a convenient option for the government to consign the expensive maintenance of public areas to private owners. This does not only apply for the spaces on the podium but also for a large number of areas in front of shopping malls and footbridges connecting commercial spaces in the interiorized world of the system.

As LOHAS Park and other examples illustrate, the network of nodes seems to function increasingly in an autonomous way, as its own world, disconnected from the rest of the city. It has become a second urban layer superimposed on the existing city but gradually detached from its existing traditional condition. The megastructures and their connecting infrastructure network has turned into a city within a city, which is functioning as an independent urban space, containing the whole range of urban programs 42. Providing self-sufficiency, it therefore runs the risk of generating zones of exclusion. The network of labyrinthine megastructures in combination with Hong Kong's hot subtropical climate increasingly generates a sort of interiorized artificial climatic and urban condition that is continuously expanding to the point where it seemingly offers all the facilities for everyday life. In the end this might be an erroneous belief: intrinsically coupled with the omnipresence of consumption, these spaces are generating an overwhelming effect of control with little chance to escape or refuse the world of commerce.

HONG KONG,CHINA

<u>43</u> Twenty-four hours in the interiorized city: living, working, and leisure
activities are integrative parts in a indoor space dominated by commerce.

HONG KONG,CHINA

44 Nathan Road, Kowloon

CONTROLLED SPACES: "SPACES OF DISAPPEARANCE"

The artificial and constructed urban landscape and the system of the public transportation network to control urban development are both evidence for the strong presence of the state within the urbanization processes. It is materialized in new, radical forms of urbanization that are specific to Hong Kong, from urban landscapes of high artificiality to the new architectural typologies of megablocks. The dimension of control that the physical reality of these new urban spaces has is omnipresent.

Nevertheless it seems that Hong Kong, motivated by the long-lasting tradition as a global marketplace, still offers a degree of acceptance and tolerance of everyday life and informal activities and businesses, in the traditional Hong Kong streets.

Examples are the Filipina gatherings on Sundays, which transform the streets into a collective living room. More than 150,000 Filipino women work in Hong Kong as domestic maids. On Sunday they invade the downtown area and change the meaning of *public space*: The plaza under the Hong Kong Shanghai Bank is transformed and turned into an outpost of the Filipino nannies, who establish a community with an extraordinary variety of social activities and intimate spaces that are created by cardboard walls 45. The concourse becomes what the Filipinas call their "cathedral." Other examples are the informal trading places and markets in the Chungking Mansions, or the remaining squatter settlements, typhoon shelters, street hawkers, and illegal constructions on rooftops and façades 46. It is this notion of urbanity that constitutes to a large extent the urban and cultural identity of Hong Kong, and which today is increasingly under pressure. It is a cultural identity that has been increasingly debated by a younger generation of Hong Kong citizens who have experienced the transition phase from colonialism to the post-handover era after 1997 and the present capitalist global city. This period is today recognized as an era of uncertainty that helped the young generation to reflect upon their own local urban and cultural identity.[7] As an urban society of migrants—a city that was built on its immigration history of the last sixty years 47—this urban identity can resort to colonialist architecture, rationalist modernism of the 1960s, or the spontaneous and ephemeral character of the physical and social structures of the street markets and the adventurous illegal constructions of the dwellers, that is, those images that stand in opposition to the controlled urban environments and constructed landscapes.

However, under the influence of a mentality that prioritizes profits, these phenomena—so typical for the urban image of Hong Kong—are increasingly being expelled under the disguise of heritage and preservation of the colonial architecture, pretending to preserve a collective memory. In truth, this strategy is being used to implement urban-renewal projects and gentrification processes of inner-city areas in order to attract real estate development. Recent conflicts and struggles between the government and various newly founded grass-roots movements are demonstrating the growing consciousness and resistance of the public to the unceasing transformation of these other qualities, constituting an important aspect of the living environment and quality of Hong Kong. The demolition of the Star Ferry Pier on Hong Kong Island in 2006 was a turning point, since it brought the entire issue of preservation versus development to the forefront of the debate 48, 49. It marks the emergence of a growing civil society—a generation that is disconnected from the life of the previous colonial generation—ready to take responsibility for their urban environment. It highlights a delicate transition phase, which will write a new chapter in the continuously changing urban history of Hong Kong.


45 Filipino women gathering under the Hong Kong Shanghai Bank on Sundays.

46 Illegal roof-top constructions, Tai Kok Tsui Area, Kowloon, from Rufina Wu and Stefan Canham, *Portraits from Above: Hong Kong's Informal Rooftop Communities*

47 Four generations of Hong Kongers: the immigrants, the founders, the internationals, the natives.

48 The Star Ferry Pier on Hong Kong Island was relocated four times over 100 years due to the encroachment of the shoreline, and is therefore closely linked with all four generations of Hong Kong.

49 The birth of a debate: 150,000 protesters gathered on November 11, 2006, to witness Star Ferry's last departure from Edinburgh Place and to demonstrate against the relocation of the pier and the demolition of the old clock tower and pier.

HONG KONG,CHINA

50 Chungking Mansions

CANARY ISLANDS, SPAIN

Jacques Herzog

OPEN–CLOSED

The Canary Islands represent an extreme model of urban development that allows for the study of the role of power—in its shape as politics and planning—on a particular territory toward a specific Canarian form of urbanity.

The history of the Canary Islands since its conquest by the Spanish in the sixteenth century has been dominated by various agrarian monocultures that until today are influencing the economic, social, and urban development of the islands. Since the 1960s these traditional monocultures have increasingly been replaced by a new form and dimension of monoculture, mass tourism, coming mostly from Western Europe and now increasingly also from Eastern Europe and Russia. Both types of monocultures, the agrarian and the touristic, are a result of the ideal climatic conditions on this volcanic territory. But they are also a result of a specific kind of colonial exercise of power from the outside onto the island territory. Agricultural production as well as the occupation of large parts of the islands by tourism are foreign-determined and -controlled. This applies to the wine production that was once in the hands of the British, just as it applies to tourism, mostly organized by nonlocal companies. By now economically dependent on it, tourism on the Canary Islands has led to a large number of migrant employees who are living in settlements and communities far removed from the gaze of the tourists. This spatial segregation of the territory of the Canary Islands into Tourist City, Support City, and Local City represents the physical expression of the social and communal disintegration of the various parts of the population, which are each living in their own parallel worlds. Beyond the specific case of the Canary Islands, one can observe this creation of borders as one of the basic building blocks of contemporary urbanity.

PREJUDICES

We were plagued by prejudice and doubt when we first thought about the Canary Islands. Would there be anything interesting to see apart from the usual ugly outgrowths of mass tourism? Would we come across anything that would illuminate the complex issue of urbanization in the twenty-first century? Specifically, we did not want to foreground the issue of tourism as such; rather, we wanted to investigate its concrete, architectural consequences with respect to the rapid advance of urbanization on all seven Canary Islands 1, 2. Tourism is the driving economic force behind the process of urbanization. Not only does it modify the landscape and displace the preceding transformation brought about by the "age of agriculture," it also creates a new form of spatial and social differentiation.

1 The relief of the Canary Islands shapes their climatic condition.

2 The seven Canary Islands are situated off the coast of Africa at approximately N28°, W13–18°

MONOCULTURES

The territory of the Canaries has long been shaped by mono-cultures imposed on the islands from outside. These mono-cultures determined the economy, the social life, and the urbanization of the islands. After centuries of agricultural monocultivation 7, 8, from the cultivation of lice for dyes and tobacco growing to banana plantations 3, 4, it is now tourism from Europe 5, 6, especially England and Germany, that is exerting a profound and rapid influence on urbanization of the islands and their appearance. Most of the terraces built for agricultural exploitation have been destroyed, abandoned, or affected by erosion.

3 Gáldar, Gran Canaria

4 Papaya cultivation, Tenerife

5 Hotel Costa Meloneras, Maspalomas, Gran Canaria

6 Costa Adeje, Tenerife

7 Terraces of banana trees, Arucas, Gran Canaria (photo: 1960/65)

8 Terraces of banana trees, Tenerife (photo: 1910/20)

INITIAL THESES

Before the semester started we outlined a few working hypotheses as a basis for the students' research projects. After excursions to all seven islands, we restricted the investigation to Tenerife 9 and Gran Canaria 10, the two most urbanized islands. Their extremely heterogeneous urban landscapes show a geographical, social, and economic division between north and south in both cases. The south is characterized by two types of city, the Tourist City and the Support City, which are economically interdependent but geographically and socially separate, while the life of the native city, or the Local City, along the mountain slopes in the north remains largely untouched by developments in the south.

9 Tenerife

10 Gran Canaria

METROPOLIZATION

The rapid advance of urbanization in the north and south of the island proved, upon further observation, to be a process of metropolization in Tenerife and Gran Canaria. In the former, active commuting is demonstrated by the network of workplace and domicile in the north between Santa Cruz via La Laguna all the way to Puerto de la Cruz on the other coast 11, 12. Similarly, on Gran Canaria, there is intense commuter activity between Las Palmas and Vecindario. It is especially interesting to observe that former tourist locations in the cooler north of the island, particularly in Tenerife, are less attractive for mass tourism and are now being populated increasingly by commuters in Santa Cruz and La Laguna. The tramway and railroad lines, some already under construction, underscore the metropolitan thrust of official planning policy, namely to de-emphasize single communities for the benefit of the Cabildo Insular, with its plans for the island as a whole.

11 Tenerife and Gran Canaria: The population growth in Tenerife and Gran Canaria, per community, 1900–2005

Tenerife 2005:
resident population 838,877
average number of tourists in hotels: 1,077,192

Gran Canaria 2005:
resident population 802,247
average number of tourists in hotels: 1,057,056

12 Master plan: Tenerife and Gran Canaria with the metropolitan area around the capital cities in the north, and in the south the touristic destinations with their support cities.

NORTH CITY–SOUTH CITY

13 Tenerife and Gran Canaria
Incoming commuters (1 line represents 100 commuters) per community, 2001
Statistics: ISTAC, Censos de Población y Viviendas de Canarias [Census of Population and Housing of the Canaries] a 1.11.2001

A look at the commuter map on both islands shows a clear division between streams of commuters in agglomerations to the north and to the south 13. It is so distinct, in fact, that one can speak of a North City and a South City: two separate living and working poles each with an entirely different economy, culture, and daily reality. We have used the generalizing term Local City to describe the city to the north (the metropolitan areas of Santa Cruz and Las Palmas, respectively) and propose two urban models, the Tourist City and the Support City, to describe the agglomerations in the south.

14 Santa Cruz, Tenerife

15 Las Palmas, Gran Canaria, seen from Las Coloradas

16 Las Palmas, Gran Canaria
Woermann Tower and Plaza
Architects: Ábalos & Herreros

17 Santa Cruz, Tenerife
Concert Hall
Architect: Santiago Calatrava

LOCAL CITY

The Local City refers to cities inhabited largely by year-round residents as opposed to the temporary presence of tourists. This distinction is of special significance for the Canary Islands because there is a growing group of people with second apartments, who represent a hybrid category between tourist and permanent resident. These are people on regular or early retirement or unemployed people from Europe. As mentioned above, the Local City has become a metropolitan area around the main cities of Santa Cruz in Tenerife 14 and Las Palmas in Gran Canaria 15. The economy and daily life of these areas have developed largely independently of mass tourism in the south 18, 19 and in recent years, both cities have seen a substantial increase in public buildings and institutions for culture, research, and education 16, 17. In addition, civil projects like airports, motorways, and trolley car services have been instituted, which surpass the ambitions and possibilities of many Central European cities of comparable size in the same period of time. An interesting aspect of the growing metropolitan scale in Santa Cruz is the expansion of the Local City to the north, to such places as Tacoronte, El Sauzal, and Los Rodeos, which were once extremely desirable for tourists and are now mutating into upper-middle-class residential neighborhoods. We had not anticipated this kind of intrusion by the local population into the beautiful landscape of their island, which was once the domain of the tourists. This is not merely intrusion into a new place; it also means that the landscape is being reshaped as an oasis for the urban population. Seen in this light, the intrusion and annexation of this oasis mirrors an urban trend that can also be observed increasingly in European cities, and expresses a kind of Mediterraneanization. As our studies progressed, the distinction between the local aspect and the tourist aspect did not prove very fruitful. But something more general and therefore more interesting came to the fore, namely the fact of the foreign and the other and their territorial delimitation in the city. We realized that tourism can be approached from several angles, but that we were primarily interested in its radical, delimiting influence on the concrete landscape, in this case of Tenerife and Gran Canaria. Recognition of these delimiting mechanisms in the Tourist City and the Support City led us to propose the thesis of the open and the closed city.

18 Santa Cruz, Tenerife

19 Las Palmas, Gran Carnaria

TOURIST CITY

20 Los Cristianos ,Tenerife

21 Maspalomas, Gran Canaria
Hotel Villa del Conde

22 Playa de Mogán, Gran Canaria

23 Maspalomas, Gran Canaria
Campo Internacional

On the Canary Islands, everything is tourism, the sunshine is omnipresent, and every single business, every hotel, every restaurant is geared toward tourists from Europe. This meets the expectations of almost every tourist, and we had a similar attitude before we took a closer look. Delimitation is taken for granted. It is expected and desired. And these expectations are, of course, uncontested by the majority of tourists who climb out of their chartered airplane directly into their chartered buses that transport them to their chartered hotel where they basically stay put during their entire holiday. When they do leave the hotel, they still remain within the confines of the world created for tourists, the Tourist City, which has spawned increasingly sophisticated architecture, as eminently illustrated on the Canary Islands. The once slightly artless and separate hotel blocks with rectangular pools in front have given way to simulative hotel universes that flaunt every conceivable form of historical architecture from all over the world in order to generate a sense of authenticity and reference to the local context. Instead of being integrated parts of a master plan, the hotel complexes are single projects erected on adjoining plots of what was once agricultural land 20. These hotel projects are independent, self-contained entities, essentially without reference to a place or to a larger public space. Each one functions as self-referential, self-sufficient islands. The Hotel Bahia del Duque is a good example of the attempt to simulate the lack of a local city by adding on to it a quarter with patios, arcades, and fountains. This architecture of simulation is hardly a film set or a stage set slapped together at low cost à la Disney World but rather a deceptively authentic construction of solid stone 21. There would, in fact, be a great deal to do for a group of students who wanted to study the architectural and urban development of building for tourism, especially in contrast to the Support City. The question of how such a radical, tourist monoculture might potentially be transformed will only become acute when the one-sided and one-syllable form of tourism that entails fourteen days of nonstop sunshine and the exclusion of the reality of other people's lives becomes unacceptable 22. Since tourism is a mirror of the need for holidays and recreation, it is also a mirror of the tourists' working world and social reality at home. In other words the Tourist City (on the Canaries) is a kind of countercity to cities in Europe 23. The cities here and the cities there belong together and express a twenty-first-century urban reality that adds a new, specific dimension to the old principal of delimitation.

SUPPORT CITY

24 Vecindario, Gran Canaria

25 San Fernando, Gran Canaria

26 Ten-Bel, Costa del Silencio, Tenerife: A model type of tourist destination built in 1970 in a straightforward modernist architectural style.
Today large parts are taken over by local population supporting the tourist infrastructure in the south of the island.

27 Los Molinos, Gran Canaria: Los Molinos (between San Fernando and Playa del Inglés) used to be an apartment block for employees of the Hotel Santa Catalina. Today the apartment block is social housing.

If the Tourist City is seen as a countercity and the inevitable consequence of the reality of life in the contemporary European city, it follows that the Support City is, in turn, an inevitable consequence of the Tourist City. The form and daily reality of life in the Support City, as primarily the home of those working in tourism, therefore represents the counterpart to the Tourist City 24. This juxtaposition is particularly fulminant inasmuch as statistics show that on average there is one tourism worker for every tourist. The Support City is not one unified urban entity, and it is not interconnected with the Tourist City 25. It is a clearly distinct territory and has been emerging in several places, as an extension of villages like San Isidro or as entirely new settlements like El Fraile, Las Galletas, and Vecindario. Support Cities are characterized by rapid growth and, initially, little planning. We studied these places but additional in-depth research could offer insight into the spontaneous rise of a city and its resulting properties. As unappealing as these places are, they still have the charm of imperfection and a certain innocence because they have to live entirely without the images and fantasies imposed by urban planners. (Relatively barren) public spaces acquire shape through the daily reality and spontaneous needs of the people living there, which is diametrically opposed to the simulation that marks the development of public space in the Tourist City. It will be interesting to see if and how the radical, mutual delimitation between the Tourist City and the Support City in the southern part of the islands begins to break down, by attracting others who do not belong to the specialized groups currently represented there 26. As mentioned, this is already happening in northern Tenerife, where former tourist locations are becoming upper-middle-class residential areas for people from the capital city of Santa Cruz. In Maspalomas-Los Molinos, people working in the tourist industry have already taken up residence in former tourist hotels in the midst of the Tourist City 27. Another interesting example is Vai Moana, a restaurant with bar and disco; located on the south coast of Tenerife, it is unique thanks to its unpretentious architecture and location directly on the water. Although this bar is in Las Galletas, a classical Support City, it is frequented largely by a young, hip public from Santa Cruz. These are, however, isolated phenomena, and certainly not the result of a deliberate policy. On the contrary, awareness of the problem of monofunctional tourism has not yet led to any political action to develop means of transformation.

28 Costa Adeje and Los Cristianos, Tenerife: Hotels arranged like independent islands, cut out from real territory.

29 Public space is reduced to a mere leftover in between them.

30 Santa Cruz, Tenerife

31 Las Palmas, Gran Carnaria

CANARY ISLANDS, SPAIN

32 Costa Adeje, Tenerife: Tourist City

33 El Fraile, Tenerife: Support City

CANARY ISLANDS, SPAIN

34 Santa Cruz, Tenerife

35 Las Palmas, Gran Carnaria

OPEN CITY VS. CLOSED CITY

The Tourist City on the Canaries, as described above, is the urban manifestation of an approach to delimitation that is reinforced by a variety of consciously and unconsciously cultivated strategies. While evaluating the work of the semester and archiving the data (Smart Archive), we realized that this delimitation applies not only to the opposition between tourist and nontourist but that delimitation of all kinds has been a basic urban principle since the earliest beginnings of what we call a city. One could recount the entire history of urban growth all over again from the vantage point of delimitation, the placement of a wall erected to distinguish and divide one side from another 36. Delimitation is neutral inasmuch as it is only a means of making visible a distinction between two sides. In an innocent, edenic state, this distinction does not exist; nor are there any other distinctions, any values, any standards, any differences—concepts that are all indispensable to the rise of the city and of urbanism. It may only be a wall between open fields and a cultivated Arabic garden; it may be the walls of a city, a wall surrounding a monastery, or marking the immunity of church property; it may be a walled-off industrial plant, a prison, a gated community, or the campus of a global pharmaceutical company under strict surveillance: all of these are closed places, partially or entirely inaccessible to the public life of the city. Unlimited public access is restricted because it is only in this way that the goals, the desires, the power, purpose, or will of the group seeking delimitation can be achieved. These delimited, closed places in the city stand in contrast to freely accessible public places: the open city. The open city, the city of unlimited freedom, is a myth, if anything, it is a rather unstable, transient state in a city that is subject to ceaseless processes of change. From open to closed, from closed to open—a continuing process of change. In *Die Welt von Gestern* (*The World of Yesterday*), Stefan Zweig sang the praises of turn-of-the-century Vienna between the wars of 1870—71 and 1914—18, painfully drawing our attention to the transience and volatility of any state of freedom and openness. Vienna had lost its political and geographic reach, which was tantamount to an amputation of power with consequences that had an impact on the inner territory of the city and, worse yet, on the self-image of the city's inhabitants. The opposite happened when the Berlin Wall fell in 1989. It was incredible: a wall that divided an entire city crumbled like a sand castle, an event that would have been inconceivable only a few years earlier. For decades this wall had been the expression and symbol of unyielding ideological, political,

and economic delimitation between East and West, the quintessential opposites of the Western world in those days 37. A less dramatic process of transformation has been taking place in many European cities in recent years as a consequence of the interdependent phenomena of de-industrialization and globalization. Though not caused by the same worldwide political problem as the fall of the Berlin Wall, this process is nonetheless indicative of global economic change that directly affects local urban conditions. Docklands and industrial zones, once closed areas, are being converted into new, open urban locations; conversely, large portions of once open and attractive inner cities are deteriorating, becoming host to the same cheap stores that are mushrooming in cities everywhere and attract only certain segments of the population. The result, once again, is delimitation.

36 *Das Paradiesgärtlein* by Meister des Frankfurter Paradiesgärtleins, ca. 1415, Städel Museum, Frankfurt am Main (detail)

37 Berlin, Germany: Building the Berlin Wall, 1961

BEIRUT, LEBANON

Manuel Herz

TERRITORY POWER **DIFFERENCE**
NATION VERSUS NEIGHBORHOOD

Heterogeneity and individuality are often cited as two of the main characteristics defining the notion of the urban. The relationship between cities and their diversity though, is not a linear one. While a lack of difference (if that is at all possible) might be a sign of the absence of urbanity, an increase of difference does not necessarily lead to a more urban character. A central question is rather how difference is played out in the urban realm, and how the various inhabitants and groups communicate with one another or negotiate their differences. How is heterogeneity manifested within the urban environment? How does difference become physical? Is there a point where diversity breaks down? Beirut, maybe more than other cities, has explored all varieties of materializing difference, from the very cosmopolitan to the very tragic.

Throughout its history Lebanon—and more specifically Beirut, which can be said to represent the country with all its complexities—has experienced a struggle between establishing and asserting a national identity and the hegemony of locally embedded religious and social groups. While Lebanon can be traced back to ancient and biblical times, where it was described as a country of strength and beauty, it was ruled by foreign powers for most of the time since the sixteenth century, and hence has not been able to develop national institutions. Even after its independence in 1943, the state and its institutions were marked by weakness, and were not able to provide the necessary public services (schools, utilities, health, etc.) to the general population, nor to mediate between the different interests of the various social and religious groups. Hence more locally rooted groups filled the gaps while demanding allegiance of its local constituency.

Thus, the struggle for hegemony is also always a struggle of scale, between the national and the neighborhood. In the 1970s, with the increased influx of Palestinians from Jordan, the state collapsed and the neighborhood won.

Today, we can witness a city that is on the one hand a territory divided into myriads of islands, each representing a specific religious affiliation, with its distinct way of life and social identity. On the other hand, more recently we can witness a transition to the political, where religious affiliation is replaced by political ideologies, such as neoliberal or socialist agendas, spanning across the spectrum of the diverse religious groups.

1 Cheikh el Ghabi Street in Karm el Zeitoun, eastern Beirut

RIVAL SPATIAL CLAIMS

2 Street corner in Haret Hreik, southern Beirut

3 Flags of Amal in proximity to an area that is dominated by Hezbollah, a competing Shia group.

A street corner in Haret Hreik, a neighborhood in southern Beirut and the stronghold of the Hezbollah, one of the main Shi'a Islamic groups in the country 2: the scene abounds with posters and the slogans of politicians and communal institutions. Statements of various heads of state are located next to a dramatic call to arms. Flags of political parties dangle in front of pious religious slogans, or next to something as benign as reminders of local administrative rules. A banner across the street, depicting the past and present Iranian leaders Khomeini and Khamenei, features the slogan "Israel should disappear from existence." A poster with a red background has Hassan Nasrallah saying "They can't extinguish the light of God." To its right a poster shows Syrian president Bashar al-Assad saying "Oh Loved One, your life is long." In the background, images of Imad Mughniya, a senior member of Hezbollah, killed in Damascus in 2008, presumably by Israeli agents. To his right, a poster depicting other Hezbollah martyrs. The white banner in the background by the Hezbollah-led municipality draws attention to traffic and parking rules. What seems at first sight to be a wild ensemble of different voices, upon closer inspection reveals the different levels of political agency that Hezbollah is using to enact authority: Photos and statements of the Syrian and Iranian heads of state show how Hezbollah is acting within, and supported by, a larger regional, international context. References to Allah and quotations from the Koran designate it as a religious authority. Through a call for armed struggle against Israel, and with its logo and emblem featuring a machine gun, Hezbollah presents itself as a military and militia organization. Nevertheless, with the national flag, the organization claims to subscribe to the logic and rules of the nation-state and references it as a political party with seats in the national parliament. Last but not least, Hezbollah sees itself also as an activist or community organization taking on responsibilities for the local population, often in critique of the actions of the formal nation-state that it participates in.

It is these dimensions of authority—the international, the religious, the military, the political, and the communal—that allow Hezbollah, but also many of the various other factions in the city, to manifest itself spatially and locally within the urban fabric of Beirut.

When moving through the streets of Beirut one is confronted by a myriad of signs, symbols, and slogans of political and religious groups. While the flags of the Hezbollah or the Amal movement—another competing Shi'a party—feature in the streets of South Beirut 3, a street in an eastern neighborhood will feature large crosses suspended between the houses,

4 Christian and Armenian neighborhood Karm el Zeitun in eastern Beirut. Cheikh el Ghabi Street in Karm el Zeitun, east Beirut

shrines with the figures of Mary, and references to the Kataeb Party or other Christian parties that have often developed out of the Phalange or Christian militias from the civil war 4. The signs mark boundaries and divisions within the urban fabric. They identify, and allocate, areas of control. A multitude of signs, posters, and political slogans pinpoint allegiance of a neighborhood to one of the many parties and factions of the colorful political—and ethnicized—landscape of Lebanon. Urban territory has become the arena where conflict, competition, and the struggle for power by the various urban actors is played out.

1840

1880

1920

2000

5–8 Urban growth, 1840–2000:
Going from provincial city to modern
capital, the rapid growth of Beirut
coincided with various phases of
immigration from other countries as
well as rural-urban migration from the
mountain villages.

TRACING BACK HETEROGENEITY

Lebanon, and specifically Beirut, has always been a country with a diverse demographic and a precarious balance between its various population groups. The search for a common national identity can be seen as a leitmotif in the formation of its fragile multiethnic society. The territory and its name feature prominently throughout history, going back to ancient times. Being described in the Bible as a country of strength and beauty, with vast forests and snow-capped mountains, it has hence gained an almost mythical quality. Its self-definition, though, has often been tenuous. With a population of supposedly Phoenician origin, it was from classical times on inhabited by Jews and early (Maronite) Christians. After a short spell under Persian rule in late Byzanz, Lebanon was conquered by the Muslim Arabs during the mid-seventh century, though a large part of its population remained Christian. Beirut 5–8 flourished as a Mediterranean harbor and a Crusaders' outpost but then, losing autonomy, since the early sixteenth century found itself under Ottoman rule in a combined province with Syria (Bilad-ash-Sham, or Greater Syria).[1] With the fall of the Ottoman empire after World War I it became part of the French Mandate, which governed Lebanon until its independence in 1943. At the beginning of the twentieth century the city could be seen as "the product, the object, and the project of imperial and urban politics of difference: overlapping European, Ottoman, and municipal civilizing missions competed in the political fields of administration, infrastructure, urban planning, public health, education, public morality, journalism, and architecture." Cosmopolitan difference was presented as Beirut's dominant trait, resulting in a metropolitan environment where religious and ethnic differences flourished, physically shaping the urban fabric. Beirut was a city of many religions, with Christians, Muslims, and Jews living within the city limits. Nicknamed both the "Paris of the East" for its exuberant and elegant lifestyle, its fancy restaurants and hotels, and its glamorous parties, and the "Switzerland of the East" for its well-established banking sector as well as the proximity of ski slopes on the snow-capped mountains and the beaches on the waterfront of the Mediterranean Sea, in the 1960s and early '70s Lebanon was the embodiment of cosmopolitanism and glamour.

The Place des Canons, later renamed Place des Martyrs, encapsulates the modern history of Lebanon, and of Beirut in specific, like no other 9. It was here that the uprising against Ottoman rule took place in 1916—and where four leaders of the uprising were subsequently hanged—representing an emergence

9 Place des Canons, ca. 1910:
The Place des Canons, now Martyrs' Square, has been one of the centers of social life in Beirut since the late nineteenth century, representing its glamour and cosmopolitan quality. It also represents a pivotal location in the history of the country. It was the site of uprising against Ottoman rule, and the subsequent hanging of the leaders of the revolution, hence earning the name Place des Martyrs (Martyrs' Square). The celebrations for the proclamation of the Lebanese Republic took place in that location in 1943, as did the demonstrations in 2005 that led to the end of the Syrian occupation.

of Lebanese national consciousness. It was the same square that demonstrations for independence from France took place and sovereignty was eventually celebrated in 1943. By that time the Place des Martyrs had already developed into the center of social life. With cinemas, restaurants, and expensive shops lining the square it represented the glamorous, hedonistic, and cosmopolitan life of Beirut.

But cosmopolitanism was just one side of the story: Only a small part of the population was able to participate in the international glamour, representing an elitist and sectarian condition. The institutions of the state were weak and were doing little to negotiate between the different population groups and their interests as well as the acute differences of income, wealth, and education. Moreover, ethnic and religious tension was rife throughout the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. In retrospect the story of cosmopolitanism seems like a construction, hiding the nation's conflicts, which have continuously shaken the foundation of the state. The civil wars during the 1840s and 1860s between the Maronites, Druze, and Muslims, the immigration of 100,000 Palestinian refugees in the wake of the 1948 Arab-Israel war, as well as the civil wars after the country's independence in 1958 foreshadow what was to become of Lebanon after 1975. They are also evidence of the questionable relationship between difference and cosmopolitanism or, on the other hand, heterogeneity and conflict.

LIMITS TO DIVERSITY?

The diversity of Beirut's population meant a fragile demographic balance and a constant struggle for hegemony. Diversity also posed the question about the terms under which the population could unite. How could the sense of a nation-state be constructed? Once the colonial powers, first the Ottomans, then the French, had withdrawn or been ousted, the apparent lack of a common national identity to bridge the different religions and ethnicities became apparent. With the National Pact of 1943 the national assembly tried to mirror the nation's diversity through the principle of "confessional distribution": specific proportions of parliamentary seats were reserved for each and every religious group. Political elections thus took place not only within a local (spatial) constituency but also within one's religious affiliation. While creating a delicate equilibrium between the different population groups, it also introduced—or reinforced—an ambiguity, as it was not clear if the nation-state or rather the religious group should be the primary reference of association or loyalty for each individual. As we will see, the latter often plays out on a smaller territorial level of the commune, neighborhood, or district.

Even though demographically mixed, the city was composed of neighborhoods that were predominantly inhabited by one religious group. While Christians and Muslims lived across the whole urban fabric of Beirut, Ottoman rule witnessed a development that led to the majority of Christians living in the eastern neighborhoods, while most Muslims lived in the western parts of the city. The location of churches and mosques constructed during this time gives evidence of this demographic layout. This process of segregation though, was destined to increase.

The twentieth century saw the immigration of various population groups' having direct impact on the city's development. Every immigration wave went hand in hand with the establishment of a new neighborhood: Bourj Hammoud in the east of Beirut grew out of the refugee settlements where tens of thousands of Christian Armenians had settled after fleeing from the Armenian genocide in the 1920s and 1930s. All throughout the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries a strong rural-urban migration of Maronite Christians from mountain villages led to the rapid growth of the city and its suburbs. Then the late 1940s saw a sudden influx of large numbers of (Sunni) Palestinians who, with the establishment of the state of Israel and the first Arab-Israeli war of 1948, had fled from their former homeland in Palestine, now settling in various refugee camps in the south and east of Beirut. Finally, in the early 1970s, following the Black September in Jordan, the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), together with additional several thousand Palestinian families, moved from Jordan to Beirut, establishing their political headquarters in the southern suburbs of the city 10.[2] Hence every wave of immigration shifted political power relationships while at the same time extending the city, creating new spaces of urban fabric. Each new neighborhood carried its own specific social and religious affiliation 14. The institutions of the Lebanese nation-state though, proved to be too weak—or unwilling—to mediate between the varying interests of the different population groups. Not able to guarantee the population's safety, to participate within a nation-based civil society, or to procure urban services from governmental institutions, inhabitants turned to local interest groups based on kinship and faith denominations. Clientelism replaced a national agenda. With the last influx during the early 1970s the fragile demographic balance finally collapsed. Cosmopolitanism through diversity turned into violence based on sectarianism.

10 Sabra and Shatila camps, South Beirut, 2002: The refugee camps of Sabra and Shatila were founded in the 1940s, when the foundation of the state of Israel resulted in the displacement of hundreds of thousands of Palestinians, many of whom eventually came to Lebanon and especially Beirut. After the expulsion of the PLO from Jordan in 1970, the organization established its headquarters in Haret Hreik, near the refugee camps.

11–13 Bouj Hammoud was founded by Armenian refugees in the early 1920s and expanded rapidly during the 1930s to become an independent municipality to the east of Beirut. Bourj Hammoud still gives testimony to the gridded street layout that was used to the the refugees, initially in tents and wooden huts.

14 Armenian refugees in Karantina, east Beirut, 1924: Various phases of immigration resulted in the establishment of new neighborhoods, with distinctive urban patterns. With the influx of approximately 100,000 Armenians in the 1920s and '30s the neighborhoods of Karantina, Bourj Hammoud, and Karm el Zeitoun were founded. Karantina was also the site of one of the first massacres that triggered the civil war in 1975.

Refugiés Arméniens

WAR AS MOTOR OF URBANIZATION

15 Divided city, 1975: The infamous Green Line was established at the very beginning of the civil war, dividing the city into western (Muslim) and eastern (Christian) parts. During the later stages of the civil war the city became filled with checkpoints and barriers, dividing the city into multiple territories, each controlled by one of the many warring factions.

16 View of the coastal region between Jounieh and Antelias from Zouk Mikael, 2008: Originally dotted with small villages and fishermen's settlements during the civil war, the coastline east of Beirut has developed into a replacement capital for the Christian population. Most of the buildings seen in this image were constructed between 1975 and 1990.

What followed were fifteen years of civil war where the city became a target, a battlefield, and an apparatus of war. Tall buildings were used as sniper positions; large, solid buildings, as protection; and the whole complexity of the built-up fabric was employed to navigate, block, assist, or prevent movement of combatants, civilians, and goods. If not invented there, twentieth-century urban warfare surely experienced its perfection in Beirut. What initially started as a divided city with an only seemingly clear split between Muslims in the west and Christians in the east 15, devolved into a fragmented urban fabric consisting of a multitude of fiefdoms. Even though the infamous Green Line cutting the city into two separate entities was the main organization principle of Beirut during the first phase of the civil war, this binary system broke down when new forces entered the war in the late 1970s, especially Israel and Syria. Different factions within the Christian right-wing Lebanese Forces were fighting and assassinating one another while the Shi'a Amal Movement, backed by the internally displaced (IDPs) from southern Lebanon, started a "War of the Camps" against the Shi'a Hezbollah, representing the Palestinian refugees. Alliances across the religious divide developed when Christian groups joined forces with Muslim counterparts. (The common joke in Lebanon was that the war ended when—or because—all combinations of coalitions had been played.) This splintering of the military and political landscape into a multitude of warring factions was complemented by analogous developments on the ground: The city fabric subdivided into several cells and small neighborhoods, each ruled by a warlord or a political party. Urban territory became the very material of warfare, with streets and housing blocks under continuously shifting rule.

Civil war though, was not only a threat to the city. Throughout the war, large areas of the city—outside of its center—were being developed along principles of ethnic purity and the exclusion of other population groups. Beirut's southern neighborhoods, such as Haret Hreik, have come to stand for supposedly radicalized suburbs under the rule of Muslim organizations such as Hezbollah that have established a state within the state since the civil war. But this urban development of sectarian neighborhoods was not exclusive to the Muslim side. An "Inter-War-City" stretches the full 20 kilometers from Bourj Hammoud to Jounieh 16. Before the war the coastline was dotted by individual small villages and fishermen's towns, but during the civil war it developed into a continuous and dense strip of linear urbanization along a motorway.[3] Populated by Christians who

17 Christ the Redeemer statue in Zouk Mosbeh, near Jounieh, overlooking the coastal hills

18 Super Night Club, in an apartment building along the coastal highway between Beirut and Jounieh

had either moved away from the intense fighting in the inner city or from other hot spots in the country, it was purposefully developed as an ethnic enclave. Christian religious imagery in the shape of small wayside shrines, large crosses, or pictures of saints feature in many of its streets even today. In the majestic Maronite cathedral, built during the war on the mountaintop of Harissa 17, overlooking the bay of Jounieh, the priest used to plead for an invigorated spirit in the fight against the Muslims while militia leaders of the various phalangist movements conducted their business in their luxury compounds along the slopes of the coastal mountain range. The civil war thus was the time when the city grew most rapidly and marks the reinforcement of a sectarian and segregated urban fabric.

What during the war acted as a replacement capital for the Christian community today has declined into a stale urbanization along a highway spine, where the fancy nightclubs of the war period have mostly shut down or been turned into seedy brothels 18.

19 Beirut Souks, 2011 – consumerism as common space: An immense open-air shopping mall, the Beirut Souks only share a name with the former commercial hub of the city and its medieval, maze-like structure.

CONSTRUCTION OF THE COMMON

The civil war ended in 1990 with a new balance of political power between the different religious groups and a major plan to reconstruct the city center. While the National Pact from 1943 had secured a 6 to 5 majority of seats to be reserved for Christian representatives and for the Lebanese president always to be a Maronite, the Taif Accord from 1989 fixed an even proportion of seats between Muslims and Christians and reduced the power of the Maronite president. It was an attempt to achieve a harmony across the demographic spectrum within the dimension of political representation. Shortly after, the Lebanese parliament passed an amnesty law pardoning all political crimes of the civil war. While perhaps representing a clean slate, it also meant that the participants of the war continued to be in power.

The reconstruction of the city center saw the conscious effort to construct the image of the common in the central areas of Beirut. The heart of the city center witnessed the construction of the Beirut Souks 19 as a large shopping mall replacing the old souks and pedestrianized shopping streets around the Etoile, the core of the city dating back to Roman times. While borrowing the historical term souk without replicating its heterogeneity, a commercialized hub was developed where commonality is based purely on consumerism, consciously excluding lower-income groups.

For a fleeting moment Martyrs' Square once again, it became the focal point for a very different form of commonality. Upon the assassination of then president Rafik Hariri in 2005, mass demonstrations took place uniting most population groups of Beirut and Lebanon, across the religious spectrum, in a collective attempt to rid the country of its Syrian occupation, the assumed perpetrators of the assassination. In a certain irony it was due to the fact that the square—because of a recent recession—had not yet been developed as planned into luxury housing and ubiquitous shopping facilities, and hence was still a large wasteland in the city center, that the general population was able to seize it in an act of urban resistance.

Ever since though, Martyrs' Square, still incomplete in its reconstruction process, is towered by the Saudi-financed Mohammad Al Amin mosque 20, 22. The mosque brings the dimension of religion into a sphere previously characterized by epicurean activities such as restaurants and nightlife. It is a testimony to the continuous struggle of physical territory in the urban fabric of Beirut.

The demonstrations of 2005 though represent a reemergence of a national consciousness in another sense. They triggered the

20 St. George's (Maronite) Church and (Sunni) Mohammad Al-Amin Mosque off Martyrs' Square, Central Beirut, 2008: While seemingly showing the peaceful coexistence of the different religious groups after the civil war, the Sunni mosque and Maronite church also give testimony to the sectarian violence that has characterized Beirut. St. George's Church is one of the only churches in the Western (predominantly Muslim) part of the city divided during civil war. Heavily damaged during the hostilities, it was reconstructed in the 1990s and reopened in 2000. The Mohammad Al-Amin mosque was initiated and financed by Rafik Hariri and (perhaps symbolically) built with Saudi stone. Located at one of the sides of Martyrs' Square, it brought religious symbolism to that square which was previously known for its hedonistic character, famous for its cafés and cinemas. Rafik Hariri himself was buried there after his assassination in 2005, variously attributed to Syrian, Israeli, or Hezbollah forces.

formation of two national coalitions which cut across the religious spectrum and unite a range of parties under shared political positions and ideologies: the anti-Syrian March 14th alliance, representing a neoliberal position; and the socialist March 8th alliance. Both blocs include secular and religious, as well as Christian, Sunni, and Shi'a Muslim parties representing a move away from the local-community and religiously based allegiance, to one which is more national and politically based.

CITY OF ISLANDS?

In contemporary Beirut power plays out territorially. Space is not only the medium, but the very interest and aim of power. The logic of national territory—or the territorial method of the nation-state—is projected down to the space of the city. Parties struggle not only for political power in the parliament, but also for territorial control. National institutions never had full control over the country's territory. Therefore questions about which organization controls which neighborhood obtain strategic importance. Inhabitants declare their allegiance to the authority in command and benefit from its protection. The factions can maneuver easily between their roles as militia, community organization, national political party, religious authority, and representative of a pan-Arab movement. The result is a territorial economy: Occupying space means access to power, but also financial gains.

Neighborhoods, streets, and quarters are marked by flags and posters indicating an affiliation to a certain political, ethnic, or religious group. Divisions, gates, and barricades have become the vocabulary and the urban code of the city 21. The archipelago city still manages to function sufficiently well, as the population has learned during the civil war to operate and maneuver through the different divisions within the urban fabric.[4] Is the proliferation of gates and barricades though an evidence for too much diversity, a coping mechanism for dealing with the postwar era, or for the fact that the nation-state cannot—or is unwilling to—moderate between the different interests of the various population groups?

More recently though, the use of the urban fabric has been changing. Perhaps spatially mirroring the reshaping of the political spectrum into two blocs—one that could be described as neo-liberal and the other as more socialist—today one can identify areas and neighborhoods that represent specific lifestyles while spanning the religious spectrum, rather than being locked into a faith-based urbanism. The shopping malls, exclusive residential compounds, and expensive night-life areas, partially located in Gemmayzeh, what is traditionally considered a Christian neighborhood, are visited by secular Muslims and Christians alike. At the same time, new art institutions and organizations that are critical of neoliberal agendas have established themselves in the areas outside of the city center, both in the east and the west, their visitors, affiliates, and members again spanning the religious spectrum.

Openness is a myth. No city is completely open. Divisions are usually one of the fundamental building blocks of cities. In Beirut though, they have become the basic currency of a ubiquitous urban economy. It remains to be seen if the pervasive presence of border conditions we observe in Beirut is part of a certain DNA of this city, forever caught up in the desire to separate and partition, or if, on the other hand, we are witnessing a transitory moment, maybe part of a healing process from a war-torn city to a city where instead of religious allegiance being the main reference, struggle will play out between different lifestyles and political agendas.

The recent influx of vast numbers of Syrian refugees fleeing from their war-torn country opens another chapter in the series of immigration movements that Lebanon has witnessed in the last hundred and more years. It is too early to speculate upon its impact on the urban fabric of the capital city. Whether this moment finds its parallel in the mid-1970s, when the changing demographics and shifting powers pushed Lebanon into civil war, or whether the national institutions have become stable enough to resist the disintegration of the state, only time will tell.

21 General Fouad Chehab Road, central Beirut, 2007: Public space has seen the proliferation of checkpoints, gates, and barricades in recent years. Especially since the assassination of Rafik Hariri and the conflict in May 2008, where fighters loyal to Hezbollah and Hariri's Future Movement were fighting in the streets of downtown Beirut, the Lebanese Army, police, Hezbollah militiamen, and private security people occupy several key positions in the city, controlling access and the flow of traffic.

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CASABLANCA, MOROCCO

Mathias Gunz

TERRITORY POWER **DIFFERENCE**

THE FORCE OF THE EVERYDAY

The history of Casablanca is characterized by the adamant unfolding of a collective energy to decompose, grind, and disperse models or strategies coming from the outside and to weave them into practices of everyday life. This applies to rural Moroccan elements for example in the Bidonvilles as well as to urban Western elements such as the modernistic housing estates. This inner energy seems to feed off a collective use of the city. It does not represent a consciously chosen position, but rather the lived habits and everyday needs of the urban dwellers. The inevitability of this dispersal into practices of everyday life in the end represents the specific inner dynamic of Casablanca.

Beyond the finer social, economic, and cultural differences, two main forces are defining the landscapes of differences in Casablanca. On the one hand this is the urban Western momentum: the idea and the power of the state, the nuclear family, and the bourgeoisie, as well as the concept of the modern city with its planning principles and its architecture. On the other hand this is opposed by the rural Moroccan momentum: traditional forms of authority and rights, the clan, the village, agriculture, and the informal and extralegal that results from the friction with the city.

This more or less exposed power struggle, and hence the intertwining of the two forces, is part and parcel of many rapidly growing cities. What is specific in Casablanca is the form and extent of this process: it encompasses not only the instable parts of a city, but also the organization of the city as a whole on all its levels. Within these urban mechanics the precarious and instable areas do not embody the dark and unresolved side of the city, but rather act as functional elements by allowing for movement and reducing friction. The ceaseless negotiation and mediation between concept and usage, state and population, formal and informal does not impede upon the development of Casablanca, but rather seems to be the secret of its flexibility. This play of forces is also in the long run not shaped by clear vectors, but rather by a reciprocal exchange of interests, strategies, and role models. Casablanca's development therefore does not strive toward globalization or westernization, nor toward provincialization. It rather represents a movement away from the alluded poles of difference, and toward a complex, contemporary, and specific slang of everyday life. Casablanca is a city that doesn't find its specificity in the sharpening of differences, but that grinds and disperses its differences and uses them as lubricant for social cohesion.

1 Le Plateau housing complex, 1957

CASABLANCA, MOROCCO

2 Postcard of a Bidonville, ca. 1931

3 Casablanca today (Ancienne Médina)

workforce

Bidonville

Newtown

products

Medina

Ville Nouvelle

grazing land

City

<u>4–6</u> Difference as potential for interaction

TOPOGRAPHY OF DIFFERENCES

Casablanca is a city full of walls, fences, and other physical demarcations. They seem to be as much rooted in traditional North-African culture as they are residues of colonial organizational and hegemonic structures. Yet these borders are almost never hermetic but rather are porous. Instead of enclosing a space they simply mark it like a soft pencil stroke indicates a location on a map. This impression of softness in the city's tissue is mirrored by a remarkable tranquility and safety which one perceives in the life of this city. Its instability and anarchy never seem threatening. By no means does this serenity mean that the disparities of political and economic power in Casablanca are not apparent and sometimes revoltingly palpable. Yet, apart from the evident security zones such as the harbor or military installations, its starkly contrasting parts are defined more by a core, or center of gravity, than clear outer borders. Even between the economically most unequal parts, border relations often stay diffuse: it remains unclear where one ends and the other begins. It seems that these soft boundries are the precondition for the differences in this city to interact, thus generating the energy the city strives on.

Casablanca seems to consist of a number of completely different parts that nevertheless or precisely for that reason form one coherent unit. Parts or neighborhoods of a specific type and economic status may be concentrated in certain areas of the city <u>8</u> but still follow a logic of interaction. Even though these neighborhoods house completely different lifestyles, they never function autarchly or physically segregated from, but in a highly sophisticated compensatory dialogue with the rest. Surprisingly the most active are not the large networks that connect certain social groups on the scale of the city but rather small-scale conjunctions between very different neighbors in immediate proximity <u>4–6</u>. This suggests that in this case interaction is even more fueled by differences than by similarities—possibly because a maximal difference in consistence, density, and economic potency holds the highest potential for symbiotic relationships.

The most extreme, but by far not only, example of such a potential are the Bidonvilles. In Casablanca these illegal squatter settlements are not physically pheripheral but in different sizes and aggregate states distributed all over the city, forming a relationship of symbiotic coexistence with the rest of the city. The blatantly visible socioeconomic difference seems to be accepted from both sides with intriguing nonchalance <u>7</u>. The paternalistic, often affectionate relationship between the rich

<u>7</u> Bidonvilles in the upscale Anfa area

and "their" poor, the master and—often—its domestic servant, may point back to a traditional class society but seems to be effortlessly translated to a modern urban life. It seems the Bidonvilles here, through their ephemerality and flexibility, function like sponges within the urban mechanic; they can quickly absorb and again release large populations and workforces thus reducing friction and allowing motion. In a city that is constantly at risk of being paralyzed by its own growth, the existence—and difference—of one part becomes the precondition for the motility and vitality of others. This synergetic interlocking of different parts is not limited to the precarious and the transitory but as modus operandi transcends any form of organization in the city. When the state here utilizes and even initiates informal processes this is not necessarily a sign of plain corruption but just as often of pure pragmatism. At the same time communities outside of the state law create and enforce their own sets of rules. In practice the boundary between state and individual power seems to be less strictly defined than Morocco's monarchy would suggest. To therefore call it democratic would be naive. The coaction of formal and informal energies is not so much owed to rights but much more to a parallelogram of power that is constantly rebalanced between insolence and consuetude.

The following examples that we have investigated in Casablanca between 2005 and 2008 show the grinding of difference as a movement from Casablanca's extreme poles, the urban/planned/modern and the rural/self-organized/traditional, toward the middle. As the word *grinding* implies, this process consumes difference, be it the glamorous metropolitan culture of the 1940s or the ancient traditions of rural Morocco, but at the same creates a new mode of life that may be ordinary yet highly specific.

8 Casablanca's center consists of the Port, the so-called Ancienne Médina, which is actually mostly from the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, and the European-built Ville Nouvelle and its extensions.

In a simplified way the surrounding city texture can be divided into three categories. The quartiers villas (green) are the lush garden suburbs occupied by the upper class. They are traditionally concentrated in the elevated southwest of the city. Their contemporary incarnation are the gated communities along the coastline, which follow the logic of tourist resorts but are often temporary or even the main domicile for Casablanca's rich. Quartiers populaires (gray) describes any form of middle- and working-class housing both public and private.

They were built or initiated by the state to replace the informal Bidonvilles but have since themselves been informally altered and extended. The quartiers informels (red) are then the informally constructed neighborhoods, mostly but not exclusively inhabited by the city's poorest. They can again be divided into quartiers clandestins, which are illegally built on private—mostly agricultural—land, and Bidonvilles where the land itself is illegally squatted.

Zénata Beach

Bidonvilles Aïn Sebaa

Aïn Sebaa

Karyane Krimat

Douar Louassti

Sidi Bernoussi

Bidonvilles Moulay Youssef

Sour Jdid

El Hank

Ancienne Médina

Port

Cosumar

Cité Mohammedia

Karyane Lmoumniya

Douar Skouil

Lhank

Douar Lahjajma

Gaultier

Lustania

Ville Nouvelle

Dar Lamane

Anassi

Anfa

Bourgogne

Liberté

Bidonville
Carrières Centrales

Hassan II

Sidi Moumen

Douar Thoma

Aïn Diab

Racine

Anfa Superier

Maarif

La Gironde

Carrières Centrales

Douar Ghanem

Hippodrome

Mers Sultan

Ben M'Sick

Derb Carlotti

Sidi Moumen

Hay Salam

Palmier

Habous

Hay Hassani

Maarif extension

CIL

Derb Ghalef

Bournazel

Le Plateau

Cité el Farah

Hay Moulay Rachid

Hay Louifaq

Douar Chnider

Riviera

Derb Sultan

Hay Mabrouka

Cité Ferrara

L'Oasis

Hay Essalama

Douar Toulinchat

France Ville

Le Polo

Sidi Otmane

Bidonville Bachkou

Bidonville Ben M'Sik

Oulfa

L'Oasis

Hay Lalla Meriem

Douar Azhari

Les Crètes

Aïn Chok

Sbata

Californie

La Floride

Hay Jamila

Oulad Abbou

Beverly

Lahraouiyine

Lot. Lissasfa

Hay Salmia

Douar Derb Jdid

La Californie

Medinat Errahma

Lamkansa

Douar Louzazne

Nassim

Douar Gribbane

Douar Lamzabiyine

Sidi Marouf

Douar Taybi

0   2,5 km

ERODING MODERNISM

As a gateway between Europe and Africa, Casablanca can be described as an early global city and has always been subject to Western fantasies, glorifying the city both as mysteriously oriental and ideally modern. While the romantic movie *Casablanca* never touched ground (the real Casablanca can only be seen once in a short bird's-eye view during the opening sequence) many modernist fantasies, at the time too radical for Europe, would be implemented in Casablanca. The reaction of the city to this sometimes violent imposition has been slow, unspectacular, but unremittingly powerful.

Despite a long and turbulent history the Casablanca we know today is essentially a twentieth-century metropolis strategically developed by the authorities of the French protectorate (1912–1956) as the economic hub of Morocco. Anfa, as the city was once known, was presumably founded by Zenata Berbers in the eleventh century and later conquered first by the Almoravids and then the Merinids, who turned the city into a thriving center of trade. Anfa was used both by European traders and North African pirates, who preyed on the former and ended up being destroyed by the Portuguese in 1468. In 1770, after three centuries of abandonment, the city, now named Casablanca, was refounded by Alouite sultan Mohammed ben Abdallah with the aid of the Spaniards and continuously expanded by European and Fessi merchants. As the warehouse for its hinterland, the fertile Chaouia plain, it grew from 700 inhabitants in 1836 to around 25,000 in 1907, when the French took control of the city 9.[1] This growth was greatly accelerated after Hubert Lyautey, Military Governor of French Morocco, chose Casablanca as the main port and center of the colonial economy. This strategic decision was based on Casablanca's geographic position and required extensive work on the harbor, which was neither deep enough nor naturally well protected. The city kept attracting European immigrants from France, Italy, and Spain among others and soon became a bustling boomtown, El Dorado for developers[2] and speculators 10. Most of the population growth, though, was triggered by the influx of Moroccan laborers from the surrounding hinterland to the booming industrial city. Around 1918 Casablanca consisted mainly of a small and dense Medina—including the Jewish Mellah—and the surrounding so-called Ville Nouvelle, structured by the Haussmannian extension plans by Albert Tardif (1912) and Henri Prost (1915) while Moroccan migrants from the countryside settled in makeshift camps, known as Bidonvilles 11-13. Housing these so called indigenous masses became a crucial task to uphold the French colonial power, which in Morocco was deliberately less destructive than elsewhere.[3]

9 Babes-Souk, 1911

10 Rue Chénier and Galeries Lafayette, 1914: "Casablanca had reached fever pitch. It was a city that had shot up out of the ground, Far West style. Plots of land changed hands three or four times a day, between five and seven in the evening, on café terraces…. With just a scrap of paper from their respective consuls, Englishmen , Spaniards, Germans, or native Moroccans under German protection could, if they so wished, build right in the middle of an avenue that the French had tagged for development." Quoted from Jean-Louis Cohen and Monique Eleb, *Casablanca: Colonial Myths and Architectural Ventures*.

11–13 Population distribution 1918, 1950, 1990: It is important to note that no population groups were homogeneous. French upper-class and other powerful immigrants from Germany, England, Switzerland, Belgium, Scandinavia, and the US–as well as wealthy Moroccan merchants–resided in the European city center or the lush garden suburbs while working-class Europeans from Italy, Corsica, or Spain also lived in slum areas not much different from the Moroccan Bidonvilles. Although they occupied most of the city space, Europeans never formed a majority–this illustrates the extreme density in the Moroccan quarters.

41,000 Europeans

158,000 Europeans

486,000 Moroccans

2.3 Mil Moroccans

CASABLANCA, MOROCCO

14 Occupation of the modern city: Outskirts of Casablanca

15 Postcard of Boubir, ca. 1930: Edward Said, "The exteriority of the representation is always governed by some version of the truism that if the Orient could represent itself, it would; since it cannot, the representation does the job, for the West, and faute de mieux, for the poor Orient."

16 Miami Pool Club, Casablanca, 1955


17 ATBAT-Afrique, Carrières Centrales, approx 1959

While Europe was marred by wars, Casablanca, in the first half of the twentieth century, can be described as a "Laboratory of Modernism"[4]—not only in respect to architecture—allowing for experiments that were not possible in Europe and celebrating a progressive lifestyle, which oriented itself not only toward Europe but also the United States. This is mirrored by the names of emerging villa neighborhoods like La Californie, Beverly, or beach clubs such as Miami Pool Club 16. The task of mass-producing housing for the Moroccans meant the possibility of implementing the principles of Modernism in a tabula rasa situation and under the favorable conditions of a quasi-colonial hegemony. This attracted many European architects, sociologists, and planners,[5] most prominently Michel Écochard, who headed the city planning office from 1946 to 1952. The need to control the local population was superimposed by a seemingly humanistic impetus to provide adequate housing for the Moroccans that would fit their indigenous needs.[6] The French authorities thus created, in an area declared Nouvelle Médina, orientalist interpretations of traditional Moroccan architecture and urbanism, such as the Habous Quarter (1921–25) or more cynically the Bousbir red-light district (1922) 15. The Habous, this fictitious quarter,[7] looks looks so authentic that today it is a major tourist attraction and probably perceived by most visitors as Casablanca's Old Town.

These relatively small city extensions were later followed by large-scale housing projects trying to combine culture specificity with the principles of classic Modernism such as Aîn Chock (1936–52) or Carrières Centrales (1951–55) 17. This placed Casablanca at the center of the international architectural debate. Especially among CIAM members culture-specific habitat and the idea of the modernized Casbah were much discussed, culminating in the 1953 congress in Aix-en-Provence where Casablanca, among other North African cities, was prominently featured.

Although these Modernist mass housing projects were designed to fit or even express local culture and lifestyle, they did not remain stable over the following five decades. Instead they were transformed—by its occupants—in a quiet but altogether radical manner. Balconies were interiorized, apartments expanded horizontally and vertically, floor plans modified and whole neighborhoods densified to a degree that, like in the Carrières Centrales, the original design concepts have become unrecognizable 18, 21. This stealthy process of appropriation and adaptation seems to be driven by a deep and strong cultural or sociopsychological energy, influenced by both traditional and modern momentums. It is most visible in the Modernist housing projects but affects all parts of the city. In the Ville Nouvelle, for example, which was progressively deserted by Europeans

18 Carrières Centrales, 2008. Conceived as single-story 8m × 8m court houses they have been vertically extended to up to ten floors.

19, 20 The Immeuble Liberté (1949–50), an icon of Modernism, was built by Léonard Morandi 1949–50 for a European clientele. While the exterior has remained unchanged the interior has been modified to accommodate a contemporary Moroccan lifestyle.

after Moroccan independence in 1956[8] and is today almost completely occupied by Moroccans, the physical alterations are very subtle but allow for a completely different lifestyle 19, 20.

The force behind these transformations seems overwhelming though never overly aggressive. Rather it appears as a natural, almost organic continuation and revaluation of the existing structures. Official plan and individual need are blended into an architecture of everyday need as the Modernist utopia is broken down to ordinary life.

21 Contemporary adaptation of the ATBAT project (see image 17)

URBANIZATION
OF THE BIDONVILLES

22 Counterworld: Most Bidonvilles thus started as compact, often impenetrable, pockets of rural life within the city, not unseldom bearing the name of the rural village or region from where their inhabitants originated. Carrières Centrales

23 Concentration of Muslim population in Casablanca: Department of the Interior, 1933

24 Lubricant in the city's mechanics: Bidonvilles in 2005

Although no regulation as such forbade it, the Ville Nouvelle was closed to the majority of Muslims 23. As the Medina soon became very dense, newly arriving migrants from the countryside settled in provisional camps, which became known as Bidonvilles in the late 1920s. For long they were ignored by the French authorities. Despite the construction of the Nouvelle Médina their quantity grew and soon became intergral parts of they city's structure as well as its most prominent "urban problem."

While the first migrants were workers attracted by the fast industrialization of Casablanca and came mainly from the surrounding Chaouia plain, a series of droughts in the 1930s led to a first wave of massive rural flight. This trend continued after Morocco's independence and peaked in the 1970s, when farmers from all over the country flocked to Casablanca, looking for a better life. These migrants from the hinterland often arrived in extended family or village groups, bringing along a strong influx of rural culture and tradition 22. This unidirectional rural-urban movement has since given way to more complex patterns of migration, often including urban interstations. This concurs with the appearance of contemporary informal settlements that somehow seem to have a much larger degree of urban experience and expertise incorporated. At the same time they sustain certain rural features—farm animals most visibly—whose absence assumably was objected in the formal urban housing offered by the state.

The long history of the Bidonvilles is paralleled by an equally long history of strategies to get rid of them, mostly based on the idea of providing sufficient alternative housing. This history is continuous because no matter how much new housing was produced, it was never enough to absorb the constant influx of Moroccans from the countryside. Abderrahmane Rachik describes this as "urbanism of urgency"—urban planning, instead of preparing the ground for development, constantly lags behind current trends and has to react to the built reality post factum. Over the centuries the planning authorities developed, tested, and refined various strategies and housing models to cope with this condition.

Restructuration, meaning legalization and restructuring of the existing Bidonvilles, seems an obvious choice considering the prevalence and operative role of the phenomenon in the city's structure. In fact small-scale pragmatic structural improvements have been undertaken in almost all Bidonvilles. Nevertheless, apart from a short foreign aid—financed bloom in the

25 Mohammed VI visits the Bidonvilles Errahma to launch a new housing project, 2012. Today Morocco's state power consists of two overlapping structures, one democratically voted from the bottom up, the other, the neofeudal bureaucracy, called the *makhzen,* instated top-down. This strategy of using modern institutions to preserve medieval political authority was established by Hassan II utilizing tactics of repression, corruption, and cooptation. Mohammed VI, who still controls most of Morocco's politics and economy, has distinguished himself through a series of careful democratic and social reforms but not affected any systemic change. A further democratization remains unsure as the political parties have been totally discredited by decades of participation in the corrupt electoral game while the old guard of the makhzen–the royal court, conservative religious authorities, heads of security branches, senior military officers, powerful secretaries of state, and some 10,000 mayors, caids, pashas, judges, and police chiefs–oppose any reform that threatens their entrenched interests.

26 Resident-General Lacoste, visting the Bidonvilles of Carrières Centrales with architects and planners, 1954

late 1970s, this has as an official strategy only recently and in combination with other measures gained acceptance. The reservation toward this approach seems to have several roots. Firstly and most evidently, the state fears that official ex post legitimation of illegal acts such as land squatting might encourage further illegal acts. Secondly, the authorities seem to have an overall hesitance to consolidate structures which are not completely urban and modern in character. The state power's (be it the Moroccan State or the French Protectorate before) general policy has been to rid the city of any archaic roots and eventually transform the farmer into a modern citizen 26. Accepting the Bidonvilles as part of a contemporary city might be a problem for the image of a modern state or even a threat to the state's power. They are dense, introverted microcosms with narrow, unnavigable roads and cannot be accessed unnoticed let alone be controlled physically or socially. This threat was especially real under the French protectorate and in the politically unstable sixties, seventies, and eighties under King Hassan II's reign. This is manifested by the constant presence of the notorious Ministry of Interior[9] in the city planning office of Casablanca during that time. Although the terrorist bombings of 2003 have once again portrayed the Bidonvilles as hotbeds of subversion, the young King Mohammed VI, who took over in 1999, seems to be more concerned about the image of the country. He has disassociated himself from his father's repressive practices and undertaken great efforts to modernize Morocco not least through his 2005 program "Villes Sans Bidonvilles" which, so far unsuccessfully, aimed to free Morocco of any Bidonvilles by 2010 25.

For a long time the most popular strategy, but also the most costly, to combat the Bidonvilles was *relogement;* the greenfield construction of social housing. This started in the 1930s and peaked in the 1990s with the construction of entire satellite cities in public-private partnership. How this rational apartment housing conflicted with the Bidonvillois rural way of life is subject to numerous humorous anecdotes in Casablanca but of course touches on a serious problem: the dissolution of the Bidonvilles' tight-knit socioeconomic fabric often meant not only the loss of its inhabitants' social network but also of the only income opportunity. As a result the targeted citizens often opted to sell their subsidized flats for a market price while remaining in their Bidonvilles. At the height of the rural exodus in the 1980s the state developed a faster, cheaper, and more adaptable method of urbanization: recasement. Here only plots, equipped with basic infrastructure, are sold to the Bidonvillois at an affordable price. The buildings are then auto-constructed and vertically expanded according to the proprietor's financial possibilities. This strategy is in fact the starting point of many

27 House numbers as a first sign of legality, Bidonville Ben M'Sik

28 Regularized structures, Bidonville Ben M'Sik

of Casablanca's quartiers populaires. Today's program "Villes Sans Bidonvilles" then combined all three strategies in 85 cities of Morocco. With a budget of USD 2.86 billion it rehoused 1.6 million people and is often called the most successful slum clearance initiative in Africa. Despite this huge effort it affected less than half of the Bidonvilles' population thus failing its ambitious goal. Today still 10—20 percent of Casablanca's inhabitants reside in one of the more than 300 Bidonvilles 29.

Parallel to the external efforts to replace the Bidonvilles with modern city, the Bidonvilles have subjected themselves to a constant process of inner urbanization. The Bidonville is firstly informal in every aspect: it consists of precarious shacks, constructed on squatted land without a building permit. The ensuing process of continuous solidification and legalization affects not only the built but also social, economic, and even political structures. Within a few years the Bidonvilles have developed their own economies, power structures, and even informal rules and regulations. In larger and smaller swoops, living conditions are slightly improved, adding sanitary units, sewers, water, electricity, and finally reconstructing whole parts in a normalized way. These improvements often followed catastrophes such as fires and required long negotiations between residents and authorities as they were traded in for the acceptance of certain state laws and regulations. For example, after a fire the state would provide more durable materials such as concrete bricks for the rebuilding, but in return it would dictate a building code and collect census data to stop further growth 27, 28. Or a Bidonville would get a safer electricity supply, but in return the inhabitants would have to pay for energy consumption. Such deals were never undebated as the Bidonvillois soon learned that living and building outside the state's legality was generally cheaper and less complicated. Today the larger Bidonvilles contain markets, schools, mills, mosques, and all other urban services up to their own informal government which—this must be admitted—is not more democratic or less corrupt than the official state.

All this indicates that the Bidonvilles are not just a "dark, unsolved, catastrophic" side effect of the city's development but integral parts of its mechanic—not least economically 24. With their ability to absorb large populations and different pressures and react immediately to economic needs and opportunities they play a vital part in the city's development. More contemporary incarnations of the Bidonville, informal quarters on the city's rural edge, have from the start developed—or been developed—as complete cities with their own internal economies 30. It appears that through a mixture of outer and inner pressure will the precarious continuously become stable and ordinary.

29 Bidonville Ben M'Sik

CASABLANCA, MOROCCO

30 Informal city: The spatial and organizational density of Lamkansa is not the result of continuous stabilization but of informal planning.

LAMKANSA: INFORMAL PLANNING

While the early Bidonvilles were a by-product of urbanization and industrialization, contemporary informal settlements develop as complete, widely self-sufficient cities <u>34</u>. These so-called quartiers clandestins are built illegally but—unlike the Bidonvilles—on legally acquired land, usually agricultural land in the the legal gray zone right outside the city limits <u>31</u>. The newest generation of this type, such as Lamkansa, show levels of density and organization unseen in earlier informal construction. This is possible because their development is only seemingly spontaneous. They are in fact planned projects that not only ignore all official laws but create their own sets of rules and regulations.

Migration has become far more complex than the rural-urban flight that characterized Casablanca's growth up to the 1980s. Today more and more people leave the city center unsatisfied with the offered housing, for the periphery where—outside the city planning laws—alternative models of living are possible. These models can usually be characterized by a translation of modern construction methods to a more traditional rural lifestyle. This mostly includes the possibility of expanding the house for multigenerational living and to keep farm animals. A first example of such an informal suburb is Lahraouyine, a city of 60,000—90,000 inhabitants that all of a sudden appeared on the outskirts of Casablanca <u>32</u>. At the height of its boom in the mid-1990s up to 3,000 houses per month were constructed—exclusively during the night. This resulted in a fragmented urban body of detached housing clumps placed within a large urban *terrain vague*. Only when the state became aware of this spontaneous city and threated to demolish it did Lahraouyine's individual initiatives contract to an organized community, which then staged a violent and in the end successful resistance.

Lamkansa, just outside Casablanca's city limits to the south looks like a genetically evolved Lahraouyine: more dense, more organized, more structured <u>33</u>. It comprises streets, public squares, and even a rudimentary sewage system. This first seems very surprising as Lamkansa also developed to a settlement of almost 25,000 inhabitants within less than ten years completely outside any state planning or law. The mystery of this genesis then proved to be very difficult—and not without danger—to unravel and at the end reads like a crime fiction novel. It starts with three brothers—one of whom is later killed, allegedly by one of his brothers—owning a large piece of land just outside the city. Taking the roles of informal developers, they parcel the plots and sell them to people whom they recruit

<u>31</u> New informal settlements on Casablanca's edge

<u>32</u> Lahraouyine

<u>33</u> Lamkansa

<u>34</u> Classic Bidonvilles (right) and informally planned city (left), Lamkansa

35 Bidonvilles and resort are part of the same mechanics, Dar Bouazza

with bus crews in the city center. While the construction is carried out by the buyers themselves, the landlord dictates certain simple building rules which he enforces through a crew of local henchmen. Energy is illegally tapped from the surrounding industrial area, water is at first only available in centralized wells. Today the city has started a process of restructuring, building sewers and a water-supply network, at the same time legalizing the development, a process that the developers and investors arguably anticipated. It is altogether characteristic for this type of private urbanism that it works with instruments both outside and inside the law. The contract between landlord and buyer, for example, confirms the sale of the parcel, but without official authentication lacks formal legality. This creates an ongoing mutual dependency between the informal developer and his clientele. In the case of Lamkansa this developer became not only a successful businessman but also a influencial politician with his own private city as a voter base. Mohamed Korima, in Lamkansa known by his shadow personality Tqalya, or Charbush, joined the communal government in 1996 and was voted in the Moroccan National Assembly in 2007 despite being an analphabet and having spent three years in prison for corruption. He represents a new actor in Casablanca's urbanization who combines forms of traditional clientelism, maybe even cryptofeudalism, with the logic of a modern developer 36 thus operating in parallel inside and outside the state's system.

Unexpectedly, it is said that large, commercial developers, for example, along Casablanca's Dar Bouazza beachfront, utilize similar mechanics. They buy agricultural land just outside the city limits and allow or even initiate the construction of Bidonvilles there 35. This urbanization will ultimately force the city to zone the land, raising its value greatly and opening the possibility for the development of commercial resort districts that will then replace or complement the Bidonvilles. At the latest here the line between legal and illegal city, precarious and commercial, urban and rural dissolves completely.

MILITARY
Supreme Commander of the Army
appoints functionaries

RELIGION
Commander of the Faithful

JUDICIAL BRANCH
Head of the Supreme Council of the Judiciary
appoints judges of the supreme court

questioning ministers,
investigate the government's actions by commissions,
dissolve the government through a vote of no confidence

EXECUTIVE BRANCH

KING Mohammed VI

Head of State

appoints
(after legislative elections)

PRIME MINISTER
Head of Government

appoints

MINISTERS
MINISTER OF THE INTERIOR

president of the council

COUNCIL OF MINISTERS
6 members

appoints

head Wali
REGIONAL COUNCIL

elect

appoints

head Governor
PREFECTURAL/ PROVINCIAL COUNCIL

elect

appoints

head Qaid
CITY/ COMMUNAL COUNCIL

elect

LEGISLATIVE BRANCH

PARLIAMENT

ASSEMBLY OF COUNCILLORS
270 members

ASSEMBLY OF REPRESENTATIVES
325 members

alter ego

Deputy Tqalya
Landowner

CHARBUSH
MISTERIOUS
INTERMEDIARY

Instruction to find people for Lamkansa

LAMKANSA

DEPUTIES OF
local councils
labor unions
trade associations

elect

elect

vote for Tqalya in the elections 2007

Promise better living conditions

Purchase of land without any legal
contract or entry in the land register

move to Lamkansa

build and maintain the infrastructure

THE SQUAD

pay "taxes" and fees

"collect" people in the city

PEOPLE
(25'000)

36 Cryptofeudalism? The system of dependencies behind the informal city Lamkansa.

Medina Errahma Project plan overlaying the existing Bidonvilles

Destroyed houses in Errahma Bidonville

MEDINA ERRAHMA: BUILDING AN ORDINARY CITY

The history of urban planning and mass housing in Casablanca has passed through all international and local paradigms from technocratic Modernism to structuralist Regionalism to the neoliberal conformity of public-private partnership developments.

Medina Errahma, a new town in the west of Casablanca, represents the newest generation of state-sponsored housing projects. For the first time this task seems to be approached completely devoid of any pathos or even vision. Instead it employs an elaborate, pragmatic mechanism of legal, social, financial, and repressive means to tie people to their new habitat. Since in former Bidonville resettlement projects people often sold their allotted apartments and stayed in the Bidonville, here the public housing is planned right atop the Bidonvilles 37 and the demolition of one's house is a precondition for participating in the program 38. This renders the applicants temporarily homeless, producing new temporary slums on the construction site.

Rather than producing finished housing, the state offers the eligible Bidonvillois fully equipped plots and access to a state-sponsored credit. This way the construction is self-financed often by integrating a commercial partner, who will cofinance the construction of the entire four-story building in return for obtaining the ground floor for commercial use 39. Since large parts of this auto-construction process happen within the informal sector the state consequently incorporates semilegal, informal aspects into the process of planning. While earlier projects were transformed by informal energies after completion, such forces are now an integral part of the project from the beginning on. As opposed to the state's second strategy of slum rehousing—the large-scale urban ensemble—Medina Errahma is built individually by its future residents utilizing the means and resources of the informal construction sector 41. State engineers merely supervise the basic structural integrity of the new buildings during the construction process. This self-construction happens on the base of supplied type plans and a 1:1 model building looking like the attempt to define the most ordinary architecture conceivable 40. Nevertheless, the project seems to succeed more than any project before in fulfilling the needs of the population for modern infrastructure as well as the constituents of the traditional village life, such as multifamiliy adaptability, in-house agriculture, and local microeconomy.

■ Bidonvillois 1
■ Bidonvillois 2
■ Investor

Financing models

Model house and credit office

The projects of Lamkansa and Medina Errahma originate at opposite poles: one is formally planned and initiated by Morocco's highest state authority, the King, the other is illegally developed by convicted criminals. Nonetheless after a continuous process of improvement and adaption by their users they result in very similar urban structures. More than that, these examples indicate that this amalgamation not only happens through informal alteration by the users but has become an integral part of the planning. Casablanca's opposing poles seem to constantly learn from and adapt one another's strategies. The state initiates the construction of entire city parts based on the informal building industry that has developed in the Bidonvilles. Meanwhile obscure slumlords conceive and enforce their own urban plans down to the building codes, developing privately and illegally neighborhoods that will probably become regular parts of the city in the near future. Neoliberalism and traditional authority, legal stability, and urban and rural seemingly do not repress or replace but constantly infect each other. The vanishing point of Casablanca's development seems therefore not to be either the western modern city or the—oversized—traditional village but a contemporary slang. It is in everyday life, not in the extremes, that this city finds its specificity. Casablanca, once a multicultural metropolis, is today religiously and ethnically largely homogenous. While other cities are characterized by the clash of differences (in both its productive and destructive incarnations) Casablanca's power seems to lie in its capacity and will to blend difference into its own specific identity. Casablanca today is a city of shades not contrasts, a pragmatic and thoroughly contemporary business city with both its Modernist heritage and the rural tradition of its territory and population firmly embedded in its DNA.

41 Contemporary normality: the state delivers the financial and legal framework, the informal sector its knowledge and resources.

SPECIFICITY AND URBANIZATION: A THEORETICAL OUTLOOK

Christian Schmid

1. THE QUESTION OF THE SPECIFIC

The core thesis of this book is that every city is distinguished by certain characteristics, which underpin the production and reproduction of its own specificity and, hence, the uniqueness of its material and social existence. This thesis only reveals its full significance and explosiveness in the context of globalization, the global extension of networks of production and consumption, the convergence of living conditions and daily life on a global scale, and the ensuing spread of urban areas over large parts of the planet.

As the studies in this book demonstrate, even under the influence of globalization, urban areas develop very different structures and dynamics; consequently, they also generate a great variety of urban forms. Accordingly, the term "city" refers in this context not to a clearly defined and bounded settlement space, but to all sorts of areas that are affected and determined by urbanization processes. Thus, we treat in this book also examples as the Canary Islands, the Nile Valley or the extended Naples Region: we understand them all as specific forms of urbanized territories.

The process of globalization does not mean that urban spaces are generally becoming ever more homogeneous—on the contrary, it is marked by contradictory processes of homogenization and differentiation, for the materialization of general tendencies in concrete contexts consistently leads to specifically individual urban situations and configurations. These observations tie directly into our project *Switzerland—An Urban Portrait*, in which we were already confronted with the question of the specific: we found out that the differences in various regions in Switzerland have become more marked in recent years rather than less so.[1]

The case studies presented in the present publication, which have been investigated over the years at Studio Basel, further illustrate our argument. We have deliberately avoided selecting spectacular examples. On the contrary, following Jennifer Robinson's proposition, our aim has been to analyze our case studies as "ordinary cities," that is to say, neither to regard them as exotic or extraordinary, but rather as equally important case studies that all provide valuable information and insights.[2] It has explicitly not been our intention to undertake a comparative study; rather, the goal was to contrast our examples and in doing so to learn more about their specific characteristics. In turn these examples allow us to fathom the depth of the possible and to stake out the full extent of different developments. This also requires us not just to consider familiar forms of urban-

ism but also to turn our attention to the very diverse urban forms that are generated across the world.

NEITHER THE PARTICULAR NOR THE GENERIC

The specific should not be confused with the particular. The search for the particular has so far produced large numbers of case studies, each of which focuses on a single city or urban region with the aim of defining its uniqueness in order to portray it as an individual unit, so to speak. They usually present the city in question as a very particular example and attempt to account for its uniqueness by citing a wide range of different factors—the city's location, the landscape, the climate, its historical development, the impact of various events and decisions. The concept of an "intrinsic logic of cities", which emerged some years ago, tends in the same direction and understands the investigation of different forms of urban socialization as a worthwhile field of study.[3] However, for all the insights that investigations of that kind might produce, in this book we have set ourselves a very different aim. Our focus is on embedding the question of specificity in the wider context and on exploring its constitutive meaning for urbanization; we want to identify how specificity is produced and reproduced, what role it plays in the production of urban spaces, and how it influences the planetary trajectory of urbanization.

The problematic of specificity is seen with particular clarity in the counterposition, whose supporters take the view that globalization is making conditions throughout the world ever more similar, and that consequently urban areas increasingly resemble one another. This is not a new position. Ever since the early days of Modernism this notion has been repeated—with varying degrees of optimism or pessimism—on the basis of the argument that the historic particularities of cities were being destroyed by the maelstrom of modernization and worldwide capitalism. However, economic forces of global capitalism are intrinsically unequal and therefore, by necessity, also produce and reproduce unequal developments.[4]

Also today many people claim that globalization is homogenizing patterns of living across the world, because the same models and procedures are taking hold everywhere; they claim that urban forms are adjusting to a single, global standard and that differences are progressively being ironed out. These claims go hand in hand with the notion that cities are becoming increasingly generic, interchangeable, and that the particularities of individual places are disappearing. Rem Koolhaas's resounding battle cry of the generic city is still heard loud and clear.[5]

Even if many urban developments these days are in fact interchangeable and global development companies throughout the world are realizing increasingly banal, transposable projects, even if terrifyingly uniform and monotonous cityscapes are being constructed, the specific has consistently held its own in various ways. During the course of urbanization there is an endless flow of surprising twists and turns: the general formulas and rules that posit all sorts of ideals and models as best practice have always to be applied to specific, concrete contexts and situations; the results that are achieved using these formulas in different places are correspondingly different. The "ideal city," much beloved of architects and social reformers, that is supposed to provide a bright future for all human beings, or the city that is supposed to bring the greatest profits for its global investors—all these ultimately break down, in the current of generic operations, into specific situations and configurations. The task is therefore to discover the specific "laws of motion" that apply to different urban areas and to understand how they develop on the basis of their specific spatial and historical conditions.

CITY AND URBANIZATION

What is urbanization? There are many theories and concepts trying to define and to grasp urbanization. It is often equated to population growth in cities. Yet this is a very narrow view, in that it only takes account of a single criterion—the number of inhabitants—and concentrates exclusively on urban centers and agglomerations. This purely statistical definition has countless implications, which are rarely discussed, and it reduces the city to a black box. Everything that happens outside this black box, anything nonurban, is not even taken into consideration. This approach not only reinforces a simplistic view of the world, it also tends back toward the position of the generic—that there is "city" and "noncity"—and all the distinctions within the urban are ignored.[6] Accordingly, there is a need for a more differentiated concept of urbanization, which, rather than concentrating on statistical definitions, the morphology of settlements, and urban forms, views the urban as a multidimensional process—a process that also includes the economic and social aspects of daily life.

The geographer and urban theorist David Harvey regards urbanization, in the context of political economy, as the process of the production of the built environment, that is to say, the construction of housing, production plants, and infrastructure with all the attendant social implications. As this process unfolds it is not only the conditions of space economy that

change, for experience and consciousness also become urbanized.[7] Therefore, in a wider sense, urbanization can also be understood as a comprehensive transformation of society. The French philosopher Henri Lefebvre has described this as a "total phenomenon." He defines urbanization as the totality of changes that a society undergoes as it evolves from its agrarian beginnings to its urban present. He makes a direct connection between urbanization and the process of industrialization. In his view, the other side of the coin of industrialization is urbanization. Industrialization is used here in its most general sense: it refers not only to industrial manufacturing, factories, and infrastructure but also to the wider industrial organization of the whole of society. This also includes the various economic, social, and cultural networks that permeate and span urban space, the interconnections and structures that determine urban life, and the changes in daily life that come with industrialization. Lefebvre famously concluded that this process tends toward the complete urbanization of society and hence the urbanization of the entire planet.[8]

For thousands of years cities could only grow if there was a sufficiently large agricultural surplus to feed the city's inhabitants. The development of a city was thus crucially dependent on the agricultural productivity of its environs. This is one of the main reasons why most cities were little more than towns up until the industrial revolution, rarely having in excess of twenty to thirty thousand inhabitants. There were of course larger cities, but these were very much the exception.[9] This only changed during the industrial revolution, when cities started to grow on a large scale, and when urbanization, as we know it today, first started to take hold. Industrialization also changed rural regions in a wide variety of ways and, in the long term, led to a comprehensive industrial reorganization of society. This in turn led to a fundamental change in the opposition of town and country: cities were no longer islands in an ocean of land, isolated settlements that could only develop given favorable natural, economic, political, and social conditions—urbanization became a generalized process. Despite coming up against all kinds of obstacles and varying widely from region to region, as a tendency it affected the entire territory.

Urbanization can therefore also be understood as a process of abstraction—a given natural space is transformed into a social space, and hence also into a technologically determined abstract space dominated by industrialization—a "second nature."[10] At the same time, however, this urban space is a concrete,

physical reality: it has its own specific characteristics. Urbanization is a process during which general social developments are, so to speak, projected onto a territory; in other words, it also involves materialization in an actual place and in an actual period of time. In so doing urbanization comes up against concrete conditions—the land with its particular characteristics, specific social and economic constellations—which it reshapes and transforms.

From a general point of view urbanization can therefore be seen as a comprehensive transformation of a certain territory. At the same time, it is also evident that urban territories form as layers: each successive wave of urbanization encounters the results of earlier phases of urbanization and transforms them anew. However, this is not to say that the traces of earlier phases completely disappear. Urbanization is thus not—like a footprint in the sand—the direct expression of a general, social development. The land, the territory, is never empty or primal; it is always already occupied, in one way or another: it bears the marks of earlier processes and is embedded in wider contexts and dispositives. Urbanization is dependent on specific local and historical conditions and therefore does not proceed evenly across the board. Every urban area has its own features and follows a particular path of development. One round of urban development creates the conditions for the next round and this in turn determines significant aspects of subsequent developments.

In view of all this, we have to revisit the question of how certain abstract processes unfold in a given territory: how are the processes of urbanization instigated and which factors influence the specific results that are reproduced, again and again, over time? This can only be answered by examining the deep structures of urbanization and by revealing the hidden "laws of motion" that affect the urbanization of a particular place and ultimately lead to the generation of a specific urban space.

A DYNAMIC DEFINITION OF THE URBAN
How might "the urban" be defined in an urbanized world? When we were trying to fathom the urban condition of Switzerland for *Switzerland—An Urban Portrait*, we came up with a set of three concepts: networks—borders—differences. These three concepts are all derived from Lefebvre's theory of the production of space, and they refer to three specific moments in this production process.[11]

An urban space is primarily a space of material interaction, of exchange, of meetings, of encounters. It is permeated by all kinds of networks, which make internal and external connections and whose reach can be anything from local to global, depending on their function: networks for trade, production, capital, communication, migration, and so on. Urban space can therefore initially be understood in terms of the networks that pervade and determine it. Every urban area has its own characteristic set of networks that has formed during the course of its historical development. These networks of interaction give an indication of the material side of an urban space: they relate to a spatial praxis and, as such, to a perceivable aspect of space.

The material realm of interaction and of networks is neither continuous nor boundless; on the contrary, it is discontinuous, contained, and structured. Urban areas are intersected by all kinds of borders, which cut territories out of the continuous flow of networks of interaction. A rural area embarks on a process of urbanization at the moment when its borders lose their status as dividers between discrete units by virtue of the fact that they now bring together and connect different elements. Urbanization thus may turn borders from a mode of containment, closure, and stillness into zones of exchange where cross-border movements prevail and differences are coming together.

It is only through the exchange of differences that an urban situation is created. The city is therefore a place of differences. It is a differential space, in which differences come to light and interact. Separations and space-time distances are replaced by oppositions, contrasts, superimpositions, and the juxtaposition of disparate realities. The city can be defined as a place where differences know, recognize, and explore one another, affirm or negate one another. It is only the interplay of differences that releases the energies that allow the city to continuously reinvent itself.

The three concepts—networks, borders, and differences—describe the occupation and urban transformation of a territory, and they accordingly lend themselves to the definition of different forms of urbanization and to the development of a typology of urban realms. This in turn opens up a new relational and dynamic understanding of the urban. It shows that urbanism and urbanity do not automatically ensue from a process of urbanization. Urbanization creates the conditions for the production of urban situations, but these ultimately only arise from the interplay of a wide range of actions and diverse actors. Concrete, enacted urbanity is the result of constant negotiation and thus generates a multiplicity of possibilities and potentials.

In the present publication we explore these three aspects in a wider context. Our aim is not to define the urban condition of a particular area or to investigate specific forms of urbanization, but to arrive at a broader understanding of the fundamental prerequisites of urban development and to focus on the processes that instigate and shape urbanization. However, this does not mean that we are abandoning those concepts: on the contrary, we will return to each of these three central concepts in a wider context and redefine them on a general level.

TERRITORY—POWER—DIFFERENCE
What are the processes that cause urban areas to develop in different ways? If we want to understand the phenomenon of specificity we have to scrutinize the mechanisms and structures that lay behind the process of urbanization and we have to explore some of the core issues in spatial development. We have to understand how general tendencies and abstract processes materialize, how they become a physical reality, consolidate, and inscribe themselves onto a territory. What specific conditions and constellations determine these processes? What possibilities and prospects arise from them? It is our intention to examine the specific conditions of urbanization in the context of three concepts: territory, power, and difference. In so doing we are opening up three perspectives, three modes of access, three windows onto the process of urbanization and its consequences.

Firstly, we examine territory as the specific, material basis for urbanization and trace the transformation of nature to a second nature, an urban space, an urbanized territory, created by society. What do we mean by this second nature? It creates connections and points of orientation by dint of the formation of centers and peripheries and the production of a system of overlapping networks. The fundamental contradiction that is the hallmark of the urbanization of an area is the conjunction of *fixity* and *motion*. The production of the built environment, with its material structures, creates new possibilities of communication, interaction, and cooperation—yet at the same time these structures fix the material characteristics of the territory on a long-term basis, they hinder or preclude many alternative possibilities of development and thus also determine the broad outlines of any future development.

Secondly, we explore the way in which power is inscribed into the territory and how urbanization is controlled and steered. A central part in these processes is played by the rules and procedures that regulate the production of the built environment and the use of the land and thus also determine what will be localized in which part of the territory. These rules and procedures arise from specific constellations of social forces, which generate and develop specific forms of territorial regulation. These forms of regulation can be *formal* and *informal* in the sense that the rules of play, according to which the territory is organized and the process of urbanization is steered, are never unequivocal: they are constantly in a contradictory balance between explicit and implicit, traditional and modern, legal and illegal procedures.

Thirdly, we investigate the consequences of urbanization, which creates urban differences by initiating interaction—and hence relationships—between the particularities of people and places. We trace these differences and examine how they develop in urban space. A central aspect that emerged in our research is the dialectics of *open* and *closed*, and hence the question of whether an urban culture evolves that is open to its own differences, or whether urban development leads to processes of closure and segregation. Whatever the case, certain patterns of social, economic, and cultural differentiation arise in every urban area that can be seen as a decisive part of the specificity of this area.

The concepts *territory*, *power*, and *difference* are intended as approximations. They are deliberately general in character, since the aim is that they should provide a way of describing the various aspects of urbanization and the production of territory. The notion of specificity is discussed in the introduction to this book by Jacques Herzog, and an explanation of the concepts is given in the overview text by Marcel Meili and in the chapter by Jacques Herzog and Pierre de Meuron. The following text complements these contributions and places the notion of specificity in a wider theoretical framework. It takes the analyses of cities and urban areas presented here as an opportunity for a theoretical discussion of the fundamental, often invisible, and little-understood determinants of urbanization.[12]

2. TERRITORY AND SECOND NATURE
The starting point for our observations of the specific is the surface of the earth as the material basis for all human activities. We move around on the surface of the earth, with all its various characteristics—its topography, its vegetation, its ground cover—and our movements are embedded in a material structure that was originally formed solely by natural forces, such as relief energy, wind, water, or volcanic activity. However, the very first societies already made their mark on this surface with trails, signs, paths, and clearings. Cultivation and settlements led to the first significant transformation of territory. Thousands of

years later this transformation was vastly accelerated by the process of urbanization and took on an entirely new quality.

This allows us to deduce a different definition of urbanization: urbanization is the production of a second, urban nature. The history of urbanization is a history of socially produced abstraction, turning natural space into abstract space. During this process nature is fundamentally changed and transformed into something new: a second, socially produced, as it were, artificial nature. This is one of the central propositions set out by Lefebvre with regard to the history of the production of space.[13]

Urban space thus has an initial basis: the physical space formed by nature. And it is on this basis that a society produces its social space with its own features; it inscribes itself into the land, into the terrain. The social relations of that society are consequently *localized*: all social activities are allocated their own place on the surface of the earth. The ensuing texture of that social space provides a concrete setting not only for abstract social relationships, but also for a spatial praxis, a usage, that is determined by that same texture. Thus, over the centuries, a second nature arises, a world created by human hand.[14]

A DEFINITION OF THE TERRITORY
In this context the concept of the territory takes on a very distinct meaning: territory can initially be understood as the socially produced basis for all human activity. In a sense it forms the material foundations for activities and interactions.

With this definition we are pursuing a fundamentally different course to many other approaches to the territory. There is a broad spectrum of understandings of territory and these are found in a wide diversity of disciplines, ranging from philosophy and biology, political science and geography to architecture and spatial planning. Despite the widespread use of this term, as yet there is no fully developed theory of the territory and there are no more than a few systematic overviews that investigate the notion of territory either as a concept or in terms of its history.[15] In the present context it is not possible to explore all the various meanings that the concept of territory has taken on hitherto and to trace their historical lines of development. Instead we will concentrate on the aspects that are of importance to this analytical framework.

It is possible to extract from the manifold genealogies of the concept of territory in social sciences and architecture two basic interpretations that are still of major importance today. One interpretation, which

above all prevails in the English-speaking world in political sciences and in political geography, places the question of the power of the state and of sovereignty center stage. Broadly speaking, in this interpretation territory is regarded as a political entity: either as the outcome of a strategy of territorialism[16] or, by contrast, as a defined, demarcated space, as "a portion of the earth's surface under the control of a group of people."[17] In essence this position regards territory as an area, on which a social and/or political institution—in the classical sense, a state—exerts power and control. Territory is here conceived of as an abstract surface, it equates to the extent of a certain authority, it is, so to speak, dematerialized.
A fundamentally different position—that has above all emerged in architecture and geography in the French- and Italian-speaking worlds—takes the materiality of the territory as its starting point. It is driven by the conviction that territory is produced—by human activity, by work, but also by being imbued with symbolic meaning. In one of the classics of architectural theory, the Italian architect Saverio Muratori theorizes territory as a product created by civilization, which can be analyzed on different levels: as a concept, in terms of political economy, ethics, and aesthetics.[18]

In geography it was Claude Raffestin in Geneva who has published the most important theoretical work on territory to date, combining Lefebvre's theory of space with Foucault's concepts on power. For Raffestin territory is a socially appropriated space; the way of appropriation can be either concrete or abstract, it can be realized by means of material or mental activities. Territory is the outcome of actions; it is formed through labor, through the use of energy, and the application of information. This also has the effect of simultaneously incorporating social conditions and relations—particularly existing power structures—into the territory.[19]

A similar view was taken by architectural historian André Corboz, also based in Geneva, who also regarded territory as the product of processes of appropriation and has put forward the metaphor of the territory as palimpsest: through a great variety of social and economic processes, the land is constantly reworked and overwritten with new texts, until it is like a tattered piece of old parchment.[20]

Largely inspired by Raffestin, Alberto Magnaghi and his colleagues developed in Italy in the 1990s a "territorial approach" of urban analysis, whereby the territory is seen as a neo-ecosystem that draws together the milieus of nature, the built environment, and human beings. This approach also put forward

the urbanistic project of a locally determined urbanization.[21]

In this context it should be said that the relationship of the concepts *space* and *territory* create some theoretical difficulties and misunderstandings. Lefebvre, for instance, rarely used the term *territory* and consequently developed a theory of the social production of *space*. In contrast, in Raffestin's writings there are lengthy passages where he uses the term *space* only in conjunction with *nature*, as opposed to *territory*, which he understands as a socially determined and defined space. However, in a later commentary Raffestin rather tellingly all but equates the two terms.[22] One's preference for either one term or the other is ultimately a matter of the applied theoretical approach and the related social theory implicit in that approach.[23] As opposed to the very general term *space*, the term *territory* is particularly suited to the needs of an urbanistic analysis, which has a special focus on the concrete, material conditions of urbanization and a special interest in the political and social processes of negotiation concerning land use.

URBANIZATION AND THE PRODUCTION
OF SECOND NATURE
Urbanization can thus initially be seen as the physical transformation of a territory. Its historical basis depends on the natural conditions that create very different starting points for urbanization. As society engages with these natural forces a second nature comes into being, which finally is accepted as a given and seen almost as a natural precondition of human activities—despite always having been determined by concrete social relations that have materialized during the course of this process of transformation and that have been incorporated into urban space.

Every urban space thus has a history that has its roots in nature and the conditions that originally prevailed there. Nature, in that situation, is nothing other than the raw material that has been transformed into a social product by the process of urbanization. During this process produced space detaches itself from natural space; nature is at once destroyed and recreated as a second nature, as a produced urban space that contains within it specific new characteristics. In the process of social transformation this space loses everything that was once natural about it. This natural aspect, its pure, original state, will never return.[24] However, the natural space does not disappear without a trace. It is still present in the background and can suddenly reemerge in the foreground. The forces of nature are never entirely contained; they can always unexpectedly break through again, as

Vesuvius, for instance, demonstrates only too vividly: its menacing presence constantly affects Naples and its urbanized surroundings, which have crept ever closer to the volcano over the years.

However, although the point of departure of an urban space is in nature, the responses to the initial conditions given by a society are never inevitable or natural: there is always a wide spectrum of possibilities with regard to the appropriation of natural forces and the transformation of the territory. The given conditions may be random, but the way those conditions are handled is never random. It is the result of historical developments that ultimately lead to the formation of an urban space that has its own traits and characteristics.

This second nature is thus the outcome of a society's appropriation and transformation of "first nature." A specific territory is created through human interaction with natural forces—from the first efforts to cultivate land, through early settlements up to urbanization. During this process material structures arise that are only made possible by the long-term occupation of that territory; they are accompanied by particular practices and techniques that can survive for a long time. Even the earliest forms of agriculture have a marked, often enduring, impact on the territory. The cultivation of land with the aid of irrigation and the clearing of woodlands, leading to the creation and formation of very different cultural landscapes, bears witness to major technical interventions and, also in many cases, to great skill.

In this context urbanization can be seen as another round of transformation of these landscapes, in which the changes are determined by an industrial logic. A central role in this process is played by sociometabolic transformations, that is to say, the extraction, treatment, and transportation of materials and energy sources, up to and including the industrialization of agriculture. Industrialization not only increases output, it also makes very different forms of land use possible and creates an entire industrial system. In waves of industrialization—the industrial revolution, the automobilization of society, the microelectronic revolution—ever new claims have been imposed to the territory. It has been repeatedly ploughed up and reorganized to the point where we have now arrived at the contemporary complex, multilayered, and intertwined metropolitan landscapes that bring as a consequence the disappearance of the city as a contained, fixed, clearly identifiable entity—urbanized territories have replaced the once clearly recognizable form of cities. In the present publication the Nile Valley and the Canary Islands, but also the

urbanization circumambient to Vesuvius and the almost complete urbanistic occupation of Hong Kong are telling examples of this process.

NETWORKS, CENTERS, AND PERIPHERIES

The logic of industry is in essence a logic of networking, spanning from ordinary, everyday networks to intercontinental trade links. For their part, these networks are all based on material underpinnings in the form of infrastructure, roads, airports, fiber-optic cables, and so on. In this sense trade links only exist in social terms insofar as they are projected onto the terrain and materialize in concrete, localized transportation networks, markets, and centers. Each aspect of these material foundations underpins a particular network and hence a realm that is a product, that can be consumed, that serves a process of exchange and a use. These material foundations only acquire meaning and finality in and through this space.[25]

As urbanization progresses a structure thus gradually comes into being in the territory and, as such, establishes connections and points of orientation. The territory constitutes the material foundations for the networks that span the urban space. These networks are always based on a built materiality: roads and interconnecting routes, residential areas and places of production—the material basis of every interaction. These networks and points of orientation have their roots in history and inscribe themselves into the territory over a long period of time. Trails, paths, and so on, take on a more permanent form over time. This in turn also creates a material foundation, a structure that guides action and that by necessity predefines further development. In this way processes of interaction become enduring features of space; specific urban forms and patterns emerge and petrify. These material structures make an impact: they lay down the lines along which the urban fabric evolves and thus also influence the further trajectory of urbanization. And hence they also survive as traces or as points of orientation, just like the topography into which they inscribed themselves.

These networks create new conditions, and they produce the specificities of a location as a result of its position in relation to other networks. This also leads to a spatial hierarchy: the networks have hubs, where there is intense interaction, and outer reaches, which thus become peripheries. One of the most important aspects of the urban condition is therefore centrality. Urban centers can have long histories, as in the case of Cairo, Naples, or Beirut, or they can be the outcome of a colonial foundation, as in the case of Hong Kong, Casablanca, and Nairobi. But however they

came into existence, these centers are today all points of encounter and assembly. As Lefebvre pointed out, an urban center may bring many elements together, people and things, the fruits of the earth, the products of industry, human works, acts and situations, signs and symbols.[26] Therefore, the center is antinature par excellence: whereas nature disperses, the center gathers all sorts of things and people and thus creates the basis for the urban condition.

In every urban area centers and peripheries form a specific pattern.[27] This pattern can exist on any scale. On a global scale, there are centers of decision making and control of the world economy, whereas on a regional scale there are subcenters and urban corridors. Urbanization ultimately leads to a complex and multilayered system of hubs and spokes that stake out a logistical space.[28] However, this also means that for every center there are also peripheries—one cannot exist without the other. The periphery is therefore not merely "natural space," "countryside," or "noncity": it is always a relational space that is defined in terms of the center. There are no centers today without multifarious peripheries that supply foodstuffs and raw materials, water and energy, that absorb all kinds of waste materials, and that serve as places of relaxation or of ideological recuperation. This means that the seemingly nonurban parts of our planet are also subject to urban change. They become places that are tied into urban networks and increasingly dominated by an industrial logic in a process that can be described as "planetary urbanization."[29]

BETWEEN FIXITY AND MOTION

All these persistent material patterns develop slowly and over a long period of time, sometimes over centuries. Depending on the concrete situation very different imprints in the territory may evolve: some patterns are rather extensive, others are more densely woven, and the basic principle might be rather monocentric or polycentric. Whatever the concrete pattern may be, it has a dual character: facilitation and limitation. It facilitates processes of interaction, but it also channels them and thus hampers alternative possibilities of development.

David Harvey has grasped this process with his concept of the production of the built environment, and has shown that these material structures are marked by an immanent, fundamental contradiction: the dialectics of fixity and motion, the contradiction between the dynamics of urbanization and the permanence, the persistence, of the spatial structures it produces.[30] The process of urbanization has the tendency to overcome the spatial barriers and to make

ever closer connections between more and more areas, thereby also accelerating the exchange of people, goods, and information. Harvey has called this process "time-space compression": the time needed to cover a certain distance becomes shorter, with the result that places move closer to one another and the globe shrinks.[31]

However, in order to create even closer connections between places and even more tightly knit global networks, it is necessary to produce a material infrastructure: highways, ports, airports, right down to manufacturing plants and office towers. The built environment is itself immobile and rigid, and it establishes a spatial structure that is hard to alter. It also requires massive, long-term capital investments that will yield rewards only over the long duration. And this in turn leads to the major problem: sooner or later the built environment will come into conflict with the dynamics of technological change and the demands of future development.[32] This also explains why urbanization manifests such a high degree of path dependency: the built environment cannot be changed overnight, or at least not without causing massive destruction and devaluation of existing investments. Thus an urban fabric arises that can often barely be fundamentally changed and can only be adjusted with considerable efforts.

SPECIFICITY AND URBAN TERRITORIES

The city, as a second nature, is caught between fixity and motion. Every urban development creates new possibilities, but at the same time also establishes fixed structures, thus limiting the potential for later corrections or changes to the course of development. There is a tendency for the urban fabric to become entrenched, to crystallize, and to fill the entire territory, as in the case of Venice or the inner city of Paris.[33]

Whereas Venice already reached its boundaries in the fifteenth century and is now something of a living museum, over the course of the centuries Paris has extended ever further outward from its center and has created a succession of peripheries: first the *faubourgs*, then, since the nineteenth century, rings of *banlieues*. The last defensive wall in Paris, built by Thiers in 1845, crucially contributed to the consolidation and petrification of the opposition between center and periphery. At a time when in the majority of European cities the city walls were demolished in order to make way for new city extensions, expanding industrial areas and workers' housing, the King of France, Louis Philippe I, wanted to protect Paris, this precious center of French civilization, against all possible enemies from the outside. To this day the

city of Paris is referred to as *Paris intra muros,* with the result that everything outside its walls is seen as periphery. Although the Thiers Wall was removed after the World War I, it still lingers on as an almost impenetrable obstacle, for it has been replaced by a huge highway ring road, which has rather significantly been named *Le périphérique.* A stark divide between center and periphery has thus arisen and deepened over the years. The divide has become even more pronounced with the huge expansion of the Paris *banlieues* after World War II. To this day *Paris intra muros* is still the privileged place that concentrates most of the important cultural, social, and economic centralities of the Paris region—and of France. This divide between the center and the periphery is one of the most intractable problems Paris has to deal with, despite all the efforts undertaken by so many governments to upgrade the periphery by means of massive investments in the infrastructure, in new metropolitan highways, in a whole new network of fast metropolitan railway connections (RER), and even new tramlines in the *banlieues*—and by constructing new centers and "new towns" (*villes nouvelles*). This is a vivid example of the strong influence of the urban fabric of a city as a legacy, which shows a strong inertia and has the tendency to constantly reproduce itself, thus shaping to a certain extent future urban developments.

In Naples this form of entrenchment and petrification has taken an almost tragic turn. The city was established in a volcanic area, where the natural conditions created an extraordinarily fertile and attractive landscape, which allowed Naples to become one of the largest cities in Europe in the Middle Ages. However, this landscape, due to its volcanic nature, is always in motion: it is unpredictable, uncontrollable, unmanageable, and constitutes a permanent threat to the city. Over the years, the city built around Vesuvius has rigidified into a solid crust that can no longer react to movements in the ground it stands on. As such, here second nature is very different to first nature and has created an impossible dilemma: if the volcano were to erupt, this crust, this second nature, would be ripped apart and wreak unimaginable havoc and destruction. Yet the only way to permanently remove the city's inhabitants from this danger would be to construct new settlements in much safer locations—and to devalue the city's existing buildings and infrastructure, leaving them to go to ruin. Obviously, there is no simple solution to this impasse.

The opposite situation is seen in the Nile Valley, where the landscape has been determined by limited natural resources. Here an entire area originally had

a form of stability imposed upon it by the waters of the Nile, which have created a linear oasis in the middle of the desert. However, this stability is at odds with the social dynamics and the huge increase in population that Egypt has seen in recent decades. The only way to overcome the limitations of the Nile Valley is to build out into the desert, but this is not only immensely costly, it also has serious social implications, in the sense that it fundamentally alters a traditional way of life that is tied into agriculture and the land. So the members of this society are in a sense trapped in their valley, immobilized; the possible future development of the valley is forced into a straitjacket and continues to depend almost entirely on Cairo, the vast, dominant center.

Another form of constraint is seen in Hong Kong, which was originally no more than a rocky outcrop in the sea not far from the coast, only inhabited by a few fishermen's families. Here the scarcity of land was the crucial natural condition and a unique urban fabric evolved in response to it. Building upward seems to be the almost inevitable answer to the limited amount of available land. In the smallest area, an incredible urban dynamic has evolved in what is now one of the leading global cities. Here second nature is particularly in evidence, as a largely artificial world that has emerged in the verticality and enormous density of its built structures, which are sustained by a highly sophisticated system of mass transit railways (MTR). This artificiality continues in a complex system of internal spaces and is equally evident in the sophisticated treatment and sealing of the surfaces outside the buildings.

At the same time, superfluity can also be a formative condition for urbanization, as in the case of the Canary Islands, where nature has created the ideal conditions for pleasant living, with its coastal areas and sandy beaches, its varied topography and vegetation, and its equable, gentle climate. These natural conditions provide the raw materials for an entire industry, namely tourism, which has now taken over large parts of the islands and has, in turn, created its own economic, social, and urbanistic structures. The Canary Islands exemplify the ever-expanding touristic landscapes that form a kind of urban edging along many coastal areas across the world and that solidify into new structures, which now often reveal little evidence of the original landscape.

The examples collected in this volume show many different aspects of the dialectics of fixity and motion. From the drama of Vesuvius to the unsolved problem of the periphery of Paris, in every case it is clear that the second nature created by society has a wideranging

structuring and determining influence. Second nature contains elements of all phases of development, from the original conditions of location and topography to the large-scale networks and connections that were constructed over the centuries and the multifarious urban forms that have left their marks on territory over time. Thus particular conditions are created that are always specific. The crucial fact is that these outcomes should not be seen as natural responses to the original natural conditions: they are the outcome of concrete historical developments that, for their part, were and are crucially dependent on power structures and territorial regulations, the subject of the following section.

3. THE INCORPORATION OF POWER INTO THE TERRITORY

As we have seen, the material, built-up structure of the territory has a determining character: it guides social activities, it suggests certain actions and hinders or prevents others—it can be understood as an incorporation of instructions. The human being perceives this structure as an obstacle, as an opposing factor, sometimes implacably hard, like a concrete wall; it is not only extremely difficult to alter but also subject to multiple rules designed to control any changes. [34] This therefore means that social relations inscribe themselves into a territory; they solidify and create an urban fabric that in turn determines human actions by allocating a space to them, by defining their possibilities and limitations—although, crucially, it is not only materiality that is a determinant; it is also the rules that pertain to this materiality and the power that is behind those rules.

This is how social relations and power structures become a reality in a terrain. This is as true of the relations of production, of the division of labor, and the organization of labor, as it is of the relationship between the sexes and numerous other social relationships. A territory allocates the appropriate place to the activities by which it is constituted; it localizes them.[35] Power is thus incorporated into any territory in a wide variety of ways. But how does a specific order of built structures arise in a territory? This in turn raises the further question of the different ways a territory is controlled and the process of urbanization is steered. How does a society inscribe itself into a space or a territory?

It is explicitly not the intention in this text to analyze power in general, nor to illuminate the question of state and territoriality, but rather to undertake an analysis of a very specific form of the exercise of power, which takes hold in the territory, which is in

fact instrumental in the constitution of that territory. This form of power has its sights set on the land and strives to control the production of the built environment. It goes without saying that this is another very complex issue that cannot be fully explored here. We will therefore concentrate on just a few crucial questions: what are the power structures and the parallelograms of forces that determine the production of the built environment? How do different interests manage to impose themselves in a space? What are the rules that apply to the construction of infrastructure and buildings? Who sets these rules?

The relationship between power and territory is often seen in purely one-dimensional terms—territory is taken to be a particular part of Earth's surface that has been claimed by a government body. This view led to the French concept of *aménagement du territoire* (territorial ordering), which simply means that the state creates order in its sovereign land. Interestingly, this same activity is known in German as *Raumplanung* (spatial planning), which is indicative of different concepts of space and territory in different language areas. Nevertheless, both terms imply particular notions of how a space or a territory should be organized and how this process can be instituted and implemented. The idea that space is an empty container that the state can fill with various objects, or that territory is an empty plane onto which the state projects its plans has little to do with reality because the state's plans come up against all kinds of obstacles that resist its efforts to impose its power. Reality produces much more complex situations within which diverse constellations of actors have to engage one another.

The question of how power structures are incorporated into a territory is linked to the specific constellation of social forces that determine and control the production of that territory. This constellation can also be seen as a specific social relation that arises from the negotiations around the production of the territory; we could call this the "territorial relationship" (*rapport territorial*).[36] The territorial relationship generates a contradictory and complex system of dependencies, jurisdictions, and rules. This system is not static, but dynamic and contested; rules are constantly being breached and questioned, with the result that the system also changes with the passage of time. The framework of rules that ensues from this, the territorial regulation, is complex, since it consists not only of laws, bylaws, and prescriptions, but also of diverse unwritten, implicit rules; as a result it is often barely comprehensible to outsiders—and even so to insiders.

BORDERS

Right at the outset of our reflections on the question of power the concept of borders comes up again, which also occupies a prominent place in *Switzerland—An Urban Portrait*. Borders are the basis of the control of any territory. They mark out and signify a territory; they serve to delimit, to demarcate, and to define that territory. This has been analyzed in detail by Claude Raffestin. He has shown that the totality of a territory's borders constitute a system, which he has called *maillage* (netting, meshing). The overlapping and mutual interpenetration of various borders can lead to complex structures that define the territory and hence also establish specific power structures. Raffestin has described this as a "grid of power" that spans the territory.[37]

Borders serve as a means to control the territory; they define the authority that occupies that area. Borders can also be read as information that structures the territory. In that respect, it is of prime importance to understand the social and political nature of borders, which are in fact instruments of action and control. It therefore makes no sense to talk of "natural borders."[38] Nature does not impose borders; it is society that designates and divides the territory. Topographic features, mountains, rivers, lakes, and the sea—which many like to regard as borders—may be obstacles that make it harder to cross the territory, but it is only social and political domination that turns them into borders. Hundreds of years ago the Mediterranean, for instance, and the Great Lakes in North America did not form borders; on the contrary they connected different cultures and peoples and, as such, constituted cultural, social, and economic spaces in their own right—and they still connect as well as separate people. The Alps and the ability to control Alpine passes were decisive factors in the existence and stability of Switzerland as a political entity.[39] Borders are set by history, not nature, and they also have a history of their own. They are like engravings of historically specific power constellations that might be transformed but sometimes survive for a long time.

Borders are implemented at every scale: nationstates, regions, communes, and so on. Often small-scale borders are more enduring than those on a much larger scale. This is certainly the case in Switzerland, where communal boundaries have had a huge impact on spatial development for a long time and are strongly predefining the course of urbanization.[40] At the same time, it is important to distinguish between political-territorial borders and everyday boundaries: while the first establish a certain political dominance

and are closely linked to formal rules, the latter can be fluid and variable, and ultimately they are mainly informal.

Borders significantly drive certain aspects of urbanization; in a sense they act as invisible guidelines for urban development. At the same time, however, they are also constantly put under pressure by the processes underlying urbanization. Because the process of urbanization has the tendency to cross borders and to undermine divisions, it tends to dissolve existing territories and to redefine them. Accordingly borders are overwritten, but they still might have an impact—often in a subliminal way—and, as such, can take on new meaning. Ultimately an urban territory is an area where borders are transformed, become permeable, and enter into complex new constellations. Borders start to overlap and jurisdictions intersect; in addition new territorial units arise or are deliberately created in order to control the development of expanding urban areas more effectively. These processes have in recent years been discussed at length in the context of the scale question.[41]

REPRESENTATIONS OF SPACE

As the discussion of borders has shown, particular significance attaches to the question of delimiting a territory. Borders are therefore always determined by definitions.[42] Definition is a form of demarcation, and definitions of territories are always founded on particular conceptions or representations of space.

An important step of the definition of a territory comes often in the form of a picture, a map, a plan that describes and records the territory and thus creates a mental space that serves as the basis for any exertion of power and control.[43] The ideas, the images we have of a city also play a decisive part, since an image or a model, like any construction of reality, is always also an instrument of power.[44] In recent years, for instance, numerous new terms have been created to find new ways to refer to expanding urban areas, and today the terminological vocabulary ranges from *urban regions* and *agglomerations* to *conurbations*, *metropolitan regions*, *global city regions*, *mega-regions*, and *urban galaxies*.[45] However, these terms—and the corresponding maps and images—do not simply convey a picture of existing realities; on the contrary, they create new realities. As representations of space, these terms and images also can be understood as interventions into a social field and are accordingly often debated and contested.

Representations of space have an operative dimension: they are intended to denominate, to illuminate, to implement something. As Lefebvre has shown, we cannot engage in any form of activity within a space, if we have not already developed an idea or a concept of what that space looks like. And in order to convey these ideas, we need terms and images that name and depict this space.[46] These representations are never neutral. They privilege certain aspects and ignore others. This raises the question of what elements are either present or absent, what is shown and what is hidden. The things that are not shown are often more important than the things that are shown. Representations thus rely on social conventions that stipulate which elements are to be shown in relation to one another and which are to be excluded. These conventions are learned, yet they are not immutable; they are often disputed and contested and negotiated in discursive (political) engagement.

Specific representations and ideas of an urban area can develop an impressive continuity and, like material structures, can solidify and turn into fixed stereotypes, which almost seem to the inhabitants of that area like natural certainties that are not up for discussion. A typical example of this kind of stereotyping is seen in the division of Paris into two zones, with sophisticated and glamorous urban Paris inside the *Périphérique* and the outlying, ordinary *banlieues* outside it. Although this image relates to the material reality of the situation, it further reinforces and cements that situation through the representation of the area. To this day many maps of Paris only show the inner zone and completely ignore the *banlieues*. The message to visitors and tourists is clear: only this inner zone is the "true" Paris, the remainder, outside it, is not worth visiting. And yet the outer zone of Paris is home to around four times as many people as the inner zone, and as such it is the dominant reality of daily life in Paris. As this example shows, a contributing factor to this is what people consider to be urban or not urban, what they regard as typical for a particular city: views that often arise behind the backs of the actors.

TERRITORIAL REGULATION

Representations convey meaning, they are mental constructs that structure our thinking. As such they have a regulatory influence—in a sense they pave the way for the regulation of a territory. The term *regulation* covers a whole set of explicit and implicit rules of play that apply in a particular area.[47] These include not only laws and explicit orders, but also the procedures and modalities of planning and the processes and forms of negotiation that these involve. They allocate places to activities—they determine what we are allowed to do where.

In the widest sense this form of territorial regulation establishes the manner in which a territory is used. It thus concerns not only the totality of formal and informal agreements and rules in the realms of spatial and urban planning or of architecture and urban design; it also concerns the social processes of negotiation that affect the use of a territory. Of central importance to this are the patterns of ownership, land law, and the various modalities of land rights. All these factors are always extremely complex and contradictory, often impenetrable; they can be very difficult to research and are generally hard to understand. But account also has to be taken of the planning processes, which may have to conform to very convoluted rules, and the diverse arrangements concerning the development of a particular territory (city, district, commune, urban region, and so on). These arrangements can concern anything from agreements regarding construction and urban development to the organization of daily life and the use of public spaces; as such they also involve debates on norms and ideals; such debates may center on the questions of what a city should be, how people should live, what is beautiful and what is ugly, and so on.[48] A characteristic property of territorial regulations is that norms and rules are often applied subconsciously, and specific forms of problem-solving arise that people always return to.

Territorial regulation is always rooted in a specific constellation of social forces that is typical of that particular area. Very different agents can be involved in the establishment of rules and equally diverse interests and constellations of forces can come into play. Different institutions and political-territorial entities can also have an influence on these matters. The ensemble of these agents and their mutual interrelations constitute the *territorial relationship*.[49] Whereas a territorial relationship on a national level is above all determined by centralized, national laws, edicts, and infrastructure policies, the debates surrounding urban development at a regional or local level give rise to the specific social constellations in which not only the local authorities but also all kinds of formal and informal coalitions, alliances, and agreements can be involved.

BETWEEN FORMAL AND INFORMAL

How do regulations imprint on the territory? Are the marks they leave enduring or temporary? During the course of our analyses, one particular aspect of territorial regulation came to the fore: the dialectics of formality and informality. The term *informality* has been used for some time now and has become a permanent instrument for the investigation and analysis of cities. In the dominant urbanistic discourse the informal sector is still often regarded as an independent sector—and sometimes even seen as a specific form of settlement. It is generally equated with poor, precarious living conditions. There is also often an assumption that there are two distinct sectors: a formal sector that conforms to state-regulated procedures and an informal sector that can be clearly delineated in social and spatial terms, and that generally exists without any direct relations to the state sector. Often the informal sector is seen as a temporary aberration in less developed cities, which—as the city develops—will increasingly be integrated into the "modern," formal sector.

However, most of these conceptions and ideas are not tenable. As our own recent research has shown, processes of informalization also appear in the global north and they are by no means only seen in the areas occupied by poorer social groups. The analysis of Belgrade[50] has in fact shown that already under the socialist regime there was an informal sector that existed in parallel to the formal, state-controlled construction of settlements. When the socialist state came into crisis, informality—notably also in rich neighborhoods—became a widespread model of territorial regulation. It is therefore obvious that formal and informal regulations are not a contrastive pair but rather that they coexist in a contradictory balance. These findings tie into research which has also focused on the mutual articulation and interpenetration of the two sectors. Roy and AlSayyad, for instance, have suggested that urban informality should not be seen as a separate sector, but rather as a mode of urbanization, an organizing logic, a system of norms that regulates the process of urban transformation, and as a series of transactions that connect different economies and spaces to one another.[51]

In the case of Naples, informal and often illegal construction is the crucial component in the answer to the question of why urbanization is coming ever closer to Vesuvius, rather than keeping its distance. Without illegal construction, settlements in the danger zone around Vesuvius would not have become so concentrated and so well established. At the same time, however, the existence of a formal sector also has a decisive role: the interplay of formal/informal is precisely the prerequisite for the enormous profits that can be made by illegal practices. The frequent amnesties that were conceded for contraventions of building laws show that illegality has become a permanent component of territorial regulation—in Naples as well as in many other parts of Italy. As a

consequence, criminal organizations such as the Camorra also play an important role in the urbanization of the territory.

These examples demonstrate that it is not only written laws and edicts that determine how urban areas develop. Implicit, illegal, and informal factors should always also be taken into consideration. In fact it is clear that in many places informal practices have always been present, even if, from time to time, they were pushed into the background by the formal sector. As the case of Belgrade shows in an exemplary way, in certain situations it is precisely the informal that creates a degree of stability, while the formal—particularly in times of major change—becomes unstable. This also explains why certain structures have such persistence, even when radical changes are under way. In the case of Belgrade, the informal provided a fallback position that people could turn to when the state itself was in crisis.

SPECIFICITY AND TERRITORIAL REGULATION

The spectrum of different forms of territorial regulation is vast, and that is also one of the main reasons why cities are so distinctive. Very different power systems may intervene in territorial regulation—even traditional, rural, or clientelistic power systems can be of major importance, as can be seen in the cases of Casablanca, Nairobi, and the Nile Valley. However, traditional aspects of regulation, which in fact go back to preindustrial social structures, are still also found in other countries, even in highly industrialized Switzerland where, to this day, individual communes wield very considerable power, especially with regard to the steering of urbanization—what leads to an extremely decentralized and small-meshed urban fabric. We have to delve right back into the Middle Ages to find the roots of this powerful communal autonomy, which still sometimes has preserved many of the traditional elements of decision making and political and social control.[52]

Territorial regulation can of course also be shaped by centralized, authoritarian control which may be determined by only a few actors. The most famous historical example of this was the large-scale transformation of Paris under the regime of Napoleon III and his Prefect Baron Haussmann. In a still unrivalled strategic urbanistic intervention Haussmann set out to impose a new order on the extremely narrow and dense, socially and physically very mixed urban fabric of Paris. He used the famous boulevards to cut through the dense weave of the urban fabric and to reorder the city; in so doing he drove large proportions of the lower classes out into the *banlieues*.

As he pursued his aims, he in fact exploited an urbanistic strategy whose main elements were already present in Paris and which he systematically deployed to restructure the city: by means of axes and central squares forming the node of streets that radiate outward in all directions like the points of a star, and by creating orientation points through the careful positioning of monuments. Parts of this urbanistic strategy were subsequently used in numerous cities in the French colonies and in the Parisian *banlieues* (above all in the *villes nouvelles*). Haussmann's fifteen-year restructuring of central Paris led to the destruction of large parts of the old inner city. In 1871, only a few years after Haussmann's brutal urbanistic intervention the famous insurrection of the Paris Commune shook the city to the very foundations—a wake-up call and a model to so many revolutionaries. The Commune can be interpreted as the people's reconquest of their own city, with the lower classes, who had been banished and driven into the periphery, returning to the center of the city: it could be described as the first urban revolution.[53]

A very different form of centralized planning can be seen in Hong Kong, which could only be constructed as it was by virtue of far-reaching governmental controls over the territory. These had their roots in the particular colonial control over the land and are, as such, very unusual. The territorial relation of Hong Kong was largely determined by an alliance between the government and local capital. This led to a sophisticated top-down planning system that was deliberately used to steer the process of urbanization and to control the population. Over the years that system was consistently refined and perfected, and, with some modifications, it has even survived the handover of the colony to the Peoples Republic of China in 1997. Yet here, too, there are numerous informal structures, from the shanty towns and squatter settlements that still exist on the fringes of Hong Kong to the informal and illegal extensions on rooftops. And this contradiction is also seen in improvised street markets and informal meeting places. Additional analysis also confirms the unexpected survival of rural structures: traditional Chinese village law still plays a major role in the urbanization process of Hong Kong; it is largely responsible for the fact that to this day large expanses of the New Territories are still not at all densely populated and it is therefore also one of the main reasons that the central districts on Hong Kong Island and Kowloon are so densely built over.[54]

The territorial regulation of the Nile Valley is also rooted in a powerful, centralized system of govern-

mental control that is particularly directed at controlling the territory and, in so doing, at determining the spheres of activity and the daily life of the population. The main aims of that system are to stabilize population growth and to limit migration to Cairo. This has indeed led to a slowing down of the process of urbanization, but also to the immobilization of social development, and—at least for a certain time—to the stabilization of the present power structures. The contrast between the highly regulated Nile Valley and the dynamic, restless metropolis of Cairo is in many ways constitutive of present-day Egypt and its political development.

In Nairobi, by contrast, various parallel power systems have developed, which coexist and constitute very different "cities" within that city—although they all relate to one another in terms of economics and daily life. Different geometries of power have arisen here, which have in turn produced various centers of power. This city therefore breaks down very distinctly into individual parts that are very different socially and economically and that also have their own territorial regulations. There could hardly be a greater difference between modern, international Nairobi and the neighborhood of Kibera, which has been shaped by traditional, rural, and informal structures.

All these examples clearly show that urbanization is not only dependent on material structures and conditions, but also on territorial regulations and national as well as local power structures. In many cases, these regulations are even more difficult to change than the material urban structures, and thus strongly contribute to the specificity of an urban area. Our analyses brought a wide variety of models of territorial regulation to the fore. Not only the scale of the main institutional units of territorial regulation differ, ranging from systems with a strong influence of the communal scale up to very centralized models almost entirely depending on the national scale, but also the origins of regulation show a tremendous variation, with traditional and sometimes even rural elements that might still be of great importance. Furthermore, informality and illegality have to be understood as constitutive parts of territorial regulation. In order to understand these specificities, we have to analyze the constellations of social forces that constitute the territorial relation of a city and we have to follow the open and hidden conflicts and fracture lines that mark these relations. Finally, the question of control of the local population is a recurrent feature, and this has precisely to do with one of the most productive aspects of urbanization: the tendency to

bring people together and thus to foster a social dynamic that might become explosive. The question of the power of difference is thus the final issue of this chapter.

4. URBANIZATION AND THE PRODUCTION OF DIFFERENCE

Urbanization transforms society—but how does an urban situation arise from this transformation? There have been numerous attempts to define the difference between town and country. Some definitions place the emphasis on the role of the city as the center, as the seat of power, as the place of civilization and culture. Others point to the specific form of social interaction that arises in cities. However, many definitions are still largely colored by the notion that a certain size of settlement is needed to create an urban situation. But size is always relative and means little in isolation.

We take a fundamentally different approach to the understanding of the urban. Our main proposition is that an urban existence is created when differences arise and become effective. Differences do not only signify social and cultural diversity, for they are also the result of active processes of interaction that often involve social struggle: "City" is where social differences collide and become productive. It is important to understand that these differences are dynamic: they are not something a city has; they are something a city constantly produces and reproduces.

As Friedrich Engels observed, in economic terms, the city is primarily a concentration of means of production and of labor force. In spatial terms this leads to an agglomeration, which in turn has certain advantages that are known as agglomeration economies. The concentration of people, goods, and activities of all kinds leads to a stronger internal differentiation, to a deepened division of labor and hence to a faster economic development of urban centers. To this day this definition has never been seriously challenged and it is still one of the most important economic definitions of the city.[55]

Many scholars regard this as an adequate definition of the urban. But what is the social impact of agglomeration? As Georg Simmel showed more than a hundred years ago, the crowding together of people and things in a confined space has certain social consequences. The variety of things and impressions that are constantly assailing people in a city provide a wide range of stimuli. An increased level of social interaction ensues, which gives much greater significance to the money economy and hence also to exchange values and the market. At the same time,

individuals enjoy a much greater degree of personal freedom, which allows them to develop their own capacities. There are not only opportunities but also economic pressures to generate diverse things and activities, because people have to earn a living. This in turn reinforces the division of labor and increases specialization. The sum of the effects that extend both in terms of time and space beyond the here and now of the city intensifies this process yet further.[56]

Urban life positively strives for differentiation. Difference can thus be seen as a fundamental productive force that basically arises in urban areas, as Marcel Meili has shown in this book: it is crucial that people have the opportunity to live out these differences and to generate new differences.

THE CONCEPT OF DIFFERENCE
The concept of difference has a long history. It is used in a wide variety of contexts and has a correspondingly wide range of meanings. It took on particular importance in relation to Post-Structuralism, Postmodernism, and Deconstruction, most notably in semiotics and linguistics. However, the connection between this concept and urbanism was first made by Henri Lefebvre, who posited difference as the fundamental characteristic of urban life. He regarded difference as a relational concept and viewed it in basically dialectical terms: differences are not to be merely understood as social contrasts, but as enacted contradictions. They can only present and re-present themselves as they relate to one another. Differences connect with the totality of actions, situations, discourses, and contexts; they relate to multifarious networks of interaction that overlap, that interfere with one another, and that change through the influence they have on one another. Thus a current is set in motion that ultimately changes the totality of social relations.[57]

Consequently, differences are not at all the same as particularities. Differences are active, relational elements, whereas particularities remain isolated from one another. In the natural world there were originally only particularities: material elements that were tied to local conditions and circumstances, such as place and location, climatic and topographical conditions, the availability of natural resources, and so on. Rural populations interacted with these natural elements, and they created sometimes remarkable, highly differentiated cultivated landscapes—however, rural life still was determined by particularities. In this original situation differences do not come to the fore as such: they exist in isolation and are externally alien to one another, and can quickly become hostile to other particularities.[58]

With the advent of industrialization this rural order was radically transformed. An overarching industrial system evolved, with a universal, rational, and rationalized logic that also led to the homogenization of society. Particularities disappeared and, with them, the distinguishing features of places. At the same time, however, a crucial change arose from these developments: people became mobile; they cut their dependencies from the land, from subsistence living, and from traditional customs. They came into contact with one another, far and near met, facilitating encounters and interactions. These confrontations led to mutual understanding, to a certain familiarity and a certain awareness of the Other. Transformed by these contacts, the qualities that survived were no longer separated from one another, and differences started to emerge. Thus the concept of difference arose: as enacted praxis, and ultimately as a mental act.[59]

Difference therefore has to be clearly distinguished from diversity and heterogeneity. The point is not that a variety of things or people are in the same space at the same time, the point is that there are interactions between them.[60] Lefebvre also further distinguishes between *minimal difference* and *maximal difference*, and between *induced* and *produced* differences. He extrapolates the first distinction from the rules of logic: minimal difference arises from the variations within a defined sphere—for instance, different types of detached houses in an otherwise homogenous suburb. Minimal difference tends toward formal similarity, that is to say, variations on a theme. Maximal difference is used to delineate differences between distinct fields and hence refers to qualitative differences, such as opposed lifestyles and modes of daily life. Induced differences are contained within a given setting or an existing system. By contrast, produced differences cross the boundaries of a field, as for instance in art, where precisely this form of transgression can lead to innovation. Differences thus become productive in that they generate something new and overcome the existing boundaries of daily life. They always have some surprises at the ready, as they are unpredictable, potentially explosive, and have the capacity to put into question an existing social system.[61]

Accordingly, the dominant social and political powers seek to exclude differences, to push them back to the margins of society and of the city; or they try to include them and to integrate them, to tame and to domesticate the maximal differences, to force them into some kind of order and, in so doing, to reduce them to minimal differences. This integration can also be seen as a process of incorporation, during which urban society is leveled out and homogenized.[62] The ultimate outcome of this integration is indifference. This situation therefore gives rise to what Lefebvre called a "titanic struggle" between homogenizing and differential forces.[63] Difference signifies potential, a possibility. It is an almost anarchic force that is innate to urban society. It is impossible to immobilize the urban—if it is pinned down, it will be destroyed. But even then urban reality tends to reinstate itself.[64] In Lefebvre's view, differential space—or differential space-time—is a concrete utopia: a possibility that can arise in the Here and Now.

DIFFERENTIAL SPACE
In Lefebvre's model, difference thus becomes a concrete utopia, the immanent potential of the urban. Difference has always to be realized in daily life, it has to evolve out on the terrain. It is thus importantly connected with space, or rather, with space-time, since it takes time to develop. Differences have to interact with one another—it is only then that an urban situation arises: "City" is where social differences collide and become productive.

Urban living is primarily different to village life or rural life in that it can be described in terms of its differences, not its particularities. This allows us to extrapolate a general criterion for the identification of urban areas: the mobilization of differences. If people are no longer chained to the land, but become mobile, if they are relatively free in their material space and also in their social spaces, a fundamental social change sets in. As soon as people start to move and to encounter one another, the possibility arises that people will interact and differences will come to light.

We have already set out our own definition of difference, on the basis of these reflections, in *Switzerland—An Urban Portrait*, which places particular emphasis on an analytical understanding of how a variety of urban situations are evolving. In our view difference is one of the main hallmarks of every urban situation although it is itself highly diverse. Differences have a dual aspect: on the one hand they are the result of the elements that come together in a concrete space—people with their individual experiences, their knowledge, and skills. At the same time, importance also attaches to the locations where people meet and interact, where differences between them can emerge. Difference is thus crucially connected with centrality: difference arises in places that draw contrasting elements together, that assemble these differences and render them productive.

On the other hand, differences can also be generated through networks: after all, urbanization specifically overcomes all kinds of borders and boundaries and brings together areas that were hitherto separate and far apart. Establishing links between areas can thus create new differences. In this sense urbanization involves the connection and articulation of different (nearby and faraway) places and situations. Particularities thus come into contact with one another and can become differences.

The presence of different socioeconomic groups, of rich and poor, is often cited as a contributing factor or even as a prerequisite for difference. However, this idealizing image precisely does not identify the essence of difference: this concept is not intended to serve as a means to romanticize or even legitimize social disparities, poverty, and precarious living conditions. On the contrary—difference includes processes of emancipation and needs equal rights and social justice as a crucial precondition that people really meet and exchange their ideas and experiences.

Immigration of course plays an important role in the emergence of differences: cities such as New York, Paris, or Toronto have been shaped by high levels of immigration, but at the same time, each of these cities also developed to a certain extent an urban culture that allows it to mediate these differences and to encounter the Other in a relatively relaxed, cool manner. Cities of that kind are melting pots, where people from the most diverse contexts, social, and cultural backgrounds productively interact with one another. But as the history of these cities also clearly demonstrates, this mediation is not always successful, and there were many places and moments in which differences were reduced and secluded.

Furthermore, this is not to say that immigration is necessarily essential for an urban culture. As Simmel showed, the urban condition itself leads to social differentiation and hence to the emergence of new differences. A prime example of this is Tokyo, which, despite the very considerable ethnic, cultural, and socioeconomic homogeneity of its inhabitants has developed a high degree of urban diversity.[65]

BETWEEN OPEN AND CLOSED
In order to define and analyze difference in greater detail, it is useful to draw up some further analytical distinctions, such as dynamic/static, inert/reactive, and active/passive.[66] For the purposes of the present analysis we have introduced another criterion, namely the dialectics of *open* and *closed*. Crucial importance attaches to the ways that various uses and urban

constellations are arranged in a territory, and to the ways that individual parts of an urban area either open up to one another—communicate with one another, and reach into one another, thereby creating new, urban potential—or turn their backs on one another and hive themselves off. Segregation and separation create all kinds of isolated entities, from gated communities to tourist resorts.

The example of the Canary Islands is paradigmatic for our analysis of difference, because it is possible to observe a particular way of managing differences there—namely segmentation, separation, and seclusion—which have led to the emergence of individual urban worlds that are cut off from one another. The Canary Islands thus break down into, and visibly exemplify, three distinct configurations, which can be described as *local city*, *tourist city*, and *support city*.[67] In other words, the touristic functions in the resorts have so to speak set themselves apart as self-contained territories, which are in turn separated from the territories occupied by the people who work in these resorts. This compartmentalization serves both to control and to commodify the touristic function.

An important role is played here by the commodification of difference. Since difference, as a productive force, can itself become a powerful magnetic force and, as such, attract both wealthy residents and businesses, there is an increasing tendency for differences to be commercialized and commodified. In the last years, processes of gentrification, urban regeneration, and urban upgrading have turned entire inner-city areas into privileged zones for global companies and wealthy population groups, with less prosperous residents and uses increasingly being displaced. This leads to a new kind of closed city, which thus also loses an important part of its differences and, hence, of its urbanity.

The dialectics of open and closed are perfectly exemplified in Paris. Urban contradictions and the debates and struggles concerning the urban have repeatedly flared up in Paris. One of the more recent examples was seen in the events of May 1968, which can be read not only as a rebellion against imperialism and the bourgeois order, but also as an urban revolt, as a reappropriation of the city. It was in this context that Lefebvre wrote his famous book *Le Droit à la ville* (The right to the city).[68] Analyzing the dialectics of this urban situation, almost fifty years ago, Lefebvre was already asking if it could really be in the interest of the political establishment and the hegemonial class to extinguish the spark of revolt and thereby to destroy the city's reputation across the world.[69] Notwithstanding, the subsequent

development of Paris has led to a situation where the Paris that exists *intra muros* has become a largely privileged, pacified urban space that is increasingly shaped by *embourgeoisement* and commodification, and has thus lost an important part of its differences.[70]

SPECIFICITY AND URBAN DIFFERENCES
As these two contrasting examples show, there exists a great variety of sociospatial patterns and modalities for the control or mediation of difference, which are as specific to individual cities as a fingerprint. The concept of difference can thus also be used analytically for the characterization of urban areas.

Right from the outset the colonial government of Hong Kong was at pains to keep control of any differences in order to be able to manage the often precarious social and political situation of this city, which was extremely exposed in political and economic terms. The government-led mass production of housing that started in the 1950s can be seen as one of the most important means of controlling the population. It instigated a long tradition of an authoritarian housing production and urban renewal policy, and Hong Kong still conveys the impression of a highly controlled territory. Nevertheless, difference always reappears and various attempts were made to help it break through: small actions in the cause of the appropriation of public spaces, but also large public protests, for instance, against the destruction of Hong Kong's inner-city neighborhoods and meeting places. The most symbolic of these were the major demonstrations against the demolition of the Star Ferry Pier and the Queen's Pier in 2006 and 2007, which can be interpreted as a call for the self-determined appropriation of the city and its history.[71]

As has already been said, the presence of various population groups, ethnicities, or religions can also contribute to increasing differences in an urban area. In favorable circumstances an open-minded cosmopolitanism can emerge, as happened in Vienna, for instance, around the turn from the nineteenth to the twentieth century.[72] But as the dramatic example of Beirut shows, these differences can also place an impossible strain on integrative possibilities and ultimately lead to an explosion. The onset of civil war in Beirut created an entirely new situation as the city fragmented into territories dominated by different ethnicities and religions. A central aspect of this was the absence of an overarching national or metropolitan structure that could have drawn the various groups together. In Beirut, as in many other places, cosmopolitanism had more to do with the elite than with the population as a whole. What was lacking was

not just an integrative culture of exchange, but also a means of mediation, of making connections between the various interests, which is in itself a crucial prerequisite for the long-term stabilization of differences.

To this day in the Nile Valley, there is only a very limited capacity for differences to arise, since the historical village-like conditions of life there have largely been preserved by the constraints of the territory and the powerful political control. Nevertheless, this area also stands as an example of the fact that differences can also arise within a rural situation. In recent years, and on a small, spatial scale, increasing numbers of networks have come into being, which are now reflected in the growing spatial mobility of people. This is also a form of urbanization of a territory and yet another possible variant of the urban condition.

There is a huge range of models of difference or of forms of territorial segregation and of social differentiation in a territory. Our examples are compelling proof of the fact that there are many ways of developing and handling differences. Furthermore, differences inscribe themselves into a territory in unpredictable ways and are, by definition, highly dynamic: in everyday life differences are constantly being confirmed or refuted; they are in constant motion, and there are moments of opening and moments of closure, in other words, phases when differences can grow and others when they are more powerfully controlled and domesticated. In that sense we could also speak of conjunctures of urbanity. The question of difference, as one of the main conditions of the urban, is a contested question.

5. TOWARD A TERRITORIAL APPROACH
OF URBAN ANALYSIS
Our analysis of urbanization engaging the three concepts that we jointly agreed on at the outset has uncovered a wide range of aspects and has shown how important the interplay of these different dimensions is in the generation of specificity. The production of a second nature on the basis of everyday actions and interactions, the processes of territorial regulation through which power structures inscribe themselves into a territory, and the patterns of lived difference that emerge—all these aspects contribute to the specific character of urban territories. In his contribution to this book Marcel Meili has described these three aspects of the production of territory as vectors that relate to one another: the specificity of an urban area can be seen as the outcome of these vectors and their mutual interactions.

These three vectors can also be understood as structuring the existing material conditions that can prove to be very resistant and persistent; the rules that prescribe how a territory is constructed and used and whose roots can go far back into history; and the various patterns and modalities of differences that are constantly forming anew in urban life—they all come together in a specific model of urbanization that is constantly developing further yet still retains certain basic structures and only very rarely suddenly changes.

We could assert that this interplay of specific structures is in fact constituting an urban territory: in the ongoing current of the process of urbanization and in the uninterrupted mesh of the urban fabric that is settling on the surface of the earth, relatively stable configurations emerge. Therefore, it is possible to discern certain consistencies in urban territories within which the same rules apply, the same laws of movement are in operation, and where overarching links and interactions are dominant with the result that a more or less delimitable catchment area arises. This analysis can be applied to the most diverse regions—not only to cities in the classical sense but also to all kinds of extensively urbanized areas, as the examples of the Nile Valley or the Canary Islands demonstrate.

The case studies in this book have shown that the fundamental constellations of urbanization are anything but simple to alter. The basic territorial patterns usually show an enormous inertia. The path dependency of these models of urbanization is self-evident—the specific, fundamental conditions of urbanization are difficult to change; even if—as in Belgrade—they are caught up in sudden upheavals, their main elements will survive. The urban is always a process, always in flux, and it often proceeds along invisible tracks, behind the backs of its actors, allowing a specific model of urbanization to constantly reproduce itself.

What is it that particularly interests us in these examples? They have shown us the vast range of urban developments and hence also the possibilities that are intrinsic to urbanization. The confrontation of general tendencies with local conditions leads to the formation of the most diverse urban situations. And in the process it becomes clear that the urban is always both geographically and historically specific. The urban is not a universal category; it is a specific category that is always dependent on concrete conditions and historical developments.

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2 Jean-Louis Cohen and Monique Eleb, *Casablanca* (New York: Monacelli, 2002), 47.
3 Military Governor Hubert Lyautey had previously served in Algeria and Indochina and knew the consequences of violent colonial suppression.
4 Cohen and Eleb, *Casablanca* (see note 2).
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8 Henri Lefebvre, *The Urban Revolution* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2003 [1970]).
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11 See Lefebvre, *Production of Space* (see note 10); Diener et al., *Switzerland* (see note 1); and Christian Schmid, *Stadt, Raum und Gesellschaft: Henri Lefebvre und die Theorie der Produktion des Raumes* (Stuttgart: Steiner, 2005).
12 Paris provides an additional example, which was researched during the winter semester in 2004/05.
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14 Ibid., 57, 120.
15 See, for instance, Stuart Elden, *The Birth of Territory* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2013), 3.
16 See, for instance, Robert D. Sack, *Human Territoriality: Its Theory and History* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986).
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18 Saverio Muratori, *Città e territorio* (Rome: Centro Studi di Storia Urbanistica, 1967).
19 Claude Raffestin, *Pour une géographie du pouvoir* (Paris: Libraries Techniques, 1980), 129.
20 André Corboz, "Le territoire come palimpseste," *Diogène* 121 (1983): 14–35.
21 Alberto Magnaghi, "Territorial Heritage: A Genetic Code for Sustainable Development," in *Possible Urban Worlds*, ed. INURA (Basel: Birkhäuser, 1998), 114–21; and Alberto Magnaghi, *Le projet local* (Sprimont: Mardaga, 2003).
22 Claude Raffestin, "Space, Territory, Territoriality," *Environment and Planning D: Society and Space* 30 (2012): 121–41.
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AUTHOR BIOGRAPHIES

Roger Diener

In 1976 the Basel architect Roger Diener, born 1950, graduated from the Swiss Federal Institute of Technology Zurich (ETHZ) and joined the firm Marcus Diener Architect, the company his father had founded in Basel. He was made partner in 1980. Diener & Diener Architects have offices in Basel and Berlin and, currently, a staff of forty-five. Works include the CentrePasquArt, an art museum in Bienne, Switzerland; the Swiss Embassy in Berlin, Germany; the Forum 3 Novartis Campus in Basel, Switzerland; the Musée de la Shoah in Drancy, France; and the Market Hall Tower in Basel, Switzerland.

From 1987 to 1989 he was a professor at the École Polytechnique Fédérale de Lausanne (EPFL), and he has been a professor at the Swiss Federal Institute of Technology Zurich, Studio Basel, since 1999. The Académie d'Architecture in Paris honored his work with the Grande Médaille d'Or in 2002. He was awarded the Prix Meret Oppenheim in 2009. In 2011 he received the Heinrich Tessenow medal.

Mathias Gunz

Mathias Gunz was born in St. Gallen in 1979. He studied architecture at the Swiss Federal Institute of Technology Zurich (ETH Zurich) from 2000 to 2007 and graduated under Roger Diener and Marcel Meili with a free diploma. Since 2002 he has worked in various architecture offices in St. Gallen, Zurich, and Tokyo and became a self-employed architect in 2008. He has been working as an assistant with Roger Diener and Marcel Meili at ETH Studio Basel since 2007. In 2011 he formed the office Gunz & Künzle Architekten with Michael Künzle in Zurich.

Manuel Herz

Manuel Herz is an architect based in Basel. His projects include the new Synagogue of Mainz and housing projects in Cologne and France. His projects have received various prizes such as the German Façade Prize 2011, the German Concrete Prize 2003 and a nomination for the Mies van der Rohe Prize for European Architecture 2010. His urban research work focuses on the architecture of humanitarian action, with a special emphasis on the planning strategies of refugee camps, and the relationship between architecture and state power. He is the author of the book *From Camp to City: Refugee Camps of the Western Sahara* and, together with Shadi Rahbaran, coauthored the book *Nairobi: Migration Shaping the City.*

Herz has taught at the Bartlett School of Architecture and the Harvard Graduate School of Design. He was head of teaching and research at ETH Studio Basel (at the chair of Herzog, de Meuron) and a visiting professor for architectural design at ETH Zurich.

Jacques Herzog

Jacques Herzog was born in Basel in 1950 and studied architecture at the Swiss Federal Institute of Technology Zurich (ETH Zurich) from 1970 to 1975 with Aldo Rossi and Dolf Schnebli. He received his degree in architecture in 1975, establishing his own firm with Pierre de Meuron in 1978. In 1977 he was an assistant to Prof. Dolf Schnebli, and in 1983 he was visiting tutor at Cornell University in Ithaca, New York, US. Since 1994 he has been a visiting professor at Harvard University, and since 1999 has been a professor at ETH Zurich, where he cofounded ETH Studio Basel: Contemporary City Institute.

Currently, Herzog & de Meuron employs an international team of around four hundred people working on more than fifty projects across Europe, North and South America, and Asia. Herzog & de Meuron have designed a wide range of projects from the small scale of a private home to the large scale of urban design. The practice has been awarded numerous prizes, including the Pritzker Architecture Prize in 2001 and the RIBA Royal Gold Medal in 2007.

Rolf Jenni

Rolf Jenni is an architect born 1972 in Biel, Switzerland. From 1989 to 1996 he pursued his architectural studies at the technical high school in Biel and the University of Applied Sciences HTL Biel. Between 2004 and 2006 he was a postgraduate student in architecture and urbanism at the Berlage Institute in Rotterdam. He has taught as teaching assistant and researcher at ETH Zurich with Prof. Marc Angélil (2002–4) and at ETH Studio Basel with Prof. Marcel Meili and Prof. Roger Diener (2007–12) and is currently lecturing at the University of Applied Science FHNW in Basel. Between 1997 and 2007 he collaborated with several architecture firms in the Netherlands and Switzerland. Since 2009 he is partner at the office Raumbureau in Zurich.

Jasmine Kastani

Jasmine Kastani was born in Athens in 1983. She studied architecture at the University of Patras in Greece, where she received her diploma in 2006. After working two years in Greece as an architect, she moved to Switzerland, where she completed her Master of Advanced Studies in Urban Design under the lead of Prof. Marc Angélil at ETH Zurich. From 2010 to 2012 she was research assistant of Prof. Christian Schmid at ETH Studio Basel. Since 2012 she has been working as an urban planner in Zurich. Her interests are mainly focused on urban phenomena and urban transformations in developing territories.

Marcel Meili

Marcel Meili was born in Zurich in 1953. He studied architecture at the Swiss Federal Institute of Technology (ETH Zurich) (1973–80) and was a research associate at the Institute for History and Theory of Architecture, ETH Zurich. He worked in the office of Prof. Dolf Schnebli (1983–85) and was a teaching assistant for Prof. Mario Campi (1985–87). In 1987 he formed an office in Zurich together with Markus Peter.

The recent built work of Meili, Peter Architekten includes the RiffRaff cinema in Zurich, the Zurich Central Station extension, the Swiss Re Center for Global Dialogue in Rüschlikon, and the Hyatt Hotel in Zurich. Major current projects include the Hofstatt-Passage in Munich; the Zölly apartment tower in Zurich; the Sprengel-Museum Hannover; and a four-star hotel in Zurich. The offices in Zurich and Munich currently employ twenty-five staff members.

Marcel Meili has taught as a visiting professor at Harvard Graduate School of Design, and since 1999 has been teaching as a professor in the Department of Architecture at ETH Zurich, where–together with Jacques Herzog, Pierre de Meuron, Roger Diener, and Christian Schmid–he founded and runs ETH Studio Basel: Contemporary City Institute.

Pierre de Meuron

Pierre de Meuron was born in Basel in 1950 and studied architecture at the Swiss Federal Institute of Technology Zurich (ETH Zurich) from 1970 to 1975 with Aldo Rossi and Dolf Schnebli. He received his degree in architecture in 1975, establishing his own practice with Jacques Herzog in 1978. In 1977 he was an assistant to Prof. Dolf Schnebli. Since 1994, he has been a visiting professor at Harvard University, and he has taught as a professor at ETH Zurich since 1999, where he cofounded ETH Studio Basel: Contemporary City Institute.

Currently, Herzog & de Meuron employs an international team of around four hundred people working on more than fifty projects across Europe, North and South America, and Asia. Herzog & de Meuron have designed a wide range of projects from the small scale of a private home to the large scale of urban design. The practice has been awarded numerous prizes, including the Pritzker Architecture Prize in 2001 and the RIBA Royal Gold Medal in 2007.

Shadi Rahbaran

Shadi Rahbaran is a practicing architect in Basel and has been involved in teaching and urban research at ETH Studio Basel with Jacques Herzog and Pierre de Meuron from 2007 to 2013. After finishing her architecture studies at the University of Toronto, she worked at various offices including Bruce Mau Design in Toronto and OMA/Rem Koolhaas in Rotterdam, Berlin, and Porto. She cofounded Rahbaran Hürzeler Architects in 2011 in Basel, has realized projects in Switzerland and Germany, and is involved in ongoing research and projects of a wide range in Europe and abroad. She has taught at Cornell University and the Harvard GSD Study Abroad Studio and has been a guest critic at various schools. Shadi Rahbaran was born in Teheran, Iran, and has lived in Germany, the USA, and Canada prior to moving to Basel.

Christian Schmid

Christian Schmid is a geographer and sociologist. He is a professor at the Department of Architecture, ETH Zurich and a member of ETH Studio Basel. His scientific work is on planetary urbanization, on comparative urban analysis, and on theories of urbanization and of space. He is a founding member of the International Network for Urban Research and Action (INURA). He is the author of *Stadt, Raum und Gesellschaft: Henri Lefebvre und die Theorie der Produktion des Raumes* (Steiner, 2005), a critical reconstruction of Henri Lefebvre's theory of the production of space; coauthor of *Switzerland: An Urban Portrait* (together with Roger Diener, Jacques Herzog, Marcel Meili, and Pierre de Meuron; Birkhäuser, 2006); and coeditor of *Urban Revolution Now: Henri Lefebvre in Social Research and Architecture* (together with Łukasz Stanek and Ákos Moravánszky; Ashgate, 2015). He currently works on the development of a new theory of urbanization (together with Neil Brenner) and on an international comparison of urbanization processes in large urban regions (in the framework of the ETH Future Cities Laboratory, Singapore).

Milica Topalović

Since 2011, Milica Topalović has been attached to the ETH Future Cities Laboratory in Singapore, as an assistant professor of Architecture and Territorial Planning. In 2006, she joined ETH as head of research at the Studio Basel and the professorial chairs held by Roger Diener and Marcel Meili. Milica comes from Belgrade, where she graduated with distinction from the Faculty of Architecture, subsequently receiving a master's degree from the Dutch Berlage Institute for her thesis on the urban transformation of Belgrade in the postsocialist period.

Since 2000 her work includes different scales and media from urban research and design to architecture and spatial installation. For collaborations with Bas Princen, Milica was awarded the Prix de Rome for Architecture in 2006 and architect-in-residence at the MAK Center for Art and Architecture in Los Angeles in 2005. A Princen-Topalović retrospective was shown at AUT, Innsbruck, in 2008.

Milica has lectured and exhibited at deSingel, in Antwerp, Munich's Haus der Kunst and the Swedish Architecture Museum, among others. She contributes essays on urbanism, architecture, and art to magazines and publications including *Oase* and *San Rocco*.

ETH Studio Basel

ETH Studio Basel is an institute of urban research that was founded in 1999 by the architects Roger Diener, Jacques Herzog, Marcel Meili, and Pierre de Meuron. It is part of the Department of Architecture at the Swiss Federal Institute of Technology (ETH) Zurich. The institute engages in urban research, teaching, and design work in Switzerland and worldwide. Since 2005 ETH Studio Basel has been running a research program focusing on international cities and urbanizing territories. Research subjects have included the Canary Islands, the development of the trinational region of Basel, the impact of migration flows on the city of Nairobi, the territorial dimension of urban development in the case of the Nile Valley, Florida, and Muscat among others, or the spatial and urban implications of food production and consumption. The institute's publications include *Switzerland: An Urban Portrait* (2004), *Open-Closed: An Urban Research Study on the Canary Islands* (2007), *MetroBasel Comic* (2009), *Belgrade: Formal-Informal* (2012) and *Nairobi: Migration Shaping the City* (2013).

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